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ABSTRACT
PLANNING FOR COMPLEX MODERNITY:
THE TURKISH CASE
Cevdet Yılmaz
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Supervisor: Associate Professor E. Fuat Keyman
January, 2003
This thesis investigates the relationship between planning and modernity, follows the
evolution of conventional planning within epistemological shifts and globalization
processes, and searches for a communicative planning alternative for Turkey on the
background of Turkish planning experience within the broader context of Turkish
modernization and democratization.
Conventional planning for national development took shape in the context of simple
modernity characterized by positivist social science, nation state and capitalism. It is
state and expert centered, and based upon instrumental rationality. Parallel to new
epistemological debates and globalization processes, conventional planning has gone
into a crisis. Today, there is a “communicative turn” in planning theory that entails
competition among multiple rationalities within a broader and multi-layered public
sphere. As a developing country that has used planning extensively in its
modernization process, Turkey faces a similar crisis in planning. Conventional
planning in Turkey reached to its limits towards the end of 1970s. However, neo-
liberal discourse, replacing planning since 1980, could not deliver to the mounting
problems of efficiency and democracy either. In that context, Turkey needs to go
beyond a simple market versus state dichotomy and should generate a genuine
communicative planning in its development process.
Based upon global trends in planning theory and the Turkish planning experience
over the 20th century, communicative planning is emerging as a real possibility in
Turkey. With its long experience in multi-party democracy and recent
democratization impetus accelerated by its candidacy for full membership into the
EU, Turkey can be one of the pioneering countries in the developing world, if it
achieves communicative planning. Bringing the state, market and civil society
representatives together, communicative planning can enrich information basis of
planning, restore legitimacy of plans in political and social domains, and thus,
increase the possibility of successful implementation of plans.
Keywords: Complex Modernity, Globalization, Communicative Planning, Turkish
Planning
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ÖZET
KOMPLEKS MODERNİTE İÇİN PLANLAMA:
TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ
Cevdet Yılmaz
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. E. Fuat Keyman
Ocak, 2003
Bu tez planlama ve modernite ilişkisini incelemekte, epistemolojik kaymalar ve
küreselleşme süreçleri içinde geleneksel planlamanın evrimini izlemekte, Türk
modernleşmesi ve demokratikleşmesinin geniş bağlamında ele alınan Türk planlama
tecrübesi temelinde Türkiye için iletişime dayalı bir planlama alternatifi aramaktadır.
Ulusal kalkınma için geleneksel planlama, positivist sosyal bilim, ulus devlet ve
kapitalizm üçgeninde tanımlanan basit modernite bağlamında şekillenmiştir. Bu
planlama yaklaşımı devlet ve uzman merkezlidir ve araçsal akla dayanır. Yeni
epistemolojik tartışmalara ve küreselleşme süreçlerine parallel olarak  geleneksel
planlama krize girmiştir. Günümüzde planlama teorisinde “iletişimsel dönüş”
yaşanmakta olup, bu dönüş daha geniş ve çok katmanlı bir kamusal alanda çeşitli
rasyonaliteler arasında rekabeti gerektirmektedir. Planlamayı modernleşme sürecinde
geniş ölçüde kullanan, gelişme yolundaki bir ülke olarak Türkiye de planlamada
benzer bir kriz yaşamaktadır. Geleneksel planlama Türkiye’de 1970’lerin sonlarında
bitme noktasına gelmiştir. Ancak, 1980’den beri planlamanın yerini almış olan neo-
liberal söylem de Türkiye’nin giderek artan etkinlik ve demokratikleşme
problemlerine yanıt verememiştir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye basit bir devlet piyasa
karşıtlığının ötesine geçerek, kalkınma sürecinde gerçek anlamda iletişime dayalı bir
planlama yaklaşımını geliştirmelidir..
Planlama teorisindeki genel eğilimler ve 20. yüzyıl Türk planlama tecrübesi temel
alındığında, Türkiye’de iletişime dayalı planlama gerçek bir olasılık olarak ortaya
çıkmaktadır.  Uzun bir geçmişe dayanan çok partili demokrasi tecrübesi ve AB’ye
tam üyelik adaylığı tarafından son dönemlerde ivme kazandırılan demokratikleşme
hareketi ile Türkiye, bu alanda gelişme yolundaki dünyaya öncü olabilecek
ülkelerden birisidir. İletişime dayalı planlama çerçevesinde kamu, piyasa ve sivil
toplum temsilcilerinin biraraya getirilmesinin, planlamanın bilgi temelini
güçlendirmesi, siyasi ve sosyal alanlarda planlamanın meşruiyetini artırması ve bu
şekilde, planların başarı ile uygulanması olasılığını yükseltmesi beklenmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kompleks Modernite, Küreselleşme, İletişime Dayalı Planlama,
Türk Planlaması
vACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost my gratitude goes to my supervisor Emin Fuat Keyman who
supported me in this long journey with his theoretical perspective, personal tolerance
and intellectual insights. This thesis would not have been completed without his
belief in my intellectual capacity and his precious contributions.
I would like to thank all my previous instructors and friends too, who nourished me
with their best fruits cultivated over long years. Without their contributions and
encouragement I could not have dared to attempt such a heavy, but at the same time,
self-realizing intellectual undertaking. At the same time, I would like to thank Ahmet
İçduygu, Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, Mehmet Kalpaklı and Galip Yalman, whose
valuable comments and suggestions helped me improve the structure of this thesis.
My gratitude also goes to my colleagues and managers in the State Planning
Organization of Turkey. I have always been proud to be part of this organization, and
enjoyed the warm environment inside its building, which may look cold to some
people looking from outside.  My debates and discussions under the roof of the SPO
are hidden behind various ideas developed in this thesis.
Finally, I would like to thank my wife and children who made a lot of sacrifices and
supported me in this long process without any rewards in return.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT …………………………………………………………………...……iii
ÖZET …………………………………………………………………...………...…iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……………………………………………...…...…...…v
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………….……………………………..…..……vi
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………….1
     1.1 Overall Arguments and Perspective of the Thesis …...………...………..……1
     1.2 Methodology…...………………………………………………..…...………..5
     1.3 Overview of Main Chapters of the Thesis………………………...………..…7
CHAPTER II: CONVENTIONAL PLANNING AND MODERNITY…………….18
     2.1 Conventional Conception of Planning……………………………...………..18
     2.2 Conventional Planning in National Development……………………...……20
     2.3 Conventional Planning and Modernity………………………….…………...22
2.3.1 Conventional Planning and Modern Mode of Thinking …...…………24
2.3.2 Conventional Planning and the Modern Economy (Capitalism)……...33
2.3.3 Conventional Planning and the Modern State ...………………….…..46
     2.4 Rationality in Simple Modernity and Conventional Planning …...………… 54
     2.5 Two Major Paradigms of Conventional Planning Based upon
       Instrumental Rationality …………...……………………………...……….. 60
     2.6 Uneven Development of Modernity and Planning…………………………. 65
2.6.1 Two Main Modalities in Modernity and Planning…………………… 65
vii
2.6.2 Deliberate Modernity or Planning for Modernization……………...…68
2.6.3 Overall Evaluation of National Planning in Development………...….73
     2.7 General Evaluation of Conventional Planning Paradigm…………………....76
CHAPTER III: THE CRISIS OF CONVENTIONAL PLANNING AND THE
     RISE OF DEMOCRATIC/COMMUNICATIVE PLANNING………...……… 80
     3.1 Crisis of Conventional Planning and Search for an Alternative
Paradigm………………………………………………………………….... 80
     3.2 A New Intellectual “Climate” and Planning……………………...………… 81
3.2.1 The Hermeneutical Shift in Epistemological Debates and Planning
under a New Epistemological Framework ………………..……...…. 81
3.2.2 The Concept of Rationality Reassessed……………………………… 90
     3.3 Globalization and Planning…………………………………………………. 92
3.3.1 Globalization as a New Framework for Development Planning…….. 92
3.3.2 Neo-liberal Understanding of Globalization and Its Repercussions
on National Development Planning………………..………………… 95
3.3.3 Cosmopolitan or Alternative Conceptions of Globalization…….…… 98
3.3.4 Representation Crisis of the State and Democracy under Global
         Conditions………………………………………...………………… 102
     3.4 A New Planning Paradigm in the Post-Positivist Global World………….. 106
3.4.1 Self and Civil Society in the Context of Post-Positivist
         Global World……………………………………………………….. 106
3.4.2 Communicative or Argumentative Turn in Planning and Public
         Policy……………………………………..………………………… 113
3.4.3 Habermas and Communicative Planning …...……………………… 116
3.4.4 Globalization, Civil Society, and Public Sphere …………………… 121
     3.5  Assessment of Communicative Planning based upon Habermas’
Critical Theory ……………………...……………………………………. 124
3.5.1 A Critical View on the Goal of Consensus in Communication…...…124
viii
 3.5.2 Beyond Habermas: Planning, Politics and Power
                     in a Global World……………………………………………… ……130
3.5.3 Planning, Democracy, Market and Freedom …………………...…...136
     3.6 A New Planner for a New Planning Paradigm……………………………. 144
CHAPTER IV: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH PLANNING:
PLANNING IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKISH MODERNIZATION
     PROCESS ………………………………...…………………………………... 147
     4.1 General Framework ……………...……………………………………….. 147
     4.2 The Ottoman Legacy and Economic Nationalism……………………...…. 149
4.2.1 The Ottoman Legacy and the Rise of Modern Turkish Nationalism ..149
4.2.2 The Formation of Economic Nationalism in the Context of
         Turkish Nationalism …………..…………...……………………….. 157
4.2.3 Policy of Economic Nationalism in the Early Republican Era………162
     4.3 Etatism and Industry Plans During 1930s…………………………………. 170
4.3.1 The Rise of Etatism ………………………………………………… 170
4.3.2 Different Interpretations of Etatism……………………...…………. 176
4.3.3 General Assessment of Etatism …………………………………..... 178
     4.4 General Assessment of Modernity and Early Planning Efforts in Turkey…179
     4.5 The Second World War and Aftermath……………………...……………. 181
4.5.1 Etatism in Transition under new International and
         Domestic Conditions…………………………………………………181
4.5.2 Planning Attempts During the 1940s…………………………...……183
     4.6 1950s as a Prelude to a New National Planning Era in Post War Context…185
CHAPTER V: PLANNED YEARS: 1960-1980 PERIOD……………………….. 190
5.1 A New Planning Framework and Organization in a New International
      and Domestic Context…………...………………………………………… 190
     5.2 Establishment of the State Planning Organization and
           High Planning Council…………………………………………………….. 194
ix
5.2.1 Establishment of the State Planning Organization (SPO) …...…..…. 194
5.2.2 The Basic Planning Model and Process…………………………….. 202
5.2.3 Ad Hoc Committees (AHCs) as a Participatory Mechanism
         in Planning………………………………………………………….. 204
     5.3 Planning and Politics in the Turkish Context..………………...………….. 206
5.3.1 Planners vis-a-vis Politicians and the Autonomy of the Planners….. 206
5.3.2 State Autonomy Debate in Turkish Planning Context……………….211
5.4 Overview of the Planning During 1960s: First and Second Five-Year
Development Plans (FYDPs)………………………………….………….. 214
5.5 Planning in Crisis: Politics and Planning in the 1970s …………………… 217
5.5.1 General Context of Planning in the 1970s………………………….. 217
5.5.2 Overview of the Third and Fourth Five-Year Development Plans…. 221
     5.6 A General Overview of Planning During the 1960-1980 Period………….. 224
CHAPTER VI: GLOBALISATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
PLANNING IN TURKEY SINCE 1980............................................................ 227
6.1 Globalization as a General Context to Interpret Evolution of Planning in
Turkey during the 1980s……………………………………...……………….. 227
6.1.1 Globalization and Asymmetric Positions of the States …………….. 227
6.1.2 Neo-liberal Globalization and Planning in Developing Countries…. 231
     6.2 Repercussions of Globalization on Turkish Planning Since 1980 ............... 233
6.2.1 From Import Substitution to Outward-Oriented Development
         Strategy……………………………………………………………... 233
6.2.2 Five-Year Development Plans of the 1980s  ………………….…… 234
6.2.3 Turkish Public Investments in a Global Context…………………… 238
6.2.4 Transformation in the Functions and Organizational Structure
                     of the SPO…………………………………………...……………… 245
     6.3 Five Year Development Plans During the 1990s …………………………. 253
6.3.1 Seventh Five-Year Development Plan……………………………… 253
x6.3.2 Eight Five-Year Development Plan ………………………………... 256
6.3.3 An Overview of FYDPs during 1990s in Turkey ……………...…... 260
6.3.4 February 2001 Crisis and the PEIR Report…………………………. 262
6.3.5 November 2, 2002 Elections and A New Political Context
         for Planning…………………………………………………………. 267
6.3.6 General Evaluation of the Planning after 1980……………………... 269
     6.4 Mechanisms for Communicative/Democratic Planning in Turkey……….. 275
6.4.1 Communicative Planning as a Realistic Alternative in Turkey…….. 275
6.4.2 A New Issue-oriented Organizational Perspective……………...….. 278
6.4.3 From Government to Governance ………………………………..... 281
6.4.4 Mechanisms for Communicative/Democratic Planning………...….. 283
6.4.4.1 Macro Level………………………………………...…….. 287
6.4.4.2 Sector and Issue Level……………………………...…….. 291
6.4.4.3 Project or Program Level……………………………...….. 293
6.4.4.4 Regional or Local Level…………………………………... 297
6.4.4.5 Institution or Agency Level………...…………………….. 305
6.4.4.6 What About Unorganized Society…………………...…… 312
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION…………………………………………………. 315
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………330
1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overall Arguments and Perspective of the Thesis
This thesis is mainly about developing a policy-relevant perspective concerning the
general understanding and practice of planning in Turkey. However, taking into
account the fact that each particular case is part and parcel of a broader process, the
Turkish case is studied on the background of broader planning and modernity
relationship in the world at large. I will be doing this in this thesis mainly by
reference to the debates concerning the concepts of rationality and democracy,
epistemological shifts and globalization, and the history of planning in Turkey.
The thesis has a historical perspective and stresses the evolution of concepts in
different time/space. However, changes in post-1980 are going to have a broader part
in the thesis, both in terms of developments in the world and in Turkey. In that
context, globalization and neo-liberal policies, debates on modernity and complex
modernity, the problematic of nation-state and national sovereignty, the role of state
in development, civil society and local administrations are some key topics for
discussion.
In recent decades planning has lost much of its appeal and many developing
countries, including Turkey, turned to market-oriented policies instead of planning.
A high and unrealistic hope attributed to planning has been replaced by an equally
unrealistic and simplistic market advocacy in that process. My basic argument,
2however, is that we do not confront an “either or” choice between planning and
market or state and society, but rather need to ask the question of what kind of
planning is required for a rational/democratic organization of state-society relations
in Turkey. In order to operationalize this perspective, I will be substantiating a
planning approach open to different rationalities (technical and societal) and a
deliberation among those rationalities on a permanent basis. This is basically a
communicative or democratic planning paradigm defended against conventional
planning based upon instrumental rationality and expert dominance.
Hermeneutical turn in epistemological debates and particularly Habermasian ideas
guide this debate on a new planning paradigm based upon dialogue. This new
epistemological perspective is used as a ground to defend a complementary rather
than conflicting relationship between democracy and development. Habermas’
communicative action theory is also considered as a major source of “communicative
turn” in planning theory. However, I have also attempted to criticize and qualify
Habermasian search for consensus in dialogue within the context of communicative
planning. Apart from practical difficulties of reaching consensus in real planning
situations, the goal of consensus is also criticized as a principle inconsistent with
democratic norms.
Planning is conventionally associated with “instrumental rationality” or a means-
ends type of relationship. In that conception, planning is performed to reach some
predetermined objectives with the most efficient utilization of resources. This type of
planning has a state-centered and top-down approach, which is dominated by experts
and technical knowledge. In this thesis I contend that democratic planning does not
3require elimination of such planning practices, but does entail ending their
monopoly. In this context, experts and technical knowledge shall continue to play an
important role in a communicative planning process in which they should be
considered as catalysts rather than a dominating party.  Considering the
indispensable role of planner in any planning paradigm, I also refer to some main
characteristics of the future planner. The future planner or planner in communicative
planning paradigm is not above the other stakeholders, but a participant in dialogue
with his facilitation and negotiation skills.  In that sense, this thesis can be considered
as part of an attempt to plan future planning and planner in Turkey.
Apart from epistemological debates related to the planning theory, considering the
close relationship between conventional planning and the state, globalization and its
repercussions on the state autonomy are explored in this thesis. I have presented not
only neo-liberal but also cosmopolitan understandings regarding globalization. In
this attempt, I have depended upon ‘globalization from below’ and glocalization
arguments in countering the dominant ‘globalization from above’ and ‘there is no
alternative’ discourse. In that context, my main argument is that the old forms of
planning or conventional planning may be irrelevant today but not a democratic
planning under global conditions, as conceptualized along communicative lines.
On the background of above mentioned debates and arguments, I have prepared my
thesis by focusing on the case of Turkey. Since 1980 Turkey has undergone an
important transformation with regard to its economic structure and its links to the
external world. Turkish society has also changed in that process, becoming a more
diversified and organized society, open to the world through various channels
4(tourism, immigrant workers, trade, capital transfers, media, Internet, etc.). However,
this transformation is not completed yet. There are important institutional reforms to
be done for further economic development and democratization of the Turkish
society.
One critical reform, in that context, is a comprehensive re-conceptualization and
restructuring of planning. In my view, Turkey needs to go beyond a simple
dichotomy of the state and the market in order to formulate a sound platform to
initiate such a reform. Today, Turkey has an experience both in plan-guided and
market-oriented policies, their respective advantages and disadvantages. What is
needed is to combine this historical experience with the growing demands for
democratization in a new global environment. A shifting division of labor between
the state, market and civil society within a dialogue secured by overall democratic
norms as well as institutionalization of communicative planning practices shall
provide a suitable environment for this new democratization momentum.
I expect that my thesis shall coincide with and contribute to the ongoing institutional
reform process in Turkey. Today there are various theoretical debates and practical
initiatives regarding reforms in different fields in Turkey. However, many of these
debates and reform proposals are either too abstract to guide practical policies or too
narrow to initiate a comprehensive change. I think that my mixed bureaucratic and
academic background helped me overcome this difficulty to a considerable extent.
Considering the limited number of studies on the institutional reform process in
Turkey—academic and otherwise—my thesis shall hopefully also motivate further
research in that field.
51.2 Methodology
This thesis consists of two main parts. The first part, covering chapters two and three,
is about the general trends in planning theory in relation with epistemological and
historical changes over the last century. Modernity debates and modernity/planning
relationship shape the debates in these two chapters. The second part, covering
chapters from three to six, focuses on Turkish case within these broader
epistemological and historical trends.
The methodology of my thesis fallows this main structure and perspective of the
thesis described above. The thesis depends on a focused and systematic literature
review, first in the broader transformations in planning theory, then in the Turkish
experience in the field of planning. In the first part of the thesis I have reviewed
literature on the evolution of modern planning and also the debate on the crisis of the
conventional planning approach. In the second part of the thesis I have concentrated
on literature on planning in Turkey in the context of broader socio-economic and
political developments. In the part related to the history of planning in Turkey, the
focus is on the broader features of past experience with possible implications for
development of communicative planning, rather than a comprehensive planning
history in detail.
The thesis, in that sense, is a case study in the context of contemporary theoretical
debates on planning. Although it is not a comparative study, I make some references
to the experiences of other developing and developed countries in the field of
planning throughout the thesis. Due to the nature of the subject matter, I have
benefited from an inter-disciplinary literature ranging from philosophy of science,
6development economics, and organization theory, down to project guidelines for
implementation. Readings in general Turkish history and the history of planning in
Turkey are a significant component in the literature review as well. In all my
readings and literature reviews, however, the focus is on planning and repercussions
of diverse epistemological and historical developments on planning theory and
practice.
In addition to a focused and systematic literature review, I have also depended on my
job experience as a planning expert in the State Planning Organization of Turkey. I
have come across and conducted in-depth dialogue on the future prospects for
planning with a large number of professional planners, academicians and politicians,
at national and local levels during my career. Apart from that, I have participated in
various workshops and studies for developing a new planning practice. In these
encounters and studies I have developed my overall perspective regarding the past
performance as well as prospects for the future institutionalization of planning in
Turkey. In that sense, all the benefits of this “participant observation” have been
reflected in this thesis.
In my viewpoint, these two sources of ideas—the literature review and the personal
experience in the subject matter—have created a fruitful tension in the overall
organization and substance of this thesis. I don’t think that we can make a sharp
separation between “public and private use of reason” as Immanuel Kant once did in
his famous article on the Enlightenment. I don’t consider myself as a detached and
value-neutral observer of objective reality, either. However, I hope I have achieved
7to strike a reasonable balance between my personal career attachments and my
intellectual endeavor.
1.3 Overview of Main Chapters of the Thesis
The thesis is composed of seven chapters. In chapter two I focus on national
planning, its history and its connection to modernity (positivist social science, nation
state, and national capitalism). Enlightenment ideals and the resulting positivist
rationality conception comprise a significant part of this chapter. In addition, nation-
state and capitalist economy as major institutional manifestations of modernity are
related to conventional planning in this chapter.
It is hard to give a common definition of planning. However, there are some major
connotations of the concept. First and foremost, planning is an action-oriented
concept, connecting human knowledge to action to create a more desirable future. In
that sense, planning implies that human beings are not just an object for natural and
social processes but also a subject. Planning has been practiced across various human
activities, systematically or not. In this thesis I have focused on national development
planning and its evolution. Planning has also been usually presented as a technical
process, which does not have much to do with politics. However, I have attempted to
show that there are very important crosscutting agendas for politics and planning.
Traditional or conventional understanding of planning, or planning under the
conditions of “simple modernity” to use Ulrich Beck’s terminology, is based upon
the concept of instrumental rationality. Planning, in that context, is usually defined as
8a rational allocation of resources to reach some given objectives. Thus, rationality
debates are a central topic for discussion in this chapter.
The concept of rationality has always occupied a significant place in planning
discourse. Thus, I have also treated with the concept of rationality as a central aspect
of the theory and practice of conventional planning. In that context, the evolution of
development planning based upon conventional rationality conceptions and its critics
will be a major topic for discussion. Different conceptions of rationality, and in
connection to this, different approaches to national development planning are treated
in this chapter.
In chapter three my focus is mainly on the “hermeneutical turn” in epistemological
debates and the historical changes reflected in concepts such as globalization, civil
society, new social movements, etc. The legitimacy and representation crisis of the
modern nation-state in the face of these historical developments are covered in that
chapter, too. Democracy and new approaches to democratic practices, citizenship,
the concept of governance, and alternative conceptions about the concept of
rationality guide the ideas in that chapter. In that context, it is argued that in a post-
positivist and global world conventional planning becomes obsolete, leading to
alternative conceptions as candidates for a new planning paradigm.
In this context, based upon “communicative or argumentative turn” in planning
theory, my central argument is that power and expertise may suffice for a top-down
planning, but not for a democratic one. Participatory mechanisms need to be
developed at the crossroads of power, public and expertise for that purpose. This mix
9also refers to a confrontation of different rationalities in a deliberation process to
reach temporary consensus on policies. It is expected that each party is going to
enrich the perspective of other parties in this process and help formulation of policies
with a stronger legitimacy basis. This process may also be considered as a tool for
managing complexity and ensuring successful implementation of public decisions in
a highly interconnected and complex world.
With the chapter four I start to present the Turkish historical experience in the field
of planning. Planning over the 1930s and the period of 1940-60 is presented and
analyzed in that part. The rise and fall of etatism within the broader Turkish
modernization process and the Ottoman heritage comprise the main story in this
chapter. That part of the thesis focuses on the modernity/planning debate in the case
of Turkey, on the background of broader processes discussed in the previous
chapters.
Like many other social, cultural and economic policies, the development of Turkish
planning can be located into the framework of the nation building and state building,
which has dominated Turkish history in the 20th century. In that context, one of the
major pillars of the nation building was creation of a self-sufficient and diversified
national economy under the control of Turkish nationals.
Etatism was developed during 1930s under the global conditions of the Great
Depression and the new Turkish Republic embarked on industrialization through the
state economic enterprises. That was a preference for the direct state intervention into
the economy. In this context, I will be arguing that etatist policies were a product of
10
both the global conditions at the time and of the “economic nationalism” that the
Republican elite inherited from the late Ottoman era dominated by the Union and
Progress Party.
Second World War has interrupted the early etatist planning, and Turkey gradually
distanced itself from a strict understanding of etatist planning. Pragmatism and
republican ideals of the political leadership, combined with the victory of the
democratic countries after the Second World War and the increased perception of a
military threat from the Soviet Union, led Turkey towards democracy and multi-
party rule in the 1950s, characterized by ad hocracy in state interventions.
My emphasis in this early planning experience will be on the elitist and state-led
character of planning in its original conception in Turkey. Planning was basically a
tool for rapid and deliberate modernization as perceived by the Republican elite.
However, that was not a radical socialist planning but a pragmatic one, used for
tackling with the development problems in a highly conflictual and authoritarian
global environment.
Chapter five describes and analyzes 1960-80 period, which is usually referred to as
“the planned years” in Turkey. The period started with a military intervention into
the civilian rule. Successful application of etatism during the 1930s and perception of
etatism as a Constitutional principle of the regime were effective in the criticisms
raised against the civilian government toppled by the military. As a result, one of the
institutions brought about by the 1961 Constitution, which restored the multi-party
regime after the 1960 military intervention, was establishment of a State Planning
11
Organization (SPO)–along with a Constitutional Court and a Senate. All three
institutions were considered as necessary checks upon an unlimited power of civilian
political power witnessed during 1950s. The First Five Year Development Plan
(1963-67) put into action in 1963 and Turkey entered into a systematic import-
substitution development strategy in this period.
Institutionalization of the SPO and the nature of plans prepared over this period are
analyzed in this chapter. My argument regarding this period can be divided into two
main parts. On the one hand, this period shows the continuity in the deliberate
Turkish modernization process under elite guidance. It is a state-led and expert based
understanding that does not trust the social capacity for devising appropriate policies
for development. On the other hand, these planned years witness more diversification
in the Turkish society and the rise of civilian objections to bureaucratic planning.
However, this civilian objection could not be formulated in a constructive way but
just based upon a simple rejection of planning in practice. Thus, planning has lost its
effectiveness in this civilian/bureaucratic clash, leading to a growing gap between
what is planned and what is realized. With increasing domestic political strife and
worsening economic conditions abroad, this planning episode reached its limits
towards the end of the 1970s.
In chapter five I focus on the post-1980 evolution of planning understanding and
practice in Turkey. The economic crisis towards the end of 1970s was interpreted as
a sign of failure of inward-oriented development strategy and comprehensive
planning, and Turkey entered into a new model of development from 1980 onwards.
The shift from planning to neo-liberal policies was a very important deviation from
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the strong legacy of the etatist and import substitution policies of the last half a
century, putting aside relatively “liberal” policies of the 1920s and the early 1950s.
This process started with January 24 stabilization program in 1980 announced by the
right-wing civilian coalition government at the time, but continued under the
surveillance of the military following a coup in October 12, 1980. Through the
repression of all opposition, among which labor movement and radical left-wing
organizations were primary targets, the military-backed government prepared the
ground for a successful implementation of the new strategy.
Taking into account the traditional emphasis on investment throughout the planning
history in Turkey, I have studied the evolution of the public investment strategy in
that period as an indicator of changing overall development strategy. The relative
decrease in the amount, as well as the change in the structure of public sector
investments are interpreted as part and parcel of neo-liberal policies and outward-
oriented development strategy adopted from 1980 onwards. The state has withdrawn
largely from manufacturing sectors and concentrated on infrastructure investments in
that process.
The process of liberalization and market-driven economic policy has continued and
deepened during the 1990s, with a growing emphasis on the need to channel private
sector finance even into some traditionally public sector dominated infrastructure
investments and social sectors.
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Despite the change in the overall development strategy, the SPO continued to act as
one of the most important counterparts of international agencies during this process.
Although its name and basic organizational structure remained largely intact, overall
organizational environment of the SPO has undergone some important modifications
in the process of transformation of the economy along neo-liberal policies. One of
the most important changes was restructuring of the High Planning Board (HPB)
which is the top decision making body of the SPO. Originally HPB was composed of
equal number of politicians and bureaucrats but the representation of bureaucrats has
been gradually decreased. On top of these changes other bureaucratic institutions like
the Central Bank, and the Treasury have been promoted vis-à-vis the SPO.
Another important change is the reduction in the effectiveness of temporary or
permanent Ad Hoc Committees (AHCs). The AHCs have been an important tool for
participatory planning modeled after the French and Indian examples. These forums
played a valuable role to provide a platform for dialogue between industry and the
state and legitimized the overall planning process. However, they have been
ineffective during 1980s and lost their attraction despite their formal continuity.
There have been also changes in the style and discourse in planning process.  First,
there has been a growing stress on the concept of strategic planning rather than
comprehensive planning. Second, in conformity with the growing emphasis on
strategic planning, the plans and annual programs have increasingly stressed
qualitative targets rather than quantitative targets. Finally, there is now more
autonomy for public investment agencies and municipalities in terms of resource
allocation for particular public projects.
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However, this autonomy is usually exercised in a highly ‘politicized’ manner in
which political elites at local and central level make arbitrary interventions for
narrow group interests. My interpretation regarding this development is that, without
inclusion of diverse groups within the process and development of accountability
channels at local and central level, more autonomy ends up with technical and
democratic inefficiency. The current state of the public investment stock is a clear
indicator for such inefficiency, which is overextended to a large number of projects
almost all of them subject to long delays and high cost overruns.
All these changes were brought about by a top-down approach, which increased
efficiency in some respects but reduced the self-esteem of bureaucracy and
politicized the decision-making process to a large extent.  It might be necessary to
make some informal interventions into the operation of the bureaucratic mechanism
in order to bring about a major shift in the operation of the public organizations along
different policy premises. However, without a re-institutionalization, these temporary
interventions usually lead to a vacuum, which is likely to be filled by powerful
interest groups rather than democratic initiatives of the citizens. In addition, in a
highly oligopolistic market, weakening of planning organization does not create a
well functioning market but rather to various rent-seeking activities.
Structural adjustment policies to transform economy from protectionism and state-
led industrialization can be divided into two main stages. The first stage, which has
largely been completed during 1980s, was a relatively easy process as it involved
destruction of barriers (legal or institutional) rather than creation of new institutions.
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However, Turkey is now in the second stage of structural adjustment, which requires
new institutionalization for a healthy functioning of the market. Turkey has not yet
completed this hard process of re-institutionalization.
Among critical institutional reform areas is the planning system of Turkey. Put
shortly, the SPO has been transformed along neo-liberal premises during 1980s and
its future organization is still uncertain. As Turkey moves along a deeper reform
policy that aims at privatizing even some traditionally public sector dominated
infrastructure investments and devising new institutions there is an increasing need to
rethink about the role of the SPO.
Turkish planning, like many other aspects of Turkish society, cannot be isolated from
globalization, localization and glocalization debates. In a global environment
planning needs to be revised both in terms of its domains and its tools. Thus, I will
underline the requirement for planning to be located within the interaction and
interrelationship of global and local processes. That function of planning, as a
transmission belt between local and global levels, is not to be defined in abstract
terms but to be put into a test in real practices. These real practices, in turn, develop
in each country as a result of active involvement of all parties. In other words, there
are no ready-made recipes for development, contrary to the standard policy packages
of the international organizations.
Planning reform in Turkey requires a double change in the public administration. On
the one hand, Turkey needs to transform its administrative structure towards a less
centralized one, and on the other hand, civil society needs to be incorporated into the
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decision-making processes both at central and local levels. Adding the role of
international and supranational organs in their respective issue areas, there is a
prospect for instituting a new administration around the concept of governance.
In this context, I will be suggesting some participatory planning mechanisms along
with a reorganization of the SPO. My main argument regarding the SPO is to
transform the current sector specific perspective along policy planning in cross-
sectoral issue areas like disaster, technology development, and so on. Regarding the
participatory planning mechanisms I will be suggesting new or revitalized
institutions and methodologies at macro, sector/issue, regional, agency, and project
levels.
Mechanisms in the history of Turkish planning (e.g., the AHCs) and the EU practices
guide the main ideas in that respect.  In all these mechanisms the planners and public
policy makers are supposed to meet with the private sector and the civil society
representatives. These mechanisms are expected to create more input in the plan
preparation process and increase the legitimacy and ownership of planning in the
stage of implementation. What is emphasized, in this context, is not plan document
or product, but the planning process as a democratic exercise with a learning effect.
Apart from these formal participatory planning mechanisms, I will also be exploring
the possibility of involving the larger society into planning process through
community planning initiatives. This part of the proposal is related to the ethical and
political responsibility of future planner as a social agent working within society.
17
And finally in the conclusion chapter, based on previous chapters, my arguments
focus on the prospects for a democratic or participatory planning in Turkey,
particularly with reference to the concept of “communicative rationality” developed
by Habermas and others.
What I am proposing is not an end or demise of the state but a reformulation of the
role of the state and the state-society relationships along democratic lines, which is
also required for the efficient functioning of the economy. Instead of a top-down
approach to decision-making, there is a requirement for a balance between societal
demands and technical knowledge. In that context, the state needs to act as a catalyst
between different social groups and between local and international stakeholders.
In that sense, the prospects for the nation state in a new environment characterized by
globalization, localization, new social movements and demands for more substantial
forms of democracy are also applicable for the re-conception and the re-
institutionalization of the planning. In that context, I have attempted to develop a
new planning mentality and respective organizational adjustment for Turkey taking
this new environment into account.
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CHAPTER II
CONVENTIONAL PLANNING AND MODERNITY
2.1 Conventional Conception of Planning
In this chapter the main focus shall be on the conventional understanding of
planning, its origins and its connection to modernity—modern philosophy, nation-
state, and capitalism. The concept of instrumental rationality and its problems shall
be explored as a central aspect of the understanding and practice of conventional
planning. In that context, the evolution of national development planning based upon
conventional planning and instrumental rationality will be the major topic for
discussion. General link between modernity and planning analyzed in this chapter
will also provide the basis for analyzing the historical development of planning in
Turkey in chapters four and five.
It is hard to give a common definition of planning. However, there are some major
connotations of the concept. First and foremost, planning is generally considered as
an action-oriented concept that is based on conscious human interaction with the
environment. Planning is done on the basis of an explicit or implicit assumption that
human beings are not just an object for natural and social processes but also a
subject. In other words, it is assumed that human beings are not only affected but
also affect their environment or conditions. This view underlying planning depends
on the idea that human beings make their own history though they don’t make it in a
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vacuum but in the context of the prevailing conditions and constraints1. Planning in
that sense is a humane characteristic that is related to humane capability for future
conception and goal-directed action.
Planning has been practiced across various human activities knowingly or
unknowingly, systematically or not. From personal career plans to child rearing,
from warfare to commercial enterprises, there are numerous fields for the generic
idea of planning (Branch, 1990: ix). However, in this thesis the concept of planning
is used basically in the context of national development planning and its evolution.
Planning, briefly put, has conventionally been associated with increasing human
control over natural and social environment by employing rational methods. It
requires a conscious intervention into the “natural” course of events. As Myrdal
(quoted in Sagasti, 1988: 432) states  “planning is essentially rationalist in approach
and interventionist in conclusions.” Planning as a future-oriented optimistic approach
is generally related to the peculiarly humane capability to think and act upon the
environment in order to change it according to some deliberate objectives
(Chadwick, 1971: 1-24; Alexander, 1986). It focuses on “the problem of how
knowledge might be linked to action”  (Friedmann, 1987: 11).  At that junction the
emphasis is put on the capacity of human  agency  and  its  power  to  change  his/her
                                           
1 This Marxist formulation, one needs to stress, is open to different interpretations (Laing and Cooper ,
1971: 48). It should be noted that those who stress determinism in history and argue that they have
identified the future path of historical change do not seem to be well positioned to argue for human
freedom, and thus, planning as a means to escape from future problems by deliberate human action. In
that framework, one might argue that determinist Marxist ideas, like any other strong determinist
approach, are essentially against planning. As put strongly by Myrdal (1960: 7) “Marx was enough of
a determinist to prevent him from ever having become a planner.” However, identifying the prevailing
conditions and limitations before the human freedom may also be perceived as a precondition for
effective freedom. Freedom in that later perspective is a context bound and knowledge related human
characteristic. It is not just individual but also social or relational.
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conditions with knowledge. Unlike other living organisms humans not only adopt
themselves to external conditions but also adopt external conditions to themselves. In
that framework, the distinction between the physical and social environment does not
have much significance, or social and physical environment are considered in similar
terms (Bailey, 1975: 5-6).
What is discussed above is more or less the conventional planning approach. In this
thesis what is important is to understand this conventional planning approach in
detail and relate it to larger processes of modernity. Later, this conventional approach
to planning as rational-intervention shall be discussed in a critical way in the context
of national development planning.
2.2 Conventional Planning in National Development
National development planning based upon the conventional understanding of
planning is a historical experience, which is largely related to the development of the
modern state and economy. Developments in natural and social sciences provided a
basis for application of planning at the national level. Evolution of the modern state
with its drive for modern warfare and its requirement for the coordination of various
activities and efficient resource utilization as well as equality concerns is part and
parcel of this development. Development of modern bureaucracies with their
capacity to reach every corner of the country by making use of modern
communication and transportation infrastructure and applying certain policies is
another significant component. Development of the welfare state and Keynesian
economic policies, post-colonial development efforts and socialist economic
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organization, all are effective in the development of different planning approaches
and practices.
Planning has usually been presented as a technical process, which does not have
much to do with politics. However, there are very important crosscutting agendas for
politics and planning, some of which are going to be explored in this thesis. State and
expert based understanding of planning, in that context, will be discussed on the
background of criticisms from various alternative perspectives that redefine politics
and its relation to other human activities, including planning.
Traditional understanding of national planning is based upon the concept of technical
or instrumental rationality. Planning, in that context, is usually defined as rational
allocation of resources to reach some given national objectives. It is thought that if
you do not interfere into the development of events and let things go as they are, the
result shall be sub-optimal resource utilization. Knowledge about means-ends
relationship or cause-effect relationship provides the justification for interference. If
it is possible to know causes and their effects, then interference at the level of causes
shall create desired results or shorten their time of realization.
However, as the historical experience reveals, there is not just one type of planning
approach or planning practice in national development. Planning in market
economies differed among themselves and from planning in centrally planned
economies. There are “limited” or market-based planning as well as “total” or
socialist planning. Planning practice in one country differed in time as well (Sartori,
1987: chap 12; Myrdal, 1960). What is important in these observations is to perceive
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the historical situated-ness of national planning and not to confuse larger planning
possibilities with limitations of a specific type of planning and its underlying
assumptions.
Conventional understanding of national planning can be related to the
epistemological and material conditions of a historical period called modernity. It is
important to understand this connection because if the world is now undergoing a
change towards a postmodern or global historical condition and new ways of
approaching to ethico-political problems on the basis of a new epistemological
framework, planning needs also adjust itself into this new environment. However, it
should also be stressed that these processes are not experienced in a uniform manner
in different contexts. In that sense, it is important to make a distinction between
“developed” and “developing” countries2 and analyze their conditions separately,
with implications regarding their planning practices.
2.3 Conventional Planning and Modernity
Planning as a future-oriented collective action based upon human knowledge is not
just a modern practice. There is some sort of a planning activity in almost all settled
civilizations. Who would deny that building the Great Wall or large irrigation
schemes in the ancient Chinese civilization did not require much consideration and
coordination of various activities and resources.  Plato’s  classic book the Republic,
written in Ancient Greece, basically  envisaging  a  planned  political  community,  is
                                           
2 Developed/developing distinction is a very loaded distinction, which goes back to distinctions such
as modern/traditional, progressed/backward, etc. However, throughout this thesis this distinction is
employed for the sake of convenience to denote economic inequality or unevenness between different
parts of the world.
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another case in point. In the ancient Egyptian civilization there was planning of
agricultural activities on the basis of predictions with regard to the regularities in the
movements of the river Nile. It is also known that Romans had some planning for the
city of Rome, a large city even in contemporary standards. Planning in large-scale
empires like the Ottoman Empire, for instance, may also give us some insights into
the early historical conceptions and practices of planning. Actually, planning in pre-
modern contexts has not been explored enough yet and we need further research in
that direction3.
Though planning is not an exclusively modern practice its systematic and widespread
application is peculiarly modern. It is within the development of modernity that
planning has risen as a significant topic for theoretical and practical debate.
Therefore, there is a need to discuss the connections between planning and modernity
in order to identify origins and evolution of the planning we face at present.
In order to understand better the connections between planning and modernity one
needs to discuss both the philosophical and material manifestations of modernity.
Modernity, in that context, is considered as an epistemological and ethico-political
institutionalization  as  well  as  a  new  historical  condition.  Modernity’s  ethico-
political aspect is best reflected in the philosophy of Enlightenment based upon the
developments of natural science and historical thinking. On the other hand,
modernity as a new historical condition is reflected in the development of modern
state and modern economy. As Anthony Giddens (1990: 174-175) formulates
“modernity = the nation-state + systematic capitalist production.” The history of the
                                           
3 For an exception, see Robinson’s (1992) study on city planning and administration in the ancient
Rome.
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modern Europe is also the history of development of the nation-state and its
dissemination all over the Continent and later to the whole world. This development
is part of a broader modernization process associated with the capitalist economy, the
enlightenment philosophy and democratic political structures. In that sense, the
development of the nation-state has been a homogenizing factor both inside and
across different political units. However, this modernization process has not been, by
any means, a smooth, peaceful, uniform, and linear one. Civil wars, revolutions,
authoritarian and totalitarian political structures, and war among nation states have
been part and parcel of this process.
Following historical changes in the mode of thinking and in material/institutional
conditions over the past several centuries, limiting the debate on dominant trends and
gross descriptions, conventional planning and its underlying rationality conception
shall be situated within those main parameters of modernity and modernization
processes.  This debate shall also shed light on the more specific discussion of
Turkish planning within the broader process of Turkish modernization in the later
chapters.
2.3.1 Conventional Planning and Modern Mode of Thinking
Planning has been more systematically applied in the 20th century. However, the
roots and partial applications of planning theories can be traced back to the formation
of the modern philosophy and the problems aftermath of the Industrial Revolution
(Friedmann, 1987). Crises in many areas of social life from education to sanitary
conditions of the big cities, health issues and unemployment led to new theoretical
constructs to deal with all those problems by a new social design. Such designs are
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expressed as “illusive promise of an Ideal City” either with search for an “Ideal
Community” or “Ideal Form” (Carvalho, 1986: 8-12).  Those projects were almost
theocratic visions putting the common good before the private interest and searching
for a just social arrangement. Thomas More’s Utopia, Tommaso Campanella’s
Civitas Solis, Fransis Bacon’s New Atlantis, Abbe Morelly ‘s Code de la Nature are
but a couple of examples for developing an ideal society. As Giddens (1990: 177)
underlies “modernity is inherently future-oriented [whereby] anticipations of the
future become part of the present” in the spirit of a utopian realism. Becker (1932:
31) also observes the same tendency in the Enlightenment philosophy and states that
“the philosophes demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it
with more up-to-date materials.”
All such philosophical and utopian writings gained a new impetus under modern
conditions, which gave them a sense of plausibility and feasibility. There were many
philosophers before the Enlightenment who had some similar designs for a perfect
society and order. However, mere ideas without a convenient historical condition do
not suffice to make them affective in practice. Therefore, it is not enough to relate
planning to a particular philosophical mood culminating in the Enlightenment, and
later developments in positivist social science. One should also look the material
aspect or historical socio-economic and political conditions which made such ideas
significant and relevant for practical concerns. That shall be done in the following
pages, but in that part of the argument regarding the connection between modernity
and planning what is going to be focused upon is modern mode of thinking based
upon modern epistemology and ontology.
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Just like any other key term in social science discourse it is hard to give a precise
definition of modernity. As Bauman (1991: 3) states, in the context of the debate on
identifying how old modernity is, “there is no agreement on dating. There is no
consensus on what is to be dated.”  There are different conceptions of modernity
reflecting different approaches to theoretical and practical concerns4. There are those
who point out normative and distortive aspect in the meaning of the term clouded by
the myth of progress (Berger, 1984: 335), while others point out distinctive paths
within the broader concept of modernity.
Owen (1994), for instance, identifies two great and distinct conceptions of modernity
in the form of post-Kantian critique. There is a route from  Hegel  to  Marx  and
present  day philosophers like Habermas. On the other hand, there is a lineage from
Nietzsche to Weber and Foucault. In the former intellectual tradition modernity is
basically considered as “reason’s reconciliation with itself and “maturity as the telos
of modernity,” while in the latter, reason becomes conscious of itself as a problem
creating an ambivalent situation whereby “modernity both creates and undercuts the
possibility of maturity” (Owen, 1994: 4). In that sense, there are “modernities” from
the very beginning rather than a uniform and simple description of the term5.
                                           
4 The terms “modern,” “modernization” and “modernity” signify different meanings depending on the
context they are employed. Modernization, as the term implies, is a process-oriented term referring to
transition from traditional to modern forms in social life. Modern, on the other hand, is derived from
Latin modo, “of today” or what is current, making a distinction between contemporary and traditional
ways. While the term modernity has a “relatively fixed reference” to the new and unique civilization
developed in Europe and North America over the last centuries, giving birth to a wide variety of
intellectual, political, social, cultural, and economic changes (Cahoone, 1996).
5 Beck’s (1997: 33) observation that “no such thing as a ‘modern’ society exist anywhere,” that “we
are always dealing with ‘semi-modern’ or partially modern societies” which also involves “counter-
modernity” may also be taken as a relevant observation with respect to the difficulty in defining
modernity. One might also argue that even the terms such as “pre-modern” and “post-modern” just
like the term “tradition” and “anti-modern” are terms produced within the discourse of modernity and
are part of modernity’s ambivalence.
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It is clear from such arguments that it is not possible to give an objective definition
of modernity acceptable to all parties to the debate. However, Kantian understanding
or, better formulated, the Kantian problematic, seems to be at the center of the debate
on the concept of modernity. Therefore, one might prefer Kant’s (1980: 85) motto for
the Enlightenment –separe aude or dare to act according to your own
understanding—as the core attunement of modernity and evaluate it from an
epistemological as well as ethical perspective. In that context modernity is a new
way of approaching human knowledge and its relation to human life. This modern
mode of thought is best reflected in its claim to universality and certainty as inherent
in Cartesian rationality and its scorn for local knowledge as parochial and backward-
oriented (Apffel-Marglin, 1996)6.
The paradigm that feeds this new vision is largely borrowed from the natural
sciences –particularly from Newton’s physics. As Hankins (1985: 9) observes the
mood among the eighteenth century intellectuals, “the greatest hero of all was
Newton.” This paradigm created a new conception of nature, which was more or less
“machine like,” functioning in mechanical terms according to some mathematical
formulations. This new understanding has almost deified the nature (Becker, 1932:
63). What was proposed was an empirical approach to nature, aiming at discovery of
underlying unity of nature beneath the apparent heterogeneity. It was a bold attempt
to create a scientific philosophy reducing everything to measurable reality after the
model of the Newtonian physics. There is no basic distinction made between
physical and human reality in that understanding. There is only one truth and we
                                           
6 As Heidegger (1956: 89) puts it “the absolute certainty of knowledge which is attainable at all times
is pathos and thus the arche, the beginning of modern philosophy.” It should be noted that Heidegger
uses the term arche in its Greek sense which does not simply mean a starting point which is left
behind, but rather a starting point which pervades the whole later process.
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could reach it by employing the method of science. Modern way of thinking was also
characterized by its futurity which meant basically a concept of quantifiable time to
be mastered, manifested in clocks in daily life, career plans in biographies and plans
for governments and corporations (Berger, 1984: 339-341). Those ideas increased
great hopes for posterity, which would make the best use of accumulated knowledge
regarding nature and society, creating conditions for reconstruction of everything in a
progressive manner. The faith in the possibility of social betterment with the help of
social science modeled after natural sciences has been “bedrock of modernity” from
the very beginning (Wallerstein, 1996).
Developments in natural science raised great hopes for reformation of all social
institution towards a better state –if not towards a perfect state—by employing
human reason.  All traditional ways of thinking, all traditional institutions and ethico-
political standards were opened to questioning in that new spirit. Once the society is
enlightened, that is, once people start to apply epistemological developments in
natural science to the social and political life, a perfect and rational order would
almost automatically emerge. That society would not only be more affluent and
powerful, but also a society of free and equal citizens.  Bauman (1991: 36) refers to
this mood as “the phiosophes’ injunction concerning the need and urgency of the
Kingdom of Reason” and connects it with the drive for ‘social engineering’ in the
hands of educated sections of society.
What was considered as natural for many people under earlier social conditions were
re-interpreted within modern philosophy as basically historical and constructed.
Contract theories developed by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau,
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each in his own way, described society as a constructed entity. What has been
accepted as sacred by early generations were put into more profane terms and
degraded. What many have accepted as a fate was described as domination of a small
group of people over the rest without any rational reason. Man had the capacity and
means to transform what has been constructed previously in a better direction.
Education was the primary means for this transformation in which, so to speak,
people would save themselves from false consciousness, reaching a maturity to take
their fates into their own hands as rational subjects.
Those ideas in political philosophy later developed into social science. Sociology has
been the core discipline developed in that context. This was a peculiarly modern
discipline to understand modern industrial society in an objective way and explain it
in historical and causal terms. Comte, Marx, Durkheim and Weber founded this
grand tradition in the 19th century as heirs to the Enlightenment mode of thinking.
Their ideas shaped the modern consciousness to a great extent. Those in power as
well as those who opposed the status quo in reformist or revolutionary ways used
this framework or mode of thinking to elaborate their action programs and legitimize
their solutions to economic as well as socio-political problems.
Social science, as developed later into a broad academic field, advocated universality
and objectivity versus mythological and metaphysical ideas of bygone ages. Newtons
of social science tried to formulate laws of social development, just like Newton’s
law of gravity developed for physical world (Hankins, 1985). Unlike the previous
social thinking, social science has based itself largely on empirical reality and the
observation of facts in deriving its theories and law like generalizations.
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Planning   is  closely  related  to  these  developments  in  social  science7.   Causal
explanations in social science, particularly in the field of economic life, gained a
widespread attention after the development of the positivist social science.  Positivist
epistemology has been dethroned in the philosophy of science, but “the ghost of
positivism continues to haunt social science in general and, it seems, policy and
planning in particular” (Dryzek, 1993: 217).  In that sense, conventional planning
might be considered as the technology of positivist social sciences. Planning as an
interdisciplinary technique has basically aimed at transforming theoretical
knowledge from social science into practice by the help of mathematical and
engineering knowledge.
The main agency to put scientifically based plans into practice was the modern state.
Just like Plato’s philosopher-king, it was up to the few knowledgeable people who
were going to design the conditions for the multitude of population for human
prosperity. The scientific knowledge regarding the social life, combined with the
political power to transform the society, was the route towards a perfect social order.
The example of statesmen-cum-philosophers like Turgot and Condorcet, their
nineteenth  century  followers like   Saint-Simon   and   August   Comte,   have   been
                                           
7 The connection between Marxist ideas and planning is more straightforward. Marx’s ideas have been
put into practice in socialist countries mainly through a central planning method. Whether real
socialist experience was in line with Marx’s original thought is a contested topic, and not relevant for
our purpose. The connection between planning practices and ideas of other founders of sociology is
less direct. However, one may argue that the connection is there. Durkheim, for example, argued that
the modern society is based upon organic solidarity and formulated a corporatist politics for bringing
stability to modern life characterized by a high level of division of labor. This corporatism (uniting the
state elite with business and labor) provides a strong ground for corporatist planning. On the other
hand, Weberian idea of bureaucratic rationality and search for efficiency on the basis of means-ends
calculations touch to the essence of conventional planning based upon instrumental rationality. Unlike
Marxist understanding, however, these two latter sociologists did not consider a revolutionary change
and did not rule out the market as a corollary to planning. Thus, their ideas support not the central
planning but rather planning in the context of a market economy, or “limited planning” as coined by
Sartori (1987).
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influential personal representatives of this new understanding of politics as a
technical affair. As Friedmann (1987) observes; Saint-Simon’s social physiology
suggested an image of the body social whose physicians would be scientists and
engineers and it was their ability to predict future outcomes of present actions that
would enable society to control its destiny.
It is not very difficult to relate dominant mode of planning to this modern temper for
controlling nature and society towards some given goals on the basis of instrumental
rationality. As described by Pellicani (1998: 3) modernity is based upon instrumental
rationality in all “its essential elements of industrialization, rationalization and
bureaucratization.” Conventional planning is mainly related to this means-ends type
of relationship promising to create a future which would be superior to the alternative
that would emerge if there is no interference into the natural course of events.
Predictions on the basis of causal explanations, then is an indispensable part of
planning process. If it is possible to predict the future in a detached manner, future
becomes a field for manipulation as well.
The basis of planning is modern knowledge, which gives us causal relationships and
increases our capacity to interfere into those relationships to reach our objectives. By
using our knowledge it becomes possible to follow regularities and predict the future.
If the predicted future does not satisfy our expectations, what is to be done is to
substitute it with another one. That means the future becomes a political issue in
modernity. In a world characterized by cause-effect relationships, interference at the
level of causes would give us the results we would like to have. In that framework,
planning is a revolutionary idea for constructing a rational and efficient society by
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scientific use of resources for the benefit of community. That is, once we get the
causes of social ills and underlying forces which shape the present form of society, it
becomes possible to interfere into those causes in order to transform society to a
desired future form.
As Weber puts it the world gets ‘disenchanted,’ a machine-like entity to be grasped
by rational concepts and representations, aiming at instrumental control and mastery
of nature, devoid of any substantive meaning (Harrison, 1994: 2-4). In other words,
modern mode of thought since Descartes makes a clear cut separation between mind
and body, subject and object, which puts the human subjectivity in a confrontational
relationship vis-à-vis a cool objective reality posing uncertainties for human life.
What is proposed in that context is to develop an instrumental relationship with the
external environment via objective knowledge based upon certainty (Apffel-Marglin,
1996: 3-4). That is the ontological status on which a planning based upon a rational
agent acting unilaterally upon an objective reality devoid of meaning could be
developed.
Although Cartesian rationalism has been subjected to harsh criticisms by empiricist
thinkers who stressed observation of facts and inductive methods to reach scientific
knowledge instead of using a priori statements formulated independent from the
empirical reality, subject/object dualism is still preserved as the underlying ontology.
Positivism as a dominant epistemology making a sharp separation between factual
(what is) and normative (what ought to be) type of statements and assuming a value
free science based upon a sharp distinction between knowing subject and known
reality remained loyal to confrontational positioning of human subjectivity with
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respect to its environment, including social environment. Knowledge, in that
positivist conception, is basically instrumental, aiming at order and control. As
Bacon formulated it long ago, and Foucault analyzed across various institutions such
type of “knowledge is power.” It creates the conditions for dominating nature as well
as “others” in the social world. As Philip (1985: 70) puts it, according to Foucault,
“human sciences are rooted in non-rational, contingent and frequently unsavory
origins.” As long as conventional understanding and practice of planning shares this
epistemology, it is equally subject to such criticisms. These critical evaluations of
conventional planning within the broader critique of positivist epistemology shall be
explored in the next chapter in more detail.
2.3.2 Conventional Planning and the Modern Economy (Capitalism)
At that junction one should stress that modernity may be defined, not only as a
philosophical paradigm, but also as a historical condition. Industrialization,
bureaucratization, technological innovations, urbanization, mass politics and new
channels of transportation and communication, among others, characterize this new
historical condition. Approached in that way, modernity means, first and foremost,
modern state and modern economy. As Gilpin (1987: 4) observes, “these two
opposed forms of social organization, the modern state and the market, have evolved
together through recent centuries,” interacting with each other to shape the
conditions for modern political economy. Thought they are interrelated, political and
economic background for the development of modern planning practices shall be
analyzed separately for the sake of clarity8. However, one need to relate those
                                           
8 Indeed, this clear-cut distinction between the state and economy is peculiarly modern (or capitalist),
forcing the state to recognize “an autonomous republic of commerce and production within its own
territory”  (Heilbroner, 1985: 85-87).
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analyses to each other, and relate them above discussed mode of modern thinking
too, for a more comprehensive understanding.
When we talk about modern economy there is mainly two perspectives. On the one
hand there is a group of thinkers who stress that modern economy is basically
characterized by industrialization. In that line of argument it is not capitalism but
industrial society, with its capitalist and later socialist variants, that needs to be taken
as the object of investigation (Bauman, 1991). While others stress the market or
capitalism as the modern economic organization. However, in either way, at its
origins the modern economy has been a capitalist economy, which is still the
dominant mode of economic organization all over the world, renewing its self-
assurance after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In that context, it would be more
appropriate to analyze the connection between capitalism and planning.
Upon the background of a long historical evolution it was Adam Smith who provided
the ideology of capitalist economy in the seventeenth century (Heilbroner, 1953). In
that account, division of labor and exchange are “natural” elements in human
societies. The degree of division of labor, in that account, depends on the size of the
market. Capitalism in the form of developed free markets open to competition
automatically creates the best results for social welfare. Sum total of egoist
calculations based on means-ends type of reasoning for individual profit
maximization brings, at the end of a process that is controlled by nobody and
operates impersonally, social welfare in the form of increasing efficiency and
declining prices. As long as there is no hindrance before the functioning of
competitive markets there is no need for planning in this modern economic order.
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Conflicting and competing individual preferences would directly produce what is
rational for community at large.
Markets, in that account, are just like natural processes and have their own ‘laws,’
like prices being determined by the pulling and pushing effects of demand and
supply forces. Producers and consumers are like atoms or particles in the mechanical
universe of Newtonian physics, giving rise to regular outcomes that they never
intended to bring about. As Laski (1971: 119) states, “with Adam Smith the practical
maxims of business enterprise achieved the status of a theology.” Planning in that
universe, one should guess, would be some sort of a ‘sin’ interfering and distorting
the natural functioning of the economy. Thus, planning could only be conceived, in
that line of thinking, when markets are not perfect, or when there is some sort of
bottlenecks for the development of markets. The content of planning is also clear in
such cases. It should act as if there is a market functioning perfectly. That is, the plan
is noting more than a simulation of the perfect market and ought to produce the same
outcomes if applied successfully (Sartori, 1987: 399-449).
As it is evident in the basic traits of the new exchange economy and portrait of the
new calculating man, the modern economy is a commercial economy based upon
instrumental reason. Either in individual relations at the market or relations among
collectivities, the criteria for action is utility maximization and efficiency. Even labor
power is commercialized and considered as a commodity whose price is determined
at the market just like any other commodity. This type of rationality first developed
in the Western Europe and then “traveled the West with trade, colonialism, and the
spread of industrialization and the market economy” (Apffel-Marglin, 1996: 11).
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Marx has spent his career to describe the modern capitalist economy and its
functioning, also shedding considerable light on the repercussions of this new
economic organization for the rest of the social organization, which he called as
superstructure determined by economic infrastructure. Capitalist economy for Marx
and Engels is an inherently chaotic one, which is prone to periodical instability or
destruction, and which shall gradually lead to a final destruction and transformation
(Engels, 1982: 63-64). Those periodical instabilities were called “business cycles”
emerging as a result of excess supply of goods and downward movement in prices
and profits9. Not only product but also increasingly financial markets have created
inherent instabilities in the capitalist economy due to decentralized nature of
capitalist economy (Minsky, 1982).
It is not very hard to see the connection between inherent instabilities of a capitalist
economy and the development of a state planning activity to counterbalance its
destructive affects. Karl Polanyi is one of the most persuasive advocates of this
perspective, who observed a clear tendency of social and political control over the
market throughout the history of capitalism. Karl Polanyi observes that markets
“generate large-scale disruptions,” which go hand in hand with a “sustained pressure
for self-protection” (Mittelman, 1996: 3). This is still a very significant perspective
to understand the relationship between capitalism and human reactions, including
planning. The state has been the primary actor in that process. That role for state is
                                           
9 In Marxist terminology this instabilities are related to “realization” problem. Labor for capitalist is a
cost but it is also purchasing power. To cut its cost capitalist class reduces labor cost through wages or
by improving its technology. But once labor gets less income markets cannot absorb increasing
production. That is, a problem of excess supply emerges which leads to falling prices, falling profits
and finally to falling levels of production. Then the cycle starts again.
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called for both from the business and larger social segments going through the
hardships of a risky or inherently uncertain environment. These objective conditions
led the state to develop means to cope with problems at crises times. With no state
intervention, “the capitalist market becomes a ‘Satanic Mill,’in Karl Polanyi’s
metaphor, that erodes the social foundations of its own existence” (Fung, 2000: 3).10
It was not only economic instabilities leading to declining growth rates that forced
the state to be involved into the economy. It was also the social aspects and
particularly income inequalities generated by the capitalist mode of economy that
motivated the political authorities to take action for improving income distribution.
National and increasingly democratic form of government in capitalist societies
forced political authorities to provide collective aid for the unemployed and other
needy people. Therefore, it is capitalism itself that forced the state to be an
interventionist one, to foster growth as well as to counterbalance social disruptions.
As Habermas (1970a: 101) puts it “the permanent regulation of the economic process
by means of state intervention arose as a defense mechanism against the
dysfunctional tendencies, which threaten the system that capitalism generates when
left to itself .”
In other words, It is not only crisis-ridden anarchic character of the markets which
ultimately resulted in the more and more active state involvement in the economy,
but also “unevenness” of capitalism, which has given rise to excessive inequalities of
income across different segments and regions of any capitalist country. Adam  Smith
                                           
10 For instance, Nobel laureate economist Vassily Leontieff claimed that planning shall be applied in
the United states not due to the efforts of radical activists but because of the need felt by the American
businessmen (Goldstein, 1978: 2).
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is one of the earliest observers of this fact, who stated that “wherever there is great
property, there is great inequality” (quoted in Heilbroner, 1985: 46). Adam Smith
himself listed “defense, justice, education and roads and communications” as
government functions and the “economists following his footsteps have expanded the
list” (Lewis, 1951: 12). Even Milton Friedman (1962: 34), an arc-liberal, declares
that “the consistent liberal is not an anarchist” and defends the role of government in
the fields of law and order, property rights, dispute settlement, promotion of
competition, monetary stability, technical monopolies, and protecting the
irresponsible people.  Given the popular demands and democratic ideals regarding
equality, capitalist inequality eventually leads to more state involvement and
intervention in the economy to counter-balance the unevenness inherent in the
capitalist accumulation process.
Those interventions, at the early stages, were more individual and idiosyncratic.
However, in the long run accumulated effects of interventions, institutional learning
and changing political climates led to more systematic interventions. The end result
was a planning state, which Myrdal (1960) identifies in all developed capitalist
economies, despite their laissez faire ideology. Planning, in that framework, is
basically a coordination of various state interventions into the economy, giving
priorities, making sequences in time, connecting different policy spheres with each
other, etc, in order to maintain the system.
In that context, one should not be surprised that it was just after a severe disruption in
capitalist economies during the 1930s that this trend towards more state intervention
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reached its apex11. New Deal in the USA and similar policies in some European
countries, largely formulated in a Keynesian perspective ushered a new era in which
the modern welfare state evolved. The heydays of the welfare state were 1950s and
1960s, both in terms of economic growth rates and distribution of prosperity among
society. Fiscal and monetary policies of the state were institutionalized and put into a
very systematic form during these decades. Those were also the post-war years in
which not only regulating macro-economic environment but also reparation of war
inflicted economic infrastructure gained a strong attention. Keynesian policies gained
almost a status of orthodoxy even in the USA, while some European countries such
as France, started to prepare five-year development plans to coordinate public
intervention into the economy (SPO, 1992).
That post war environment favorable for public intervention growing in size and
complexity gave an impetus for economic planning as a broader approach to
interrelate different policies towards some national objectives. Rivalry between the
“free world” led by the USA and communist bloc led by the USSR, as well as
success of planning in rapid development of heavy industries in socialist countries
also fueled the intellectual and political support for planning as a rational tool for
resource utilization.
                                           
11 One needs remember the rise of Fascism after the economic turbulence in the capitalist world.
Unlike orthodox Marxist expectation the crisis did not evolve into a communist revolution but turned
into one of the most repressive regimes over the history. Hence, economic instability is not just an
economic problem but also a very significant factor for political life. Unfortunately, unlike optimistic
expectations based upon the idea of a linear progress in a teleological history, all hardships do not lead
to a desired outcome. Therefore, the state needs to contain those instabilities for political as well as
economic reasons.
40
Planning has generally been applied in developed market economies in one form or
another. However, the degree and form of planning changed from country to country
and from time to time. There have always been those who objected to planning by
the state to correct market failure by pointing out the cost of intervention. Those
debates reached to a certain point at which “government or state failure” is stressed
as much as market failure (Kuhlman, 2000: 6). Under those conditions what is
defended is a cost benefit analysis of government intervention. If a government
intervention creates more cost than benefit by correcting a market failure, then it is
argued, it is better to live under market imperfections as a second best solution.  In
addition to efficiency consideration, there are also objections to automatic recourse
to state interventions because of negative democratic repercussions of such actions
(Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon, 1999)
In the development of national planning in various countries new international
environment after the Second World War need to be taken into account as well.
There were two important changes. First, this was a post-colonial era witnessing
emergence of a large number of independent states, which were former colonies of
Western imperialist powers. They were poor but politically independent and their
aspirations were very high for rapid development. They were also between two rival
global camps and had to decide to side with one of them. Planning was a very
favorable tool for those newly independent states to back up their political
independence by creating a self- sufficient economy. Underdeveloped markets,
insufficient skilled labor and capital and lack of private capital for large scale
investments made planning even more necessary for these poor countries (Todaro,
1992: 418-419). In addition to those economic reasons, newly independent states also
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used planning as a tool for motivating and uniting their populations around common
goals in their effort for nation building and state-building.
Development economics arose in the same period as an intellectual corollary to the
development efforts. The premise on which the development economics formulated
was that the developed and developing countries couldn’t be analyzed with the same
set of theoretical approaches.  In other words, this new discipline aimed at
developing an alternative to neo-classical analysis. The new discipline, which put a
strong emphasis on practical problems, provided a scientific foundation for the
development of planning in the developing countries. Furthermore, this discipline put
“import-substituting development strategy,” which had a longer history12, into a
more complex theoretical framework.
The second important change was a new international institutionalization. That was
largely a US defined international order with multilateral institutions like the IMF
and the World Bank. The main task of those institutions were to provide a stable
global environment for the expansion of trade and finance among countries,
preventing a second great depression due to excess protectionism and unilateral
policy. Especially the World Bank insisted developing countries to formulate a plan
and get foreign investment, foreign finance as well as foreign aid in that framework
(Waterson, 1966: 31-36). Under the impact of international financial circles some
                                           
12 During the 19th century George Hamilton in the United States and Frederick List in Germany
defended policies for the protection of new industries by the state against external competition, mainly
from British industry. Those ideas later developed into “infant industry” thesis, which requires a
temporary protection in order to prepare the national industry for international competition. It is
argued that without this protection the latecomers do not have much chance to compete with already
well established industries benefiting from the economies of scale and accumulated knowledge
(Yılmaz, 1999: 92). Import substitution policies developed on the basis of such arguments primarily
aimed at a delinking strategy for fostering national industrialization. Those policies were applied in
Latin America and in many other developing countries including Turkey.
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developing countries embarked upon preparing plans, which were largely
“ritualistic” plans just aiming at impressing international finance circles (Agarwala,
1985).
The crises during the 1970s changed much of this status quo. The crisis was already
started towards the end of 1960s in the form of fundamental changes in the post war
economic order based on the hegemony of the US dollar. It was aggravated by hikes
in the price of oil under the effect of the OPEC cartel. That was the end of
development by using cheap energy. It created inflation and unemployment problems
as well as major imbalances in the external balance for many countries, both in
developed and developing world.
At the same period fiscal crises of the welfare state became more pronounced. High
unemployment increased the bill for the welfare state while declining economic
conditions limited the capacity of the state to raise income through further taxation.
Increasing level of interdependence and the need to attract foreign finance also
restricted many states in increasing their tax revenue. Those conditions gave rise to
policies to reduce the disruptive effects of crisis in national economy. One
manifestation of interference into the economy in that context was neo-
protectionism. Developed countries formulating their policies within the context of
GATT could not use open protectionism in the form of raising tariffs, and thus,
devised indirect and covert mechanisms to regulate their external balance.
In short this was a period of adjustment.  Those efforts to adjust in the new economic
environment reached its apex during the 1980s. This was a period in which the
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former Keynesian orthodoxy eroded in major capitalist countries and replaced by
neo-liberal policies of the New Right. The primary target to attack was the welfare
state and state intervention into the “natural” functioning of the market. Suddenly,
Adam Smith’s idea of automatically functioning market, which also solves its
disruption by built-in incentives, reappeared in the intellectual as well as policy
circles. A new orthodoxy developed in this context, which is called as “Washington
consensus” by Lance Taylor (1997). Those policies were implemented by Reagan
administration in the United States and Thatcher government in Britain.  Planning for
this approach was passé and state intervention was at the root of the problems we
face. Hence the call for deregulation, privatization, liberalization, free trade and free
movement of finance.
That was also the end development economics as a strong intellectual policy oriented
discipline for the developing countries. What was replacing the development
economics was a call for using the same set of economic analyses for both developed
and developing countries (Lal, 1985). After a long experience in import substituting
policies and delinking strategy under dirigiste policies of intensive state intervention
into the economy, majority of those developing countries were under desperate
conditions of a debt crisis. They were either in miserable shape (like African
countries) or relatively much behind their goal of reaching the developed world in
terms of per capita income (many countries in Latin America and Asia including
Turkey).
Only a handful of the East Asian countries could escape from this fate by combining
a strong government responsible for regulating economy with a clear preference to
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set up internationally competitive export-oriented industries. This exception has been
subject to much controversy regarding the role of the state in development.
According to neo-liberal reading, the East Asia succeeded due to its preference for
markets, private initiative and openness to external competition, while others stressed
the role of “developmental state” and its overall governance structures as well as
planning of the development process via strategic interventions as the reason for
success (Streeten, 1995: 207; Taschereau and Campos, 1997: 1).
Today we are still living under the conditions of neo-liberal policy prescriptions.
However, it gets clearer that these policies could not solve many fundamental
problems in terms of growth, stability and equality. The world is still in a very crisis
prone environment and inequalities among as well as within nations are becoming
larger and larger.
According to official World Bank figures (2000: 25) the following table represents
the people living on less than $ 1 per day.
Regions
Millions % of total
population
East Asia and Pacific 446 26
Europe and Central Asia 15 3.5
Latin America and Caribbean 110 23.5
Middle East and North Africa 11 4.1
South Asia 515 43.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 219 39.1
Total 1316
Considering the fact that “less than $ 1 per day” signifies “subsistence income
threshold,” the world economy as a whole does not present a very bright picture.
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The rise of New Left politics to reconcile the social objectives with the dictates of a
global competitive market is a manifestation of search for novel forms of intellectual
and policy frameworks for the coming years. Planning as an important tool for
reducing instability, creating relatively equal income distribution, preserving
environment, and satisfying democratic demands of people with non-market
mechanisms alongside market can be seen as a potential yet to be explored and used
fully.
As some economists observe, due to various kinds of non-market interventions into
the economy it is getting increasingly clear that there is not just one type of
capitalism. Instead, it might be better to talk about “capitalisms,” of the Anglo-Saxon
type, European type, Scandinavian type, Japanese type, etc. (Streeten, 1985: 208;
Heilbroner, 1998: 6-7). In all these capitalist societies there is a stress on markets and
private ownership, but they have their distinct traits in terms of state-economy and
state-society relationships. Those differences might not be taken seriously at a high
level of abstraction in which all capitalist societies are considered as interchangeable
entities. However, for real people living and working under those different contexts,
even slight differences might matter a lot. It is clear that in current conditions of the
world, planning is going to be used in the context of markets. Under those conditions
the problem is how to reconcile planning and market for the betterment of society.
All these considerations point to a new environment for planning debate and
practices, which are in a state of transition. Gramsci’s observation for his times
seems to be relevant today as well, that “the old is dying, the new is being born, and
in the interregnum there are many morbid symptoms” (quoted in Gill, 1996: 208).
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The current status of planning and planning alternatives under what is called
globalization processes, and a new intellectual climate, shall be explored further in
the following chapter.
2.3.3 Conventional Planning and the Modern State
The modern state is another important component of modern conditions developing
more or less parallel to the capitalist economy. The peace of Westphalia in 1648 is
usually taken as the beginning of an international system of states in Europe. It
brought about the concept of national sovereignty, mutual recognition, and balance
of power as organizing principles of conduct among nation states (Held, 1995).
Sovereignty was the central concept defining mutual relations among states, and
‘recognition’ of sovereignty by other states was a sign of being a member of the state
system. The concept did not only define the external relations of the states but also
reflected in the domestic realm. The sovereign state would not recognize any higher
authority (like papacy or other powers) in its internal jurisdiction and would uphold
the principle of non-interference into the domestic affairs of other states.
Contrary to many traditional forms of polity, modern state have a large and
efficiency-oriented bureaucracy. Max Weber has given a great deal of his energy to
describe the modern political life organized around modern bureaucratic structures.
His conception of modernity as a process of rationalization expresses itself in the
transition from traditional and charismatic forms of legitimization into a legal-
rational form in which impersonal procedures dominate the discourse on political
legitimacy. Bureaucracy as an impersonal and legal entity engaged with a will for
efficiency in administration emerges as a powerful force in modern political
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processes. This bureaucratic structure, in Weberian world, operates in a means-ends
type of rationality with the ends given by the political authority and means chosen by
technical imperatives of bureaucratic efficiency.
Modern state with its rational and large bureaucratic apparatus provides planning
with distinct loci for application. The modern state is a nation state, and in
competition to other nation states as well as in need of preserving its power
structures dominated by some sort of a domestic elite, uses planning as a tool for
increasing its external as well as internal power. The state is also considered in a
position to order society and transform it into a one preferred by the modern
environment. As Bauman (1991: 20) states “rationally designed societies was the
declared causa finalis of the modern state.” Given the knowledge provided by the
modern science and capabilities of the bureaucracy, the modern state could approach
society as a “raw material” to be transformed into a better product. Here are the roots
of an elitist and state-centered aspect of conventional planning practices. As Bauman
(1991) observes this tendency gets into its extreme forms under totalitarian political
orders (both fascist and communist), which turn human beings into means for some
seemingly sublime objectives or goals.
There might be some pre-modern states that have embarked on similar designs, but
they did not have necessary means to achieve their objectives. It is only on the basis
of new technology (in communication, transportation, accounting, weaponry, etc.)
that the modern state reaches a capacity to order a society in a central way. The
modern state is a territorial state with clear borders demarcating its supreme
monopoly over those ‘inside’ the borders and its absolute independence from those
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‘outside.’ That is, it is internally and externally ‘sovereign’ recognizing neither a
sub-national nor a supra-national limit to its sovereignty. There are not any ethical
codes that the modern states should consider themselves bounded with, and thus, the
only criterion is instrumental rationality in success for the internal peace and external
security. As Macciavelli (1992: 47) put succinctly “in the actions of all men, and
most of all of Princes, where there is no tribunal to which we can appeal, we look to
results.” In that framework, the primary aim of the state is to order everything within
its borders to preserve its existence and defend its borders to any possible attack, and
there is no criterion other than success in this effort.
As the power of the state gets more and more defined by its economic resources, the
state organizes economy in order to be powerful and reach its objectives, because,
without an independent national economy, political sovereignty in itself means little.
Economic nationalism or mercantilism in its older formulation, assumes and
advocates the primacy of politics over economics, functioning basically as a doctrine
of state-building subordinating the market to the pursuit of state interests (Gilpin,
1987: 26).
The sovereignty of the state over its population within a given territory has been
“appropriated and transformed by the people into ‘popular’ sovereignty in the
process of democratization since the 18th century” (Axtmann, 1996: 10-11). The
source of legitimacy for the political authority was no longer divine but secular. One
may argue that this new source of legitimacy also brought new responsibilities for
the political authority. It was not sufficient to police the borders, provide internal and
external security, but there was also a new environment forcing the state to be more
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responsive to the popular demands. If people, as the source of legitimacy in a
nationalist or democratic state, require interference into the economy for
improvement of their lives, the state is the agency to provide them with this
interference. The way the modern democratic state relates to popular demands with
respect to the economy and other concerns creates yet another motivation for
planning as a tool for rational interventions and putting those interventions into a
more coherent package (Myrdal, 1960).
Indeed, there is close interaction between the Enlightenment conception of science,
modern state and capitalism in bringing about modernity as a new historical context
as well as a new epistemological and ethico-political approach. In that larger
framework there are some important tensions as well. The Enlightenment has a
universal language based upon the universality of scientific knowledge. It uses
humanity as a term in its call for a perfect and rational world. However, modernity
has taken place basically in various national contexts. Nationalism has almost put its
stamp upon almost every great achievement of modernity; modern philosophy,
modern state, capitalism, democracy, etc. There is, for instance, a German
philosophy, a German state, a German economy, and a German democracy. This
national adjective becomes a corollary to almost every product and thought created
under modern conditions, despite its appeal for universality. Even Adam Smith has
coined his book as “the Wealth of Nations,” not that of individuals, assuming as
given the national boundaries, national political organization and political culture as
the context for approaching capitalism.
This national adjective gives the modern state a mission beyond providing external
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and internal security. National and liberal state developed its own doctrines to
interfere into the economy first in the form of mercantilism. Which “simply transfers
the idea of social control from the church to the state in the economic realm” (Laski,
1971: 42). The state also starts to look for more scientific and effective methods for
administration that is embodied in the Cameralist movement. Apart from state’s
survival considerations based upon raison d’etat, national interest and common good
of the people living within well defined borders attached to the state via legal
citizenship ties guided the state actions. That is so much so that the welfare state that
emerged in its full sense in the 20th century is considered to be clearly nationalistic
(Myrdal, 1960: 13)
The modern state, in addition to its other functions, is also the main institution to
create, nurture or sustain a common identity. This function of the state is fulfilled
mainly by reference to a reconstructed past. Going beyond the differences between
its civic (citizenship-based legal definitions) and ethno (language- or blood-based)
types, nationalism creates a drive for uniformity and concern for the common good
of the population. If markets are not functioning for the national interest or the
common good, the state can easily turn towards planning as a tool for correcting the
situation. Planning as a neutral, rational and effective tool in the service of the
common good is a powerful legitimizing force for conventional practices of
planning. In that context, conventional planning is basically a national planning that
operates within the borders of the territorial nation state on the assumption that the
state can and should control the fate of the nation. Within the interplay of capitalist
economic structure and nation state what emerged at the end was a “technocratically-
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managed capitalism” or “organized capitalism,” the terms that imply the rise of
welfare state in the 20th century (Giddens, 1985b: 134-136).
Planning also enters into the agenda of the competing nation-states especially in war
situations. Use of planning in Germany during the First World War and later in the
United States of America is early examples in the previous century (Friedmann,
1987: 24-25). Modern warfare requires “professionalism and permanent forces, so
the state to grew both in overall size and (probably) in terms of its size in relation to
‘civil society’” (Held, 1995: 53).  Either in the process of preparing for war or
directly in the war, the state tries to harness the resources in the most effective and
efficient way possible in order to raise its military powers. That activity does not
only have a military aspect, but also requires a coordination of economic and social
activities all across the country. War requires mobilization of resources for the
objective of winning a victory, and it is easier to mobilize resources through a plan
based on calculations and statistics of national endowments, human, artificial or
natural. In order to mobilize people in these military campaigns requiring great
sacrifices, the state gets to depend on its “citizen-soldiers,” which in turn, makes the
state more responsive to popular demands. The objective of war under modern
conditions also gradually gets to be more economic (Held, 1995: 63; Hont, 1990: 42-
43). In other words, the war is increasingly used as a means to acquire economic
ends rather than the economic means are used to get political ends.
Regarding the connection between the nation-state and planning one may also refer
to the debate on the “autonomy” of the state. This debate mainly is about whether the
state has the capacity to pursue its own agenda or whether it is just a tool at the hands
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of dominant sections of civil society. The orthodox Marxist approach considers the
state as the apparatus of the dominant class –the bourgeoisie—, which gives the state
its basic character. The state is there to protect this ruling class against the majority
of working classes by coercive and other means. There is also structural dependency
of the state argument that basically means, “self-interest, not weakness, derives the
state to support and advance the accumulation of capital” (Heilbroner, 1985: 90).
On the other hand, liberal understanding pictures the state as a broker or mediator
between different interest groups within society. This is a state that is basically
neutral to the groups within its jurisdiction and aims at reaching compromises among
them (Bardhan, 1999: 97-98). However, similar to the Marxist conception the state,
the state is not a very powerful figure in the liberal pluralist account, despite the
other radical differences between these two schools of thought. However, some
theorists, Theda Skocpol among others, criticize this as economic or class
reductionism and argue that this is inconsistent with empirical realities. Territoriality
and sheer force of the state are emphasized as adequate for the autonomy of the state
(Gülalp, 1997: 8). This is somewhat the opposite pole that accepts state as a powerful
entity that has the monopoly over the use of legitimate “means of violence.” That is
mainly a Waberian approach, which stresses multiple variables in social processes in
which politics has its distinctive logic. Particularly in realist school literature in
international relations theory there is such a strong portrait of an autonomous state
which acts on the basis of “national interest” vis-à-vis other nation states, no matter it
is a capitalist or a socialist state.
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As Keyman (1997: Chapter 3) presents there has long been a debate on the “agency”
or the “autonomy” of the state in political theory. “Social reductionism” rejected the
state autonomy, while “political reductionism” reasserted it. In both accounts,
however, relational character of state/society distinction has largely been ignored. It
seems that it is not possible to decide on the autonomy of the state in abstract. One
needs to look at concrete historical cases and complex interactions between the state
and society relationships taking place in a broader international, and global
environment. Panitch’s (1996: 83) observation of this debate is very informative in
that regard:
By the late 1970s and early 1980s a considerable reaction emerged against the growing influence of
the new state theory. This involved a challenge to the notion of relative autonomy, stressing once
again the state’s independence from determination by the capitalist economy and class structure. The
great irony of all these variants of the state autonomy approach was that they emerged just as limits
of even the relative autonomy of the state were severely tested.
Particularly in the developing countries the state competencies are also blurred by the
dependencies to external powers. That is, the state in those countries might look like
very powerful vis-à-vis the native population but not at all vis-à-vis other states and
international institutions. This aspect has been examined and strongly stressed by the
“Dependency School” in the development economics13. This school does not
evaluate development and underdevelopment in isolation from each other, but rather
treats them as related concepts. Hence the idea of the “development of the
underdevelopment.” It is argued that it is precisely  development  in  one  part  of  the
                                           
13 For detailed information on the evolution of dependency school in the development literature and its
critics see Oman and Vignaraja (1991: 137-195).
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world, which creates conditions for underdevelopment in other parts, building
hierarchical and asymmetric relations in the process that structurally works for the
benefit of the strong parties.  This approach forms the basis for a radical delinking
strategy as a precondition for development.
2.4 Rationality in Simple Modernity and Conventional Planning
In all facets of modernity examined so far one common theme emerges, which is a
search for a universal rationality that provides us with the means to control our
environment. Modernity as a search for certainty, universality, and efficiency finds
its echo in the concept of instrumental rationality. That is evident in the modern
mode of thinking, both in the Cartesian dualism as well as in the Enlightenment’s
great hopes for the reconstruction of the society along rational knowledge. Not only
in philosophy but also in the economic and bureaucratic organization of the modern
society the concept of technical or instrumental rationality gains the upper hand.
It is mainly this context in which planning rises as a modern tool for transforming
theoretical knowledge into practice in a rational way. As put by Faludi (1985: 27)
“Anybody interested in rendering planning a rigorous activity must subscribe to
‘rationality’” and “indeed, if ever there was a central principle of planning
methodology, then this is it.” That conception of rational planning is what developed
societies have practiced to a great extent and developing countries have aspired to
practice. That is why, rationality, as a modern concept closely related to conventional
planning approach needs a closer examination.
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Rationality is the unifying theme in most of the planning literature14 as well as in
most of the arguments to legitimize its use in practical contexts, though “planners
have somewhat assumed that they can adopt the concept, but avoid the philosophical
reflexivity that surrounds its interpretation and use in other disciplines” (Brenhery
and Hooper, 1985: 1). Without going into a philosophical and historical debate on the
role of the concept of rationality in the planning discourse there is little chance for a
different understanding and practice of planning.
Indeed, both centrally planned economies and those defending the market
mechanism as the most efficient means for efficient resource utilization adopt the
same rationality norm. They both aim at optimum resource utilization but differ in
their means to reach that objective (Lal, 1985: 106; Dahrendorf, 1968: Chapter 8). In
other words, both advocate an instrumental or functional concept of rationality, while
differ in their choice for locating this rationality. Market and consumer are the locus
of rationality in market discourse whereas the state and expert are at the center in the
planning alternative. Thus, a critique of instrumental rationality needs to prepare
itself to attacks coming from both market libertarians and state or expert proponents
of various sorts. That means an alternative conception of planning based upon a
different conception of rationality implies a way out of a sharp dichotomy between
state and the market or consumer and expert guidance. However, before going into a
debate on a new conception of rationality, let us first try to understand conventional
rationality as it is applied in planning.
                                           
14 Economics is probably the closest discipline to planning in its stress on the concept of rationality.
As Arrow (1974: 16) expresses “an economist by training thinks of himself as the guardian of
rationality, the ascriber of rationality to others, and the prescriber of rationality to the social world.”
Indeed, there is a stress on the concept in most of the social science disciplines.
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In popular usage rationality is opposite to irrationality, which refers to deviant
behavior that manifests itself in its full sense in madness. Therefore, rationality has a
positive meaning in popular usage. Conventional conception of rationality in social
science as well as in planning, however, is basically defined with respect to means
and ends and their relationship. It does not give much attention to ends that are
considered to reflect arbitrary value judgments, but focuses on means to reach in a
most efficient way to the ends externally determined (Arrow, 1974: 17). Rationality
in that context is a scientific way of approaching to problem solving. In that account
rationality is neither good nor bad, but just a tool, which is considered to be value-
neutral (Alexander, 1986: 11-12). By applying rational methodology we formulate
our alternatives and choose the best course of actions that would take us to our
objectives. The conventional rational planning process involves: determination of
objectives, identification of alternatives, selection of the best alternative, preparation
of plan, implementation, and evaluation. This methodology is basically in line with
“the strict canons of the scientific method” (Carvalho, 1986: 35). Indeed, Karl
Popper’s (1979: 27) suggestion for a “critical rationalism” as the ideal form of
scientific rationality bears close resemblance to what is proposed as a rational
process of planning for society.
As Branch (1990: 26) puts it “planning presupposes that rationality triumph over
irrationality, order over disorder, constructive hope over discouragement and
fatalism, action over inaction.”  Planners in that rational mood of problem solving
and creating a better future are “both artist and scientists,” or they are “artists of
rationality” (Chadwick, 1971: 81). They give their work legitimacy in the eyes of
general public as well as political elite by recourse to the demands of rationality.
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They decide on behalf of others, distribute resources from one group, sector or region
to another on the basis of the authority of reason.
This ideal typical description of instrumental rationality requires clarity with respect
to ends and full information with respect to means used to arrive those ends. Planner
needs to predict consequences of different courses of action, weight their costs and
benefits, anticipate their future valuation, etc. Those are all formidable duties, which
led many observers to the sheer conclusion that rationality in practice is always a
bounded rationality (Chadwick, 1971: 118).
Bounded rationality is a concept developed by Herbert Simon. He developed this
concept in order to point out the impossibility of reaching optimum solutions in most
practical decision-making contexts. Instead of optimality Simon brought the concept
of "satisficing" which means to do our best to reach rational solutions under various
constraining factors. In that sense, “good enough replaces the best” and what is
important is not to find the one single optimum solution but a solution which would
satisfy the real parties in the decision making process (Sager, 1994: 14-15).
Instrumental rationality, in different sub-systems of industrial society, implies linear
terms and tendency to quantify and calculate. That is basically the mode of thinking
for Taylorist industrial society in which all resources are used in the best way to
reach the maximum production or profitability. The higher levels of production and
productivity are not discussed in that framework but only the best division of labor to
reach those targets. Beck (1997) relates this concept of instrumental rationality to
what he calls “simple modernity.” How this concept is being problematized and how
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alternative rationality conceptions are developed along communicative or dialogical
ways, by Habermas among others, shall be explored in the next chapter.
Going back to Weberian formulations there is a distinction made between purpose
rationality and value rationality. Manheim’s distinction between formal and
substantive rationality also drew attention from some planners. What are discussed
under those distinctions are more or less the characteristics of instrumental
rationality. Weber’s concept of purpose rationality and Manheim’s formal rationality
denote to a means-ends type of rationality. This concept is defined in terms of value-
free and non-ethical pursuit of most efficient ways to reach some externally given
ends. While value rationality and substantive rationality requires a debate on the
rationality of ends as well.  Conventional planning has mainly been based upon
purpose rationality or formal rationality, often looking suspicious to value rationality
or substantive rationality as ambiguous, non-technical and arbitrary.
In a sense, this irrational or non-rational sphere is left to “politics” and political
processes as the source of ends for the rational and technical process of means-ends
relationships in the sphere of bureaucratic planning. With its emphasis on value-free
and efficiency-oriented action, instrumental rationality concept is largely derived
from positivist epistemology, which requires universality, objectivity and verification
via experimentation. Rationality in that context is a rule following exercise that has
an algorithmic form. The algorithm is a scheme independent from the subjects
employing it or the context in which it is applied. In each case there is just one true
outcome that one has to reach if the rules of the algorithm are applied properly. The
very fact that each inquirer reaches the same result by using the same algorithm is
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presented as a proof for its non-subjective, non-arbitrary, and non-relative nature
(Brown, 1988).
In that sense, rationality is first and foremost logic. Rules of logic like consistency
and coherence provide the paradigmatic idea for rationality. However, for a scientific
understanding of rationality internal coherence of a statement is not sufficient. There
is also a requirement for correspondence between a statement and its subject matter.
That is rationality also requires truth of a statement. If a statement is coherent in
itself and with the empirical reality then we are justified to hold it or to believe in it
as a reliable belief. Those beliefs are not subjective or arbitrary, and thus, all
reasonable persons are expected to accept them and organize their actions on the
basis of such sound knowledge.
It may be argued that in all such debates the problem is positivism and its claim for
value free objective knowledge. Rational planning in that context requires coherence
and conformity to empirical reality. Coherence in the context of planning is basically
coherence between means and ends. While conformity to empirical reality requires
plans to be quantitative, employ statistics and formulate their interventions on the
basis of causal connections among variables. The image of planner, in that account,
is more or less similar to laboratory scientist. He does not have to bother with politics
or ethics. What is expected of a planner is to do a purely technical job to formulate
the most rational plans for externally given ends.
As far as this positivist premise is not challenged the means-end type of instrumental
rationality is going to dominate the field of planning. What is rational, in that
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framework, is a purely technical issue to be decided upon by competent experts.
Politics is important to define the ends, but remains “irrational” when it comes to
relate means and ends. Even the goals determined by the political process need to
base themselves upon technical considerations with regard to their internal
consistency as well as their future consequences.
That is indeed what Habermas (1970a: 58-68; Giddens, 1985b: 134-135) calls
“scientization of politics” or a politics that is controlled by expert bureaucrats on the
basis of instrumental rationality. That is also the reason why there is a “legitimacy
crises” of liberal democracy, which puts success before deliberation and reduces
everything to efficiency. When there is an economic crisis, then, the liberal state does
not have much to promise in order to preserve loyalty of its citizens. That is also why
Habermas (1996d: 5) talks about “the danger of an expertocracy” and also states that
“the euphoria over planning has ceased, together with the belief in science.”
2.5 Two Major Paradigms of Conventional Planning Based Upon Instrumental
Rationality
Neither modern mode of thinking nor modern historical conditions is the same for all
countries and for any country over time. Britain and France have important
differences in their experience in modernity just like Japan and Germany, the United
States and Scandinavian countries, Russia and Eastern Europe, Latin America and
China. These differences were perhaps more apparent before the revolutionary
changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe. At that time the modern world was clearly
divided into three camps: socialist countries, capitalist countries and the rest called as
the Third World. Socialist countries were also called as centrally planned economies
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or command economies, while capitalist countries defended private ownership and
competitive markets. Third World, on the other hand, was largely defined in terms of
“mixed economy” in which a large public sector coexisted with private ownership
and markets.
In that divided world differences within each “world” got no or little attention.
However, neither of those gross categories had indeed a uniform membership and
identical practices in terms of their approach to planning.  These differences within
each group became clearer after the collapse of the second world comprised by
socialist countries.
In socialist countries the planning has been the major tool to distribute resources
across different sectors, regions and peoples within the nation. That was a physical
planning which required a decision for production of each and every commodity. The
actual production was done by state enterprises. However, there were some
differences among socialist countries with regard to the limits of private ownership
and incentives for work. Yugoslavia, for instance put a stress on decentralization,
incentives for producers and their participation in decision-making process, whereas,
in countries like Albania everything was put under the control of the central authority
(Yılmaz, 1999).
In the capitalist bloc there were significant differences with respect to planning
approaches, too. Japan, from the very beginning of its economic development put a
strong emphasis on planning and public guidance of private capital. MITI is an
institutional manifestation of this Japanese approach. Even today there are five year
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development plans prepared by Japanese government, though those plans are
increasingly tending to be more flexible “rolling plans.” France is another country
which used five-year development plans to reconstruct its economy after the Second
World War. After reaching a certain level of development, however, France also
limited the power of planning in its economic management. French planning, which
is also referred as “indicative planning,” involved an element of participation as well
(SPO, 1992). Britain also attempted a short experience with five year plans but left it
later turning towards city planning. Indeed, in Anglo-Saxon countries planning has
come to be understood basically as city planning (Poxon, 2000).
In almost all developed countries planning meant mainly macro-economic policy and
coordination. They tried to create a coherent fiscal and monetary policy in line with
Keynesian demand management techniques in order to reach full employment. Two
schools of thought crystallized themselves in that process. On the one hand there
were those who advocated a rational-comprehensive plan or a synoptic plan. The aim
of synoptic planning is to cover all interrelationships in a single document and guide
decisions in different fields according to this systemic framework. Socialist planning
in a sense represents rational-comprehensive planning par excellence. However,
there were capitalist countries like Japan who adopted such a holistic planning
perspective, though with an indirect role to the state in its execution.
In rational-comprehensive planning the planner is expected to use scientific data and
methods in order to reach given objectives in most efficient way. Systems analysis,
cost-benefit analysis, decision-making theories, modeling, among other tools are
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used to prepare plans. Then the plans are put into practice via budgets and programs.
Todaro (1992) summarizes typical planning activities in that process as fallows:
1. Plan starts with political views and goals of the government
2. Through a strategy document governmental goals are operationalized into
concrete objectives
3. Principles and policies derived from strategy are formulated to guide daily
decisions
4. Plan is comprehensive as it covers not only public but also private sector
5. For optimum resource utilization plan is based upon a macro-economic model
6. Plan is usually prepared for five years but longer-term perspective plans and
yearly programs support it.
This is a fairly accurate description of planning in many countries including Turkey.
Those who criticize rational-comprehensive planning point out that it is elitist and
close to social participation, present it as idealistic and hard to be realized in practice
due to data problems, institutional weaknesses, etc. They also point out the drive for
“social engineering,” its mechanical nature, and its too much stress on quantitative
techniques (Wilson, 1980). Particularly in pluralist societies where there is distrust to
the state intervention into the economy this approach has not been accepted
(Hayward and Narkiewicz, 1978).
On the other pole to planning approach there is incrementalism. Incremental
planning approach developed mainly in pluralist developed countries. What
incrementalism points out most often is the difficulty to define the common good for
a pluralist society. In that environment grand designs are not enjoyed. Instead what is
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advocated is piecemeal and marginal changes over the existing policies in a
negotiation process among different interest groups, regulated by the planners as
mediators (Wilson, 1980; Benveniste, 1989). Those who criticize incrementalism
point out the role of strong lobbies in the decision making process, its individualistic
and conservative approach, its reactionary rather than proactive approach to problem
solving, and its insufficiency in cases where there is a need for rapid and structural
change (Wilson, 1980).
Much of the planning literature is about this “grand debate” between comprehensive
planning and incremental planning approaches. The former is usually associated with
the idea that what is rational for society can be identified, while the latter adheres to a
“bounded rationality” concept. One can argue that they both derive their main
premises from an instrumental rationality conception, but differ in their belief in its
practicality within a pluralist society (Sager, 1994).
In practice countries have adopted and applied differing degrees of comprehensive
and incremental planning approach, changing the emphasis according to their
specific context and historical background. Turkey, for instance, adopted basically a
comprehensive planning approach after the 1960, though it has been short of a
socialist comprehensive planning, and gradually limited the scope of the planning
after the 1980s along with neo-liberal policies.
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2.6 Uneven Development of Modernity and Planning
2.6.1 Two Main Modalities in Modernity and Planning
Up to this point the focus has been on the relationship of planning to the emerging
modernity in its philosophical and material aspects. One should also touch upon the
uneven development of modernity –somewhat similar to “uneven development of
capitalism” stressed by Marxist political economy—over the world and its
ramifications in terms of planning. In that case, one should point out the fact that it is
not the affects of modernity but precisely its absence, insufficiency or delay which
led planning efforts in many less “developed” parts of the world, under the banner of
socialism or otherwise. As emphasized by Gerschenkron in the context of
development economics, the process of modernization and development for the
latecomers is “a less spontaneous and more deliberate process” (Hirschman, 1958:
8).  “What should be added to this very plausible hypothesis, however, is that certain
states are much more capable than others of drawing up and implementing
development strategies” (Muzelis, 1995: 217). Planning, in that context, is a tool to
reverse “natural” trends in favor of latecomers by actively interfering into the socio-
economic processes. In that case, planning gets more radical and aims at more
comprehensive changes, requiring greater sacrifices from the present generation for
the benefit of the future generations.
State led capitalist developments in Germany and Japan reveal the role of the
conscious intervention to “catch up” with the more developed countries. The East
Asian “economic miracle” is also an episode that involves a great role for the state as
the leading agency in economic performance. This is the main explanation behind the
development of the literature on the role of “developmental state” with a peculiarity
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to harness resources towards long-term investments by resisting particularistic
interests within society. Although contested by neo-liberal writers, there has been a
strong emphasis on plan and planning institutions in those countries in their attempt
to modernize.
One should also stress the drive for independence in semi-colonial and post-colonial
states, which led them to plan to create a self-sustaining national economy. Turkey
and India, among many others, are examples for this policy. Both countries tried to
shut their doors to imports to a great extent in their early modernization efforts and
tried very hard to develop a national industry. If private sector was not developed
enough to do this, the state was ready to substitute it and directly involve into the
productive activities. The deliberate attempt for modernization as a strong force for
national planning efforts shall be elaborated in detail in the last chapters of this thesis
in the context of Turkish modernization.
In sum, planning is related to modernity in two distinct ways. First, planning is a
logical consequence of modernity and emerges as a result of modernizing processes
(means provided by modernity and instabilities and inequalities created by modern
conditions) over a long period of time. Second, planning is a tool for entering into
modernization or speeding up modernization process, mainly by making a conscious
use of accumulated techniques of already modernized parts of the world.
It is important to make this distinction between planning as an outcome of modernity
and planning as a means for modernity in order to understand origins of the
distinction made between incremental and comprehensive planning theories. The
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former can, more or less, be identified with planning as an outcome of modernity.
Since there is already a modern society to manage, incremental planning is more
focused on “correcting” some imperfections or balancing different interests in a
consensus forming process. On the other hand comprehensive planning aims at a
more radical change, sometimes a revolutionary change in the existing conditions in
order to bring about a structural change in society. Hence there are so many
advocates of rational-comprehensive planning for the developing countries, Turkey
among many others.
Though both incremental and comprehensive planning share an elitist-bias, it is clear
that the state enters into the scene by assuming a much stronger and direct role in the
comprehensive planning compared to incremental type. In comprehensive planning
the state assumes the role to transform society and substitutes the rules of the game
with better ones, whereas, in incremental planning the state applies well-founded
rules to problem solving in a pluralist society.
However, one needs also touch upon the fact that, though the state in a less
developed country is more willing to interfere into the economy and other aspects of
social life, its organizational capacity is less powerful to do an effective planning15.
As a result, as Myrdal (1960) observes, elites in the developing countries often give a
lip service to planning or use planning as a slogan rather than a real policy tool, while
                                           
15 As Yukowa (1988: 21-27) stresses developing countries face difficulties both in formulating and
implementing plans. In the formulation part they have to rely on imported models, work with
insufficient data, neglect non-economic aspects and participation. In the implementation stage
administrative deficiencies, lack of political will or social consensus, and lack of ideological and
political stability limit the success.
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planning is applied more effectively in the developed countries without pronouncing
it too much in public.
2.6.2 Deliberate Modernity or Planning for Modernization
Planning has its rationale for developed market economies generally as a tool to
correct “market imperfections,” while its rationale in developing countries reveal
some quantitative and qualitative differences. Developing countries have much more
imperfections in their markets compared to developed countries. In addition to those
imperfections the need for motivating people around a common objective and
fulfilling the preconditions to get foreign finance entailed planning in developing
countries (Todaro, 1992: 418-419; Waterson, 1966). However, in order to get a better
sense on the evolution of national planning practice in developing countries it would
be more appropriate to take a broader historical scene into account.
Modernity started in Western Europe and then gradually spread all over world
through various economic, political and cultural channels. Development of large-
scale industry and its advantage over traditional production techniques caused a
severe destructive effect over the local production of non-Western countries. British
supremacy in sectors like textile and iron and steel forced many local enterprises into
bankruptcy.  However, this was not just a purely economic phenomenon determined
by trade relations. Britain and other early industrialized countries also embarked
upon imperialist policies backed by their military force in order to reach cheap raw
materials and secure open markets for their manufactured goods. With their modern
military organization and weaponry those industrial countries colonized most parts of
the world and directly ruled over their colonies.
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Under the colonial rule many countries had undergone great transformations in their
socio-economic and political life. Not only they faced great economic inequalities
versus the colonial powers, they also lost their political and cultural independence.
Humanistic ideals of Enlightenment, particularly the idea of progress, have been used
in that process to legitimize bourgeois dominance in the domestic front and white
man’s dominance over the backward territories and peoples (Sorel, 1969). This
ideological use of Enlightenment ideas is perhaps best reflected in the “white man’s
burden” arguments. It was claimed that modern Western dominance was right and
beneficial for colonized and semi-colonized peoples who were not capable of
administering nature and society.
However, colonized parts of the world developed various resistance movements and
finally got their political independence from the colonial powers. This anti colonial
movement might be traced back to the independence of the United States from
British dominance. A series of movements in the 19th century Latin America down to
the post second world war anti-colonial era increased the number of politically
independent states all over the world.
Those newly independent states were basically organized as nation states imitating
the colonial powers in their political institutions. They were nationalist and stressed
their distinct identity vis-à-vis the colonial powers, but also embarked upon a
deliberate project to modernize and become similar to Western states.  As Charles
Taylor  (1997) observes, they had a hate-love relationship with the West in their
quest for modernity, trying to catch up with modern nations without losing their
distinct identity and political independence.
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Those countries, which had not been colonized, were also living in semi-colonial
conditions of unequal exchange and threat of direct occupation by Western powers.
Japan and Ottoman Empire were under such conditions. They preserved their formal
independence but in a very insecure environment. Thus, just like countries with a
colonial past Japan and Ottoman Empire tried to modernize their socio-political
structures to adjust to this new environment during the 19th century.
The primary task before those politically independent peoples were state building
and nation building. They had to do those with a backward and agrarian economy
compared to the modern world. Thus, those states put a strong emphasis on national
interest or collective interests rather than individualism, and targeted indigenous
industrialization—as the material manifestation of the modernity—through various
protectionist and drigist methods.
In that process planning was taken as a tool for deliberate effort of poor countries to
industrialize and modernize.  The agency for modernity was basically educated
sections of society –or the intelligentsia—and the state bureaucracy. As is the case in
the Ottoman experience, membership in those two groups were usually overlapping.
In that early effort to modernize, those elites did not have well elaborated models
(like input-output models, econometric techniques, etc.) but mainly depended on
their reflections in terms of defining the West.
Modernity for most of the post-colonial peoples has been identified with
industrialization. That is why they tried to transform their economies from an
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agrarian to an industrial structure. However, facing the competition of cheap imports
those countries did not have much chance. That is why most of the newly
industrializing countries applied some sort of an import substitution (IS) policy. The
IS strategy required high tariffs in order to protect infant industries from external
competition. Due to insufficient capital accumulation in the private sector the state in
many developing countries involved directly into economy by creating state
economic enterprises (SEEs).
Those SEEs together with their private counterparts mainly worked to sell their
products in the domestic market and, thus had relatively smaller scales or low rates
of capacity utilization. They reduced the need for importing consumer goods, but
simultaneously increased imports for capital goods and raw materials. Therefore, as
shall be observed in the Turkish example, the IS strategy did not indeed substitute
imports but rather changed its composition. It did not eliminate dependence but
changed one form of dependence with another. Nonetheless, it should also be noted
that some countries applied IS more successful than others16.
Planning has been a very strong element in IS strategy for development. It was
through planning that the states decided upon their future industries, their short and
long term production levels, prices of basic inputs,  foreign  exchange,  and  the  like.
                                           
16 For example, East Asian countries also applied IS but combined this policy with a strong element of
export promotion. As a result, they could manage to solve their foreign exchange problem for further
industrialization while most developing countries got into crisis due to foreign exchange shortage
towards the end of 1970s. In Africa, on the other hand, most countries failed in developing any
significant industrial production and remained depended upon export of raw materials as a source of
foreign exchange. So, it is not easy to make gross generalizations about the success and failure of IS
policies for all regions, let alone for individual countries.
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Plans in that process were mostly quantitative documents indicating exact targets and
stipulating policy tools and investments to reach those targets.
The plans that have been prepared by the developing countries were basically of
rational-comprehensive type. That is, these plans covered almost all fields of
economic activity and their interrelations. Using input-output matrixes for the whole
economy gained a standard application during the 1950s and 1960s, with increasing
complexity in their number of sectors and sub-sectors. In some countries, including
Turkey, not only economic but also social sectors were considered as an integral
element of planning process17.
States did have many policy tools at their hands to realize the objectives of the plans.
Among these tools were annual budget, monetary policy, customs policy, foreign
exchange, setting prices of basic inputs produced by the SEEs, providing incentives
for the private investments, etc.   As it is going to be discussed in the next chapter,
many of these policy tools have been either totally eliminated or limited in their
effectiveness under the effects of globalization and adaptation of neo-liberal policies.
                                           
17 Turkey, for example, from the very beginning of planned period in the 1960s designed its planning
organization with two departments; one for the economic planning, and the other one for the social
planning. There was also a third department called coordination department to serve external relations
of these two main departments. However, historically planning practices as well as organizational
attitude in the planning unit favored economic planning over social planning. Thus, the planning unit
has mostly employed engineers and economists.
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2.6.3 Overall Evaluation of National Planning in Development
Except a few successful countries national development planning in developing
countries entered into a crises during the 1980s. There are two major explanations for
that failure: the first view asserts that it is the differentiation between theory and
practice of planning which led to this conclusion, while the other view searches for
problems inherent in the planning process itself (Todaro, 1992: 423).
The proponents of the first view underlie the implementation problems and point out
the lack of political will behind plans due to populist policies under the force of
social demands. The main problem in that context is the difficulty to reconcile
private interests and social utility. As governments in the developing countries could
not act in a responsible manner in reconciling private interests and common good
they gave rise to problems like overemphasis on capital-intensive technologies,
neglect of rural areas, worsening income distribution between regions, excess
migration, concentration of education investments in socially less productive fields,
excess protectionism with foreign exchange shortages and inefficient production.
Those who stress the problems within the planning process, on the other hand focus
on over-optimistic attitude in plans trying to achieve everything at once, formulation
of plans on the basis of insufficient and unreliable data, unpredictable internal and
external shocks (like the oil crises), lack of institutional capacity, problems in the
relationship between planners and politicians, etc. Sagasti (1988: 434-435), in
addition to those difficulties points out the problem of “institutional schizophrenia”
due to the tensions in the planning organizations that are in a position to reconcile
day-to-day decisions with long-term policies.
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When planning organizations stress long-term policies too much they turn into
research institutes and lose their contact with daily decision-making process, and
thus their effectiveness in terms of implementation of policies. On the other hand,
when those organizations get too much involved into daily decisions they get to
resemble line ministries and lose their capacity to stress long-term policies. What
Sagasti (1988) suggests is a balance between those two poles inserting a long-term
perspective into daily decisions. This approach requires a planning organization with
distinct departments to perform those functions simultaneously.
Looking back and evaluating the past performance of planning in developing
countries it is hard to reach a general judgment with regard to the success of
planning. However, as a broad observation neither those countries who pursued
dirigist policies (such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Sri Lanka and Turkey) nor
those who did not put a stress on planning (such as Argentina, Chile, Jamaica, and
Nigeria) did show a successful performance in terms of economic development. On
the other hand countries that motivated their private sector through various incentives
and at the same time directing their public investments in the framework of sound
macro plans (such as Korea, Malaysia, Colombia, Ivory Coast, and Kenya)
performed relatively better during the 1970s (Agarwala, 1985: 13-16). Under those
observations it is argued that planning needs to be based upon a consultation process,
have flexibility and selectivity, and a strong element of coordination. Despite all
criticisms raised about planning experience in the developing countries in the post
war period there is no strong argument that there is no longer a need for planning. A
field survey conducted in 70 countries during the 1980s, for instance, revealed that
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the idea of development planning still preserves its attraction and there is still a belief
in the usefulness of rational interventions in the development process (Sagasti, 1988:
434).
What is important, in that context, is to differentiate between the failure of a certain
type of planning at a particular time-space and overall usefulness and applicability of
planning in general. Demise of one type of planning should not lead us to declare the
end of planning for development but rather encourage us to think novel forms of
planning that would be more appropriate under present conditions. Planning
approach, planning tools and the degree of planning might change, but the need for
development planning is still there, particularly for the developing countries
confronting serious economic and social problems after more that 20 years of neo-
liberal market-friendly policies. In the process of economic development it is normal
to put more stress on markets and their effective functioning. However, in a global
competitive environment the need for effective governance also becomes a crucial
element for success (Todaro, 1992: 431). In that framework, a planning process open
to organized labor, private sector and civil society is perhaps significant than ever.
Search for an alternative conception of planning along these lines shall be elaborated
in the sections of this thesis that are related to planning in Turkey.
The problems created by an over-emphasis on markets has become more clear in
recent years and even some international institutions started to change their approach
with regard to the role of the state in development. World Bank’s 1997 report on “the
State in a Changing World” underlines the fact that without a strong legal and
institutional infrastructure markets do not have much chance to function effectively.
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This new approach, based upon the experience of last two decades, poses a serious –
though late—alarm for the simple understanding of markets as anarchy. What is
stressed is the role of governance as a catalyst in the process of development. It is
also pointed out that what is important is not what is done by the state but how it is
done.
It is clear from the past experience that we cannot go with conventional planning
approach, radical delinking strategies and very extensive and direct state involvement
in economic life. However, it is equally clear that markets themselves are no panacea
for ever-important social problems that need conscious human intervention. That
means we have to go beyond a simple market-plan dichotomy towards a more
pragmatic and democratic mix of market and plan within a broader democratic
context for collective deliberation and political action.
2.7 General Evaluation of Conventional Planning Paradigm
As has been discussed in this chapter planning is closely related to modernity, in
epistemological as well as material and institutional sense. Modern epistemology
based upon a value-free inquiry, object/subject dichotomy and search for objective
truth set the stage for planning as a purely technical endeavor conforming to the logic
of scientific method. Conventional understanding of rationality as an algorithm
guides this notion of planning and its insistence on instrumental –means-ends type of
rationality. Not only this particular mode of inquiry but also historical requirements
of modern economy (capitalism) and modern state (the nation-state) forced planning
to define itself within the parameters of instrumental rationality.
77
This planning practice is largely state and expert-oriented and technical. It assumes
that planners can act in a detached manner to devise the most efficient ways to
achieve externally given goals. This planning approach is not only technical but also
elitist in its nature. When there is only one true way of solving a problem there is not
much to be debated democratically. In fact, rational planning in that formulation is a
tool to be used by any political regime including the most irrational and repressive
ones.
It is also identified that conventional planning has been used not in a vacuum but in
concrete economic and institutional contexts. In that regard the most important
element is territorial aspect of conventional planning. Planning has been applied in
national contexts in order to reach common good or national interest. The agency
capable of doing planning has been the nation state with its allegedly rational
bureaucracy. It was believed that the state might use planning to foster growth, to
reduce instability, to improve income distribution, to preserve environment, etc. The
means and degree of planning changed according to the character of the political
regime (capitalist or socialist) as well as on the level of the economic and
administrative capabilities (developed and underdeveloped) of the particular nations.
As shall be attempted in the next chapter this paradigm of planning is coming to an
end due to its epistemological and institutional shortcomings, as revealed in its
failure in practice in the development efforts of many countries. For the time being
failure of conventional planning is presented as the triumph of the market. However,
that is a fallacious and easy judgment, which requires answering many questions.
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First, if markets can solve our problems then why has planning developed in the first
place? As has been investigated in this chapter, planning arose, among other things,
as a reaction to the problems generated by the instabilities and limitations of
capitalist economy as well as its inherent dynamics of uneven development.
Particularly developed countries are under severe economic conditions, which
markets have not responded in a positive way over the last two decades of intense
market-oriented practices.
Second, how appropriate it is to condemn planning in general due to the failure of a
particular planning practice in a particular context? The demise of conventional
planning based upon instrumental rationality cannot be used as a general argument to
condemn a different planning approach based upon a different conception of
rationality. Instrumental rationality is not wrong in itself and we certainly need
instrumental rationality in various contexts. What is wrong about instrumental
rationality is its claim for monopoly over our collective actions. What is required is a
broader conception of rationality that is also inclusive for the appropriate application
of instrumental rationality.
Finally, we have to ask what is going to be the value of politics in general and
democratic politics in particular under a total technical decision making process or
under automatically functioning markets. It seems that in both cases the field of
democratic politics is largely restricted if not totally eliminated. Both a market
dominated approach and a purely technocratic alternative need also answer the
legitimacy issues and the value of democracy. If democratic politics is above all an
activity based upon deliberation in solving our collective problems, it can neither
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leave planning to the monopoly of experts nor declare the end of planning in favor of
an automatically functioning market. As Dunn (1990: 36) puts it in clear terms “the
full domination of either market or plan today requires a narrow and socially
insulated dictatorship.”
As a consequence, one may argue that conventional planning, so far as it is related to
a particular phase of modernity with its particular epistemological and institutional
corollaries, is passé.  However, planning in general is not. A new planning approach
based upon new epistemological as well as historical grounds is a real possibility.
Adopting Ulrich Beck’s (1997) terminology one may argue that simple planning is
passé as a dominant paradigm but not a complex or reflexive planning whose
potential is yet to be explored, in developed as well as developing world. This
possibility will be elaborated in the next chapter on the background of
epistemological debates and globalization processes. It is particularly significant
today to elaborate on this possibility for the developing world confronting growing
problems in terms of economic, social and environmental issues. The chapters of this
thesis related to the history of planning and prospects for an alternative conception of
planning in Turkey would specifically aim at presenting this possibility.
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CHAPTER III
THE CRISIS OF CONVENTIONAL PLANNING AND THE RISE OF
DEMOCRATIC/COMMUNICATIVE PLANNING
3.1 Crisis of Conventional Planning and Search for an Alternative Paradigm
The main argument in that chapter is that entering into a new epistemological and
material framework does largely obliterate the conventional form of planning, or at
least, reduces its legitimacy and effectiveness. However, it is also argued that this is
the problem of a particular planning paradigm based solely or predominantly upon
instrumental reason and elite dominance, and thus, we are not confronted with the
end of planning in general for social betterment. What is needed is a different
conception and organization of planning, characterized by democratic mechanisms
and communicative rationality, without ignoring the role of the “political,” that
would meet the requirements of the new mode of thinking and material conditions.
In that context, this chapter focuses mainly on the new intellectual climate and the
new historical conditions on the basis of contemporary debates such as post-positivist
epistemology, globalization, new debates on democracy and public sphere. The
legitimacy and representation crisis of the modern nation-state in the face of these
historical developments will be covered in that chapter as well. Democracy and new
approaches to democratic practices, and alternative conceptions about the concept of
rationality shall guide the ideas developed in this chapter. The central argument in all
these debates is that we are in a complex transition period, which seems to call for a
multi actor, communicative or participatory planning paradigm as a real possibility.
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The ideas developed in this chapter will later be used to suggest a new planning
practice in Turkish context.
3.2 A New Intellectual “Climate” and Planning
3.2.1 Hermeneutical Shift in Epistemological Debates and Planning under a
New Epistemological Framework
As has been pointed out in the previous chapter, one way to elaborate on the concept
of modernity is to discuss it as a mode of thinking. On that account, modernity might
largely be related to the dominance of positivism as an epistemology. Of course,
modernity is a complex process in which there are various, and oftentimes contesting
viewpoints. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, modernity or “simple modernity”
(Beck, 1997) might be identified with positivist epistemology as the dominant mode
of approaching to knowledge.
On the basis of positivism there is a conception of rationality that is largely derived
from logic and empirical procedures in the production of knowledge. Logical
empiricism developed in the early decades of the 20th century formulated the concept
of rationality in a formal way. In that context, what is rational is what is verified or
verifiable by objective empirical data. Any statement that is not verified or verifiable
by empirical data is assumed to be either non-rational or totally irrational (Ayer,
1952). The results of the rational scientific enterprise are repeatable  by  anyone,  and
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they are not going to change from one person to another18. In that sense scientific
knowledge is objective. This is clearly an epistemology based upon a foundationalist
approach that makes the scientific practice as the model for perfect rationality.
Rationality in positivism is accepted to be the source of truth. Truth, in that context,
is obtained by highly professional scientific elite and disseminated to larger society
through education. There is no room for debate among different truth claims based
upon different ontological and epistemological assumptions. Dissent is limited to the
details of empirical verification process taking place within the framework of
dominant approach to knowledge or paradigm19. As Feyerabend (1981: 28-31)
stresses, science as conceived in this manner, is not a democratic enterprise but rather
an elitist activity.
As has been argued in the chapter two it is this instrumental, uniform and reduced
understanding of rationality on the basis of positivist epistemology that also provided
the overall intellectual climate for the theory and practice of conventional planning,
both in developed and developing countries. Reduction of rationality to a technical
meaning  and  the  tendency  to  attribute  the  guardianship  of  rationality   to   some
                                           
18 Karl Popper (1979) is also a student of the logical positivist school but he tried to develop a rather
different criterion for demarcating scientific statements from non-scientific ones. According to him it
is falsifiability of a statement that makes it scientific. He also stresses that being non-scientific does
not automatically transform a statement into a meaningless one. In that junction he argues that the
logical positivist school is based upon a self-contradictory foundation regarding its definition of
meaningful statements because meaning itself is not observable and verifiable through empirical data.
19 In that context, one may argue with T. Kuhn (1970) that logical positivists are not actually defining
a universal understanding of science but just a particular scientific paradigm for the normal science.
Kuhn argues, on the other hand, that the criteria to demarcate science from non-science is not external
to the particular scientific paradigm agreed upon by a scientific community at a certain time in history
of science. In that sense, neither verifiability nor falsifiability can provide an objective foundational
criterion for demarcation of science from non-science. In other words, it is very difficult to draw a
clear-cut border for science.
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technically competent elite in the conventional planning takes its legitimacy from
this simple modernity and positivist epistemology. Otherwise, how could an expert,
as a human being, dare to assume a role to decide upon the fate of a people without
taking their consent?
This dominant epistemological framework has transformed and took a rather
different direction after the Second World War. There have always been dissident
voices within the modernity, like Nietzsche, from the very outset (Megill, 1985).
However, those voices have gained a very strong publicity after the Second World
War, particularly after the 1960s. There are many different dissident voices from
Thomas Kuhn to Paul Feyerabend, Michael Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Richard
Rorty, and various other thinkers considered under the banner of postmodernism,
who raised significant objections to the positivist epistemology.
Leaving aside the differences among those dissidents themselves for the time being,
one may assert that the dominant mode of thinking, or the “intellectual climate”, has
shifted towards a direction that may be considered under the general title of
hermeneutic approach (Rorty, 1979). This thesis is not about the intricacies of
hermeneutic tradition and its historical development. However, it is important to
understand this intellectual shift in its broader features and relate those features to the
theory and practice of planning.
What is attacked by the hermeneutic tradition is the claim of positivist epistemology
to be the one and the only legitimate source of truth. Truth in a positivist context is
modeled on the physical sciences and empirical procedures borrowed and adopted
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from those sciences.  The ideal of positivist tradition is to reduce all phenomena to
physical phenomena and its laws of motion. The difference between the natural and
social reality is considered not as a difference of nature but just a difference in the
degree of complexity that would be overcome in the long run through the
accumulation of knowledge. Similar to the technology created on the basis of
physical sciences, social sciences based upon positivist assumptions are supposed to
create a ground for the better administration and organization of the social and
political life. Once we know the causal mechanisms behind the social phenomena it
is just a matter of time to develop appropriate policies to intervene into those causes
and change the direction of economic, social and political life towards some desired
ends. As has been explained in the previous chapter this is nothing but the aspiration
of the conventional planning approach, whether it is applied successfully or not.
Hermeneutic approach or post-positivist theories, on the other hand, have a different
point of departure. In this conception there is no external point of reference for the
observer and “every description of society must take place within society”
(Luhmann, 1998: 78). Truth in the hermeneutic tradition is not one, if there is any.
Social reality is different from natural phenomena and there is no possibility of
making a sharp object-subject distinction in the process of producing social
knowledge. Even our conceptions about the nature and natural phenomena are
largely shaped by our cultural parameters. We may not be able to acknowledge those
“taken for granted” cultural assumptions and background knowledge  (or prejudices)
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in our investigations20. Not causal mechanisms but rather interactions among
conscious and meaning-generating agents are given the priority in social analysis.
Human mind in this conception is not tabula rasa, as envisaged by John Locke and
other empiricists, and thus, does not directly reflect reality out there, but permanently
attributes meanings and forms to a complex interactive environment. Reality is
constructed and reconstructed in various forms in different historical conditions,
cultural environments as well as among different segments of a society21.
“Reading rather than seeing” is the paradigm in radical hermeneutics (Hoy 1985: 52).
As Wittgenstein (1958) in his second philosophy emphasizes, language is not a
mirror of reality but rather a game permanently played by human agents. It is neither
possible nor desirable to create a language that is derived from objective “reality,” in
which each word corresponds to a concrete object in reality. Even a word like “tree”
that may be considered as a clear word corresponding to an object may have so many
different meanings depending on the context it is used by parties of a language game.
Rorty (1979)22, among others, repeats the same idea in his distinction between
epistemology based upon representation and hermeneutics based upon meaning.
Derrida and his deconstruction method is perhaps the most radical assault to
                                           
20 Approaching this issue in the field of sociology one may take the development of symbolic
interactionism school and ethno-methodological studies as a case in point. What is stressed in these
schools of sociology is the problematic of objective study of a social life in which the observer is also
taking part.
21 Here one should make a distinction between classical or old hermeneutic tradition and hermeneutic
understanding within the recent postmodern debates. Hermeneutic tradition of Schleiermacker, Ranke,
Diltey and others is based upon recovering the original meaning of the author or historical events from
the perspective of the subject, whereas modern hermeneutic is based upon an “active” or “productive”
interpretation, which is basically open to multiple directions (Megill, 1985: 21-23; Smith, 1994).
22 With a pragmatic perspective, Rorty (1979: 10-11) declares that “truth” need not be considered as
“the accurate representation of reality” but just as “what is better for us to believe.” Conversation
among parties of a “language game” replaces description of detached solitary observer in this
framework.
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traditional epistemology. Postmodernists in general, and Derrida in particular, claim
that the “truth is contextually bound” and call us to “get rid of the notion of
rationality” (Harrison, 1994: 191). For Feyerabend, for instance, the goal of scientific
inquiry is not to reach truth but generate new ideas through disequilibria and dissent,
siding with the weak arguments against the strong ones (Fritzman, 1992: 189).
What can be expected from planning in that hermeneutic epistemological
framework? It is not easy to answer this question as there might be different
meanings attributed to planning in a hermeneutic context, and even a total rejection
of the possibility of planning. However, it seems to be possible to conceive a new
planning model based upon some general characteristics of hermeneutic way of
approaching to knowledge. What is important in a hermeneutic framework is not
explanation of causal mechanisms and respective technologies, but rather
understanding and consensus based upon sharing of different viewpoints or
meanings. Habermas’ (1981; 1990) communicative rationality approach provides a
very fertile ground for such a new planning paradigm. That means planning needs to
be based upon communication rather than expert judgment. If a political community
is going to decide about some public issues by making some critical preferences,
nobody or no group is privileged to impose his/her viewpoint upon the rest. People
have to express and defend their ideas and meanings before the others in order to
create a basis for legitimate public policy. Hermeneutic epistemology, interpreted in
that manner, creates a more favorable environment for democratic planning based
upon communicative rationality.
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However, there are problems to be raised about this hermeneutic approach to
planning as well. First, as has been discussed in the previous chapter, planning needs
to be related to historical and material conditions as well as the dominant mode of
thinking. In that context, hermeneutic practices should be located into the framework
of larger economic and political practices and conditions. Foucault and some other
philosophers discuss the role of power and ideology in the construction of dominant
discourses that limit the horizon of possible knowledge and practice extensively23.
One may also go back to Gramsci’s concept of “hegemonic ideology” (Gülalp, 1997:
9) in order to discuss the problematic before the planning based upon communicative
rationality. In that sense, hermeneutic process of consensus may take a conservative
turn and become a subtle means for the preservation of the status quo.
Second, and in connection to the first criticism, planning based upon a hermeneutic
approach may create a relativist environment in which power rather than knowledge
might become the arbiter of a debate. As Habermas (1981; 1990) argues within the
general theory of communicative action, rational knowledge based upon the power of
the better argument is a means for the weaker party to defend itself against the sheer
power of the stronger party to a debate. If we completely leave the concept of
rationality, it is going to create a vacuum that is probably going to be open to forced
solutions. In other words, it is possible to base an authoritarian politics and planning
upon an ultra relativist or nihilist epistemology. Heidegger’s notorious flirt with Nazi
party during the early 1930s, among other examples, is a clear case in point to be
alert against the articulation between nihilism and totalitarian politics.
                                           
23 As D’Agostino (1993: 101) points out, Foucault makes us more attentive to the problem of ideology
and the “risk of letting ourselves be determined by more general structures of which we may not be
conscious” in seemingly free and equal conversations.
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As Brown (1988: 130) observes, despite the use of relativist arguments, “a universal
social relativism, one which allows no purchase for any trans-social mode of
cognition cannot be coherently defended.” However, the solution for those problems
confronted in the application of hermeneutic epistemology into the public sphere
could not be overcome by going back to the positivist approach that has its own
problems. What is required is a broader and balanced approach that would make it
possible to create a ground for democratic planning without falling into the trap of
ultra relativism and gridlock.
The concepts of “hermeneutical circle” and “fusion of horizons” developed by
Gadamer on the basis of Heidegerian philosophy and his concept of objectivity as
openness (Dallmayr, 2001: 341; Healy, 1996: 163; Outwaite 1985) might be taken as
a departure point in the application of hermeneutical approach in planning. The
“hermeneutical circle” implies that whatever consensus reached at a point in time is
open to revaluation and criticism later on. That means planning is not a blueprint but
a process permanently open to revisions on the basis of new arguments and
developments. On the other hand, “the fusion of horizons” and objectivity as
openness give us a channel to overcome the difficulty of ultra-relativism by
accepting the possibility of communication between human beings from different
cultural, social, and economic backgrounds under appropriate conditions. Combined
with Habermas’ “ideal speech situation” in which all participants to debate are
assumed to be free and equal parties, it is possible to envisage a participatory
planning process with appropriate mechanisms for public involvement at different
stages of plan preparation, implementation and monitoring.
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It may also be argued that Foucault’s stress on power/knowledge can be related and
used as a theoretical framework as a complement to Gadamer’s stress on
conversation and Habermas’ communicative action approach. Though there is a
tension between Habermas and Foucault regarding the meaning and possibility of
modernity24, it seems a fruitful adventure to consider them together to reach a more
comprehensive view about an alternative planning paradigm that recognizes the role
of both power and validity claims.
It is clear in the radical hermeneutics, defended by Derrida among others, that “any
apparently coherent system of thought can be shown to have underlying, irresolvable
antinomies, such that there are multiple and conflicting readings that must be held
simultaneously” (Hoy 1985: 52). That means the new planning paradigm has to
accept multiplicity or pluralism as a starting point, rejecting any ideal or single
planning approach as the one and only alternative.
On the basis of these epistemological arguments one may assert that what is
preferable among those alternatives is a combination of expect judgment and public
involvement, or a broader concept of rationality that contains in itself instrumental as
well as communicative elements under general conditions of politics and political
conflict. That would provide a balanced approach to what is desired and what can
                                           
24 Habermas criticizes Foucault and some other postmodern thinkers for falling into what he calls
“performative contradiction” that is supposed to serve interest of neo-conservatism rather than
progressive politics (Bernstein, 1985). That basic criticism emanates from different conceptions about
the Enlightenment or modernity. Habermas takes modernity as an “unfinished project” with broader
potentials against radical objections to the totalitarian tendencies inherent in modern practices.
However, it is not necessary to make an “either-or” choice between Habermas and other critics.
Habermas’ more practical approach for improvement seems to be open to use within a broader critical
approach that would underline the role of power as a guard against a simple optimism towards
communicative practices.
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feasibly be obtained. This option shall be critically elaborated in the below sections.
Habermas’ idea of communicative rationality, criticisms towards Habermasian
standards in public policy, and the use of Habermasian arguments in planning theory
will guide this elaboration.  In addition to this theoretical debate, practical
implications of the new planning paradigm will be developed into some concrete
proposals within the context of a suggested future planning practice in Turkey in the
chapter six of this thesis.
3.2.2 The Concept of Rationality Reassessed
All these debates about the sources and nature of knowledge have had significant
implications for the central concept of planning, i.e. for the concept of rationality. As
Breheny and Hooper (1985: 1) critically stated long ago, “planners have somewhat
assumed that they can adopt the concept [of rationality], but avoid the philosophical
reflexivity that surrounds its interpretation and use in other disciplines.” It is clear
from the viewpoint of post-positivist epistemological debates that today this attitude
is much less sustainable. Planners cannot close their eyes to the philosophical
changes that put more emphasis on judgment and critical debate in defining
rationality rather than a rule-based, algorithmic and subject-centered rationality
concept (Brown, 1988). Planners should also accept “the fact that we are imperfect
agents operating in an imperfect world” (Rescher, 1993: 9).
Apart from philosophical debates surrounding rationality, there are also ideological
and political criticisms regarding the concept. Ideological function of technical or
instrumental rationality is a central topic particularly in critical theory or Frankfurt
school in sociology. Marcuse (1971: 149) and Tehrenian (1995: 16), among others,
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declare that technical rationality and its appeal to common good is just seemingly a
neutral and value-free concept. Rationality, in that account, is in fact itself an
ideology, mainly functional in depoliticizing the people for the good of the dominant
classes. This ideological criticism necessitates a political as well as a philosophical
assessment of the concept. According to Amin (1997: 135-136), for instance, “a
deeper critique of capitalism requires an alternative conception of rationality.” There
are also planning theorists who point out the danger of “rationally pursuing non-
rational or irrational” (Forester, 1985: 49). All such criticisms entail a political
reassessment of the rationality concept along with philosophical debates.
All these philosophical and political criticisms of rationality should not be assessed
as problems of rationality per se, but basically as criticisms raised against
instrumental rationality based upon positivist epistemology. Otherwise, with the
decline of rationality as the central concept of planning, there is no hope for an
alternative conception of planning. What is required is to approach the problem of
rationality from a pluralist perspective, making a room for alternative conceptions of
rationality.
As Rescher (1993: 79) observes “even pluralism has plural versions.” The challenge
for planners is to perceive this new paradigm and develop alternative planning
paradigms in a pluralist approach. The fact that we don’t have just one and universal
concept of rationality but rather multiple rationalities is a significant point in that
regard. There are various distinctions made in that framework. Lukes (1970)
analyzes the concept of rationality in the context of universality and relativism
debates in cultural anthropology, distinguishing between “Rationality I” (universal,
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science and expert-based) and “Rationality II” (culture and context-dependent).
Similar distinctions are made in policy analysis and planning literature: Deising
distinguishes between technical, economic, social, legal and political rationality
(Reade, 1985: 81); Friedman (1987: 19-21) refers to social rationality (common
good) versus market (self-interest) rationality; Goulet (1986: 301-302) identifies the
technological, the political and the ethical rationality in development decision-
making; and Dryzek (1996: 107) distinguishes between economic and
communicative rationalities in development. Among these different conceptions of
rationality the one made by Habermas (1981; 1990) between instrumental and
communicative rationality seems to offer a fruitful framework for developing a new
planning paradigm. That is why the planning paradigm suggested in this thesis will
be developed on the basis of exploration and critical analysis of Habermas.
3.3 Globalization and Planning
3.3.1 Globalization as a New Framework for Development Planning
Mere epistemological debates and new rationality conceptions are necessary but not
sufficient to develop a new approach to planning. It is also required to analyze
“material” conditions that demands and facilitates a new planning paradigm. As has
been discussed in the second chapter capitalist economy and the nation state are two
significant components in so far as conventional planning is concerned. That is why
it is necessary to follow the debates about the evolution of these framework
conditions for identifying possibilities of a different planning approach. In that
context, globalization debate provides the general background. This debate is
important both as a broader context to situate epistemological and methodological
93
discussions and as a constraining factor for devising new and practical alternatives
for planning.
Conventional planning, based upon instrumental rationality, is used by nation states
and bureaucracies in capitalist and socialist contexts, both in developed and
developing countries. That experience has already been evaluated in the relevant
parts of the previous chapter. Put in simple terms, conventional planning is state-
centered and largely operating within well-defined national boundaries.
“Inside/outside” distinction or dichotomy plays a significant role in that framework.
In that context, conventional planning operates on the basis of the sovereignty of the
nation state and various tools (like tariffs, monetary policy, fiscal policy, state
procurements, investment incentives, public investments, etc.) at the disposal of
national bureaucracy to arrange “internal” vis-à-vis “external” actors.
The problem in that regard is new processes and conditions that are generally
referred to as “globalization.” It is not necessary to go into the details of the concept
of globalization.25 However, it is clear that globalization, among other things, means
a transformation in the position of the nation state and its capabilities. The state, in
that context, is perceived “as the meat in the sandwich between two opposing forces
[of globalization and localization]” (Summy, 1996). Globalization also means a
transformation in the capitalist economy as institutionalized within the national
context. Globalization as a discourse (hegemonic ideology) as well as a material
                                           
25 To give some insight into the definition of globalization, Giddens refers to “the intensification of
worldwide social relations,” while Robertson writes about “the compression of the world and the
intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (quoted in Martin and Beittel, 1998).
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condition26 problematizes the legitimacy and capability of the nation state in the
formulation and application of public policies in the global economy.
What state bureaucracy could easily plan a few decades ago may not be planned
effectively today. Take for instance tariffs and quotas as a means to protect national
industry. Those tools were acceptable for the international community and feasible
for the applicant countries in the past. Today, that is not so clear. There are
multilateral trade agreements that bound countries and impose upon them some
conditions that are sanctioned through various mechanisms. National economies are
much more integrated today and trade is a key element for growth and development.
If a country insists upon following unilateral trade policies that are not in line with
international standards, there is a high probability that that country would be isolated
from international trade and lose its chance to make its economy function
effectively27. Similar arguments might be developed for fields like capital
movements, multilateral investments, global environmental issues, human rights, etc.
(Held, 1995).
                                           
26 Cox (1996: 23-24), in that context, distinguishes “globalism” from “globalization,” the former term
signifying the ideological aspect while the latter term emphasizing globalization as a condition.
Ideological or discursive aspect is best reflected in “inevitability” of globalization and “there is no
alternative” slogan according to this analysis.
27 It is not argued here that the nation states completely lost their power upon foreign trade. On the
contrary they are still very effective in arranging trade policies, taking the advantage of gaps in the
current international agreements and participating as major actors in the bargaining process in the
determination of those rules. As Hirst and Thomson argue the states could even increase their “pivotal
role” as a mediator between local and global processes as tread among different hierarchical levels
(Çıtak, 2000: 59-60). However, they are no longer free or alone to take radical decisions about their
trade policy without taking the international trade relations into account. That new environment also
makes “de-linking” strategy for development advocated by the dependency school in the development
economics more problematic (Falk, 1998), at least for countries that do not have a large-scale
domestic market.
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Globalization processes in economic, cultural and political fields blur the national
boundaries and make them more permeable. Global capital, global media, Internet,
migration, trans-national social movements, etc. create an environment in which it
gets more and more difficult to create an isolated national environment under the
control of the nation state. This process creates a crisis of democracy as well, so far
as modern conception of democracy is largely premised upon the national or
territorial boundaries. Power shifts from the national authorities, accountable to their
respective citizens, to global institutions that are not accountable to any definite
political community.  Thus, globalization is important not only as a new material
condition and a new epistemology with a different unit of analysis, but also as a new
context to redefine democracy among other political structures.
There are different approaches to the concept of globalization and these differences
have significant implications for planning under the global conditions. Thus, it is
useful to go into the debate about two broad alternatives regarding globalization:
neo-liberal and cosmopolitan. Those alternative approaches are going to be discussed
in relation to planning, particularly planning in a developing country like Turkey.
3.3.2 Neo-liberal Understanding of Globalization and Its Repercussions on
National Development Planning
Historical roots of the neo-liberal understanding of globalization go back to the
classical economy, namely to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who defended the
efficiency of markets both inside and outside the national economy. The core idea
advocated is a minimum government and a maximum space for free interplay of
forces of demand and supply which guarantees most rational allocation of resources
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and maximum utility for the people. The mechanism that brings about this efficient
and maximum production is division of labour and specialization in a competitive
environment through which every agent perfects its own abilities --or its comparative
advantage in the case of national agents.
Division of labor has been a central idea in the classical political economy. Division
of labour, in turn, depends on the size of the market (Heilbroner, 1953). Thus, the
larger the market –the end limit of which is the whole world-- and the less the
political interference into the purely exchange relations, the greater the production
and utility for the nation and the world as a whole.  Relative position of the
individuals, social classes or nations is not stressed in that classical framework which
focuses on aggregate effects and assumes a common interest in increased output.
If the classical economists are considered as philosophers of capitalism, one may
infer the conclusion that capitalism has been tending towards globalization both in its
practice and ideology from the very beginning. Marxian analyses (Marx is also a
classical economist), Lenin’s imperialism thesis and Wallerstein’s world system
approach also support this global tendency thesis, though in a critical spirit. They
stress the distribution aspect and its political repercussions by pointing out uneven
development and structural inequalities inherent in capitalist expansion.
The future of the nation-state is one of the central topics for debate within the
globalization literature. The most common view in popular magazines and media is
“the demise” of the nation state. Increasing and more open trade, rise in the volume
and speed of cross-border finance capital (foreign exchange, stock exchange,
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banking and credit, various derivatives, etc.), transnational corporations, formation of
regional economic blocks (EC, NAFTA, ASEAN, etc.), active role of international
institutions (WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, etc.) all signify a new environment
bringing strong constraints to the power and autonomy of the states to pursue
independent policies (Summy, 1996). Changes in transportation and communication
technologies are usually pointed out as the infrastructure of this transformation
towards a de-territorialized world of global exchange.   Put briefly, the argument is
that the nation-state as a territorial entity is largely passé within the new environment
transforming time and space. Governments cannot arrange their “domestic” policies
(macroeconomic measures, taxation, income redistribution, labor law, etc.)
independent from the requirements of a mobile capital that has a veto power via
entry and exit.
That narrative about the demise of the nation state as a meaningful unit of effective
policy formulation and implementation is actually presented as the victory of global
market (capitalism) over the local regulatory entities. This is the neo-liberal
understanding of globalization, which also stresses liberal democracy as a universal
corollary of the global market. There is also a normative aspect to this argument,
which is based upon efficiency and freedom. Markets, it is stressed, bring resource
efficiency and force the states to respect individual rights and liberties (Friedman,
1962). What is required is a minimal state that shall enforce law and order and take
certain measures to attract foreign investments and to prepare the society for global
competition. It is mainly a negative freedom that is promised by proponents of the
neo-liberal approach. That is, all obstacles before the individual
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(consumer/entrepreneur/capitalist) initiative is attacked without paying much
attention to the relative position of different individuals and groups.
3.3.3 Cosmopolitan or Alternative Conceptions of Globalization
Neo-liberal globalization or the ‘globalization from above’ is not the only conception
about globalization. As Falk (1998) aptly defends there is also a ‘globalization from
below.’ Against the current market-oriented and statist outlook of the neo-liberal
globalization, globalization from below stresses adverse consequences of
globalization such as environmental degradation, severe vulnerabilities of social
segments, inadequate provision of global public goods, and world poverty. The role
of the state is redefined in that ‘globalization from below’ perspective as a mediating
body between the logic of capital and the priorities of people (Falk, 1998). Extending
Gramscian analysis from domestic to international level, it is argued that the
counterforce to capitalist globalization will also be global (Amoore and Dodgson,
1997). In other words, resistance to the dominant discourse and practice of
globalization should also be “localized, regionalized and globalized at the same
time” (Mahan and Stokke, 2000: 264).
Unlike neo-liberal understanding, cosmopolitan approach perceives globalization as
a multi-faceted phenomenon, with varying consequences for different policy
domains as well as for different states in real historical context. Put as such,
globalization is rather a new agenda for redefining state/society relations and
democracy rather than an end of the state and triumph of pure market relations (Held,
1995; Axtmann, 1996).  Cosmopolitan thinkers raise some criticisms towards the old
de-linking strategy of development and do not see much merit in its continuation in a
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fundamentally different environment. However, they do not jump into an easy
solution based on the thesis of universal free markets.  They do also refer some
problems of welfare state and central planning. However, such criticisms are not
raised from a New Right market efficiency perspective but rather from the
perspective of new social movements (environmentalism, feminism,
multiculturalism, etc.) that are critical towards paternalistic aspects of the state
(Axtmann, 1996: 44-45).
Cosmopolitan thinkers also observe a general tendency of erosion in the capacity of
the state in the economic policy front. However, they do not push this to the extreme
and declare the total surrender of the state. Indeed, the very dichotomy between the
state and globalization is argued to be illusory, as the globalization processes are
largely embedded in state structures (Amoore and Dodgson, 1997). The state is
losing in some fronts and gaining in others in the process of globalization. As
observed by Pieterse (1995: 63) “nation state is still strategic but ‘it is no longer the
only game in town’.”
More important than the increasing pressure on economic policy options of the
governments is the erosion of representation and legitimacy of the state with respect
to its citizens (Keyman, 2000a). Following the neo-liberal idea of negative freedom
does not bring forth a solution to mounting problems, in the context of blurred
categories like domestic/foreign, inside/outside, and national/international. What
forced the development of democracy and welfare state at the national level is
reappearing on a global scale. Though markets are certainly important, they do not
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bring solutions to many vital issues because of the problem of externalities,
monopolization, structural inequalities, identity issues, etc.
Particularly the “nation” part of the nation-state is under scrutiny in such critical
analyses. Nation state is territorial whereas culture is not, and this is increasingly
apparent in a world of global media, cross-border social movements (like feminism,
ecological groups, religious fundamentalism, etc.) and immigration. The notion of a
homogeneous nation is increasingly problematic and that problematic reflects itself
especially in the public realm. That is, classical liberal distinction between public and
private becomes debatable. All such changes signal the demise of old forms of
politics and the need for a “reinvention of politics” (Beck, 1997).   In that context,
globalization makes political decisions more urgent and consequential, though it also
entails going beyond classical left/right distinctions (Giddens, 1998).
The issue in such critical and reflexive arguments is not a problem of choosing
between minimal (liberal/technical) or maximal (authoritarian/paternalistic) state, but
rather a redefinition of state/society relations along a substantive or participatory
understanding of democracy. Globalization does not have an ontological existence
separate from the society and the state. Globalization is not the end of the state but
development of a democratic state that shall have a larger and multi-layered public
domain tolerating difference and preserving accountability.
In that framework, globalization is not an “external” factor that forces the states to
change internally; rather it is a relational concept that signifies the gap between what
is being demanded from the states and what the states can offer in their present form.
101
In other words, the nation state is under pressure from ‘within’ as much as from
‘without.’28 The solution to narrow this gap is neither a minimal neo-liberal state nor
a strong authoritarian state rising as a reaction to “external” or global threats and
promising protection to the “internal” populace. There is an alternative of democratic
state that goes beyond democracy in the context of the territorial nation-state. This
involves a “double movement,” from both upward and downward directions, in
which governance structures from local to global levels take part (Pieterse, 1997)
Put into the framework of planning debate, cosmopolitan approach favors neither
laissez faire nor the authoritarian overall planning (Beck, 1997: 142). The answer is
democratic state or democratization of state/society interaction that would promote
development of governance in global and local contexts. That is, planning needs to
be democratized and put on the service of society at large instead of that of the
market or state elite. As Beck (1997) emphasizes time and again, we don’t have to
reduce everything to the ‘either or’ logic of market versus the state in an age of
‘both/and’ logic. In that sense, the real question is how to find the appropriate kind of
institutional ‘mix’ of the state, market and community provision for each individual
country in concrete conditions (Axtmann, 1996: 45). Authoritarian planning might be
passe but not a democratic planning that would also include experts, this time not as
guardians of a transcendent rationality but as catalysts for empowerment and self-
governance within a broader negotiation process.
                                           
28 It should also be noted, at this junction, that policy makers may use globalization as a pretext to
justify their own preferred policies (Jones, 1997).
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3.3.4 Representation Crisis of the State and Democracy under Global
Conditions
As has been touched upon above globalization is not a process working from outside,
but rather an interconnection between various localities29. Globalization processes do
not take place somewhere outside the national or local environments but rather
continuously produced and reproduced by those very same locations interconnected
by various channels. A significant political result of those processes is the growing
and more diversified demand raised by the people upon the state on the one hand,
and the eroding classical tools at the hands of the state to meet those demands on the
other hand (Keyman, 1997; Summy, 1996). Elected representatives of the political
community do not effectively deliver what they have promised to their electorate and
people lose their trust into the political structures in that process. If there is no
alternative in economic policy prescriptions, for instance, voting between alternative
parties on the basis of different economic expectations loses much of its meaning.
The result is what is called as “representation crisis” of the state.
That representation crisis has various sources. Those sources might be classified
under three main topics; (a) Rousseau’s classical representation problematic, (b)
distribution of power between representative and non-representative bodies of the
state (the executive and the legislative bodies), and (c) the loss of power in national
institutions either representative or non-representative.
                                           
29 Robertson’s (1995: 26) concept of “glocalization” combines “globalization” and “localization”
concepts and implies that it is not possible to make a clear cut demarcation between “local” and
“global.” What is called as local might be created under various global effects and what is called as
global might be a sum total of innumerable local actions and contributions.
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First two sources of representation crisis are not so new. The first one is a classical
problem for representative democracy legitimated on the basis of size and
complexity of the modern communities not able to apply direct democracy as
practiced in the ancient Greece. According to Rousseau’s classical objection people
may feel free on the election day and become subjects of the rulers till the next
elections in a representative democracy. That problem is also related to the
distinction between formal and substantive democracy. Free and fair elections and
rule of law might suffice for a formal definition of a political community as
democratic. However, for a substantive conception of democracy those are not
adequate. It is not enough to vote and wait for the next elections. There are various
other channels in a functioning democracy to involve citizenry into the public policy
making. In that context, civil society organizations, social movements, and various
grass roots initiatives are considered as indispensable for a substantive understanding
of democracy.
Approaching to this issue from Hannah Arendt’s (1968) conception of politics that
goes back to Aristotelian understanding of man as a political animal, a substantive
understanding of democracy requires mechanisms other than elections to give people
a chance for telling their stories to each other, negotiating with peaceful
argumentation and devising policies together in a broadly defined public space.
Politics, as a process to realize common interests defined in a non-violent and
collective manner, corresponds to a similar planning process as a subset of this
overall political context. However, lack or inadequate level of civil society (including
bourgeoisie and working classes as well as other social agents) is a corollary to the
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weakness of substantive democracy as well as democratic or communicative
planning.
The second source of the representation crisis of the state is related to the
institutionalization of democracy, even in its formal sense, particularly in the
developing countries. It is observed that in many formal democracies there are
powerful bureaucratic structures, especially military, that preserve their position as
“guardians of the polity.” Turkey, among others, is a case in point in that regard
(Heper, 1992a and 1992b)30. Democracy in that context is a fragile process that is
open to periodical crises due to competition between the state elite who emphasizes
the national interests and the political elite who insists upon popular demands or the
national will. Without a balance between long-term state interests and short-term
popular demands absorbed by the political elite and a sense of respect for civil
politics on the part of state elite, it is hard to create a self-sustaining democratic
process.
The problem between executive and legislative bodies is also related to the
complexity of administration and the time constraints to take urgent decisions as a
reaction to real time developments in an uncertain environment. However, that
tendency to strengthen executive bodies vis-à-vis the legislative ones creates a
tension between efficiency requirements and democratic demands.
                                           
30 Powerful and oligopolistic business interests are also a problem for the effective functioning of
representative institutions particularly in developing countries. Especially individualistic relations
between politicians and businessmen create a very distortive decision making process.
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The last source of the representation crisis is related directly to the globalization
process discussed above, and partly to the changing weights between executive and
legislative bodies under uncertain environments discussed in the previous paragraph.
There are two dimensions of that last source of representation crisis; supranational
bodies and local resistance. Globalization, in that context, is a constraint upon both
representative and non-representative organs of a political community organized in
the framework of a nation state.
Indeed, some critical observers underlie the happy alliance between a “strong” state
inside and a “weak” state outside. As Marvall (1977: 19) formulates in the Latin
American context, “domestic ruthlessness and external submissiveness” turns to be
“the essence of the political economy of authoritarianism” in many developing
countries.  The visible (international financial institutions) and invisible (global
market) constraining hands in globalization processes have already discussed above.
As long as the classical conception of planning is part of the nation-state capability
regarding economic domain, this representation crisis of the state is reflected in the
planning approaches and practices across a whole spectrum of developing countries.
This problem will be elaborated in more detail in the context of Turkish experience
in chapter six. However, in this general context, one needs to further this debate into
broader debate about the relationship between planning and politics or planning and
power.
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3.4 A New Planning Paradigm in the Post-Positivist Global World
3.4.1 Self and Civil Society in the Context of Post-Positivist Global World
Identity/difference has always been problematic throughout the history of Western
philosophy. There has always been a fight over facts and concepts, Platonic ‘ideas’
and Aristotelian empirical reality, the general/universal abstractions or categories and
the particular/diverse manifestations in reality. In this framework, idealist/rational
and realist/empiricist ontology and epistemologies have persistently clashed with and
reacted to one another. Every attempt at universality had to face, sooner or later, a
reaction from a particularistic/individualist impulse, and vise versa. Any colorless,
abstract and reductionist universality claim, ‘disembodying’ individuals and
imposing upon them uniformity, could not preserve its authority too long. The same
fate is faced by any extreme particularistic claim, leading to ultra relativism, total
subjectivity and no common ground for dialogue.
Modernity and modern philosophy reproduced this axial problematic in various
forms and contexts. Descartes, in his famous formula of ‘cogito ergo sum,’ reasserted
the superiority of universal over particular, ratio over body, and homogeneity over
heterogeneity. Liberal tradition, mainly through the Kantian philosophy, attributed a
moral worth to this universal and abstract ‘self’ as defined by Descartes. This
universal self was accepted to be ontologically prior to any social construction.
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, among others, developed their social contract theories
on the basis of this universal/abstract self. Modern politics has been defined around
this universal/rational/moral conception of the self as a being with reason to find out
the best for his own interests. There has been a dual consequence of this new
political philosophy. On the one hand, the modern self gained some
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universal/inalienable/natural rights whose concrete content developed in historical
conditions, and on the other hand, it created a public sphere that has been principally
blind to particularities and diversity.
In a society of rational, self-interested and moral individuals, a strong need has
emerged for reconciling liberty of individuals with their inherent equality as well as
striking a balance between liberty and order. ‘Equality before law’ is the key formula
developed by the liberal tradition to reconcile liberty with equality. ‘Negative
liberty,’ that is, liberty from external/state interference in pursuing one’s own ends, is
another key concept for reconciling universal self in the public domain with diversity
in the individual private lives. The role of the public authority, in this context, is not
to provide ends for the self-interested private rational agents, but just to impose some
impersonal limits to eliminate violent clashes among selves.
Notwithstanding this universalistic conception of self in the liberal tradition,
territoriality and nationhood remained as underlying framework for politics.
Exclusion/inclusion into the rational/legitimate members of polity changed according
to the inside/outside distinction drawn by the territorial state as well as to different
attributes of the domestic population within the boundaries of the territorial state. In
other words, the universal rights of men are only effective when they are citizens of a
particular polity (Klusmeyer, 1996: 72-73). The nation state provided the necessary
mechanisms for democratic rule based upon the sovereignty of the people, but also
imposed internal and external limits for the legitimate membership of the polity.
Nationalism as a particularistic ideology is paradoxically also the principal political
force to operationalize universalistic ideals of modernity. In short, liberal democracy
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does not just demand rational citizens but also ones with patriotic sentiments,
particularly in times of war or inter-state conflicts (Axtmann, 1996).
However, ‘identity’ is a complex and relational concept or construct that entails the
‘other’ or ‘others’ (Keyman, 1997, Keyman, 2000b; Young, 1990).  Inside cannot be
defined without reference to outside and identity without difference.  In spite of the
universalistic appeals of Cartesian self, modernity has largely operated through the
same logic of categorical distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ In this context, “even
the expression ‘intersubjectivity’ carries the burden of the philosophy of subject”
(Bernstein, 1985: 14). In fact, class, gender, ethnicity, culture and religion, among
others, intersect and interact within this complex process of inclusion/exclusion
processes and mechanisms for identity formation and reformations. Power relations
are a central part of this process in which it is always the more powerful party who
defines the ‘other’ and posits its identity against it. The other is one who does not
have a space to speak for itself as itself, but faces a residual identity imposed from
the outside. Even when there is a space for the other to speak, it has to speak within
the language or discourse of the dominant identity (Young, 1990).
Liberal democracy within the boundaries of the territorial nation state is also
premised upon public/private distinction and existence of civil society as an
intermediate layer between the state and the individual. Public sphere is the domain
of politics where rational individuals as individuals or groups pursue their self-
interests or ideas under universal principles of the polity. Individuals in the public
domain, as lawmakers, executives or judges, must leave their particularistic identities
and concerns, and become ‘disembodied’ public figures. This is the domain of the
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general interest or common good, which entails universalistic formulation of private
interests. In the private domain, in contrast, particularity and diversity reigns, which
are assumed to be non-political. Feminism, immigration and multiculturalism, use of
ethnic and religious symbols naturally problematize this public/private and
political/non-political distinction. Liberal democracy with its abstract constituency
gets increasingly incapable of responding to such new demands in the context of
globalization or intermingling of diverse life forms.
In a liberal democratic framework civil society comes into the political scene in the
form of interest groups or pressure groups with a certain degree of influence over the
formal power holders. However, just like democracy, civil society has also been a
territorial and national phenomenon in its concrete historical evolution. Civil society
developed alongside capitalism and the nation state, taking root on the new economic
classes and operating within the relatively secure environment generated by the rule
of law (Keane, 1998; Cohen and Arato, 1992). In a capitalist society with a nation
state, the conception of a civil society at the margins of the ‘public’ or ‘political’ is in
fact deeply problematic. To consider the whole capitalist class, huge private
enterprises and their organizations, in the same category as weak or loose voluntary
groupings of citizens, seems to be a very unrealistic picture of the real political
processes. The growth of transnational companies and banks, with a turnover greater
than many small or poor nation states, makes this picture even more superficial.
Increasing concern for cross border risks and problems (environment, nuclear
weapons, poverty, etc.) and development of a web of relationships among individuals
and groups living under very different political settings, also poses a problem to the
current conception of the civil society and its relationship to what is ‘political.’
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The crux of the problem at hand is whether the self, civil society and democracy
conceptions and practices developed under the city-state and national contexts could
be transcended by a more inclusive one in a global context (Held, 1995). In other
words, the problem is to reconsider the possibility of a non-territorial and inclusive
democracy, with a new perspective on the relationship between the universal and the
particular, public and private, political and non-political. Globalization, used in this
context, means not something above or beyond particular states and societies, forcing
change from outside. It is rather conceived as a growing gap between the state and
society and a growing need for democratizing democracy in a new time/space.
Diversity and ambiguity are parts of this endeavor, which requires a broader and
multi layered public sphere.
Such a conception of democracy and globalization does not necessitate rejection and
elimination of the state and instrumental rationality of the Cartesian self. However, it
means an end to their absolute dominance or monopoly. In that context, there is a
demand for both horizontal and vertical enlargement of the boundaries of public or
political. By a horizontal enlargement I mean going beyond the territorial nation
state, without eliminating democratic politics at the state level. By a vertical
enlargement I mean going beyond the limitations of the simple instrumental
rationality. This is basically a demand for further democratization of the state and
state/society relations, looking for different conceptions with respect to state
sovereignty and citizenship.
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Going back to the universal/particular dialectic as a recurrent theme in the Western
philosophy and political practice, globalization could be considered as another grand
battle among these old concepts. In contradistinction to the simple characterization of
the globalization as the triumph of the capitalist market and liberal democracy,
globalization needs to be considered as a complex concept including simultaneous
processes of integration and fragmentation, homogenization and heterogenization,
peaceful resolution of old conflicts and new forms of conflict. Concepts like
glocalization (Robertson, 1992) and hybridization (Pieterse, 1995) often used in the
globalization literature point the need for more complex terminology in the evolution
of the globalization debate. In a world more interconnected, and perhaps more
important than this, aware of itself as more interconnected, some notions of classical
epistemology and methodology lose their practical value or validity. As has already
been explored in previous parts, postmodern and post-structuralist debates,
hermeneutic approaches and pluralist epistemological and methodological arguments
become pervasive in that process.
Globalization, in this sense, does not mean construction of a universal logic for all
humanity or the ‘end of history’ but rather a concept that refers to multi-layered,
complex and relational world, where no single actor or rationality can assert a total
domination over the rest. There is not the single universal self but various selves and
various conceptions of selves, not the modernity but different modernities, not the
rationality but multiple rationalities, and so on. The challenge, in this context, is how
to reformulate democracy as a general framework for facing and preserving this
diversity without falling back to extreme forms of relativism and violence. There is
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no easy and once-for-all answer to this challenge which entails permanent struggle in
a world that is open to multiple alternatives, desirable or not.
What has planning to do with all these debates on globalization and
identity/difference? It is clear from the discussions in the previous chapter that state-
centered planning based upon instrumental rationality and expert dominance is part
of modernity in its “simple form.” What is argued in this context is that as the
general epistemological and material conditions change, or as the globalization or
“reflexive modernity” processes outdate old forms of public and politics (Beck,
1997), planning in its traditional form becomes problematic and dysfunctional as
well.
Are we going to abandon planning altogether and let the market take care of social
problems automatically? Can pure market relations substitute for identity/solidarity
issues and sustain the social fabric? Postmodernity and globalization debates are
significant in terms of identifying the limits of social engineering based upon human
knowledge, but how are we going to approach our practical problems of justice. Even
the most radical postmodern thinkers are deeply concerned about such issues so far
as declaring, “if anything is deconstructable, it is justice” (Derrida, 1994: 36). The
old planning may be dead but pure market relations do not seem to be the only
answer for social betterment. As Durkheim observed long ago “if interest relates
men, it is never for more than a few moments” (quoted in Habermas, 1981: 116).
What we are in need of is not abandonment of planning as such but a new conception
of planning adapted to this new environment. Bauman puts this tension or ambiguity
concerning social justice and social engineering succinctly:
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One can even say that prohibition of social engineering is itself a social engineering of sorts, once one
knows (and we have such knowledge now) what consequences the ‘natural’ trends, if unattended and
uncorrected, are likely to bring …Balancing of costs and gains of, respectively, action and non-action
is not just an exercise in non-partisan expertise and dry, dispassionate accuracy, but a political
decision between alternatives burdened with prospectless lives and dashed hopes (Bauman, 1991:
270)
It seems that the “argumentative turn” in policy planning may provide us a new
opportunity to cope with this challenge.
3.4.1 Communicative or Argumentative Turn in Planning and Public Policy
There is a visible effect of post-positivist (e.g., Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, etc.)
and reflexive modernity thinkers (e.g., Anthony Giddens, Ulrich beck, Scott Lash,
etc.) on planners of a new generation (Muller, 1998; Innes, 1998). From all these
discussions on post-positivist epistemology and globalization one might conclude
that under the new intellectual and material conditions facing the planners today, it is
neither feasible for desirable to continue a planning practice based solely upon
instrumental rationality, elite guidance and paternalist state considerations. As
Fischer (1993: 21) observes, there is an “argumentative turn” in public policy and
planning, which “emerges as much from larger political and institutional conflicts in
society as from methodological issues.” This “communicative turn in planning” is
not “idealistic,” considering the practical experience of planners in complex societies
and anti-democratic alternatives (Healey, 1993: 248). It is in that context that
planning theorists, such as Sandercock and Forester, developed planning theories that
go beyond “simple modernity” (Beauregard, 1998: 94).
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Habermas is a very strong connection between philosophical debates and practical
planning alternatives. Marx thought we have reached a stage to make history rather
than being an alienated object before the forces of nature and political structures of a
class society. That stage for Marx is communism, which goes beyond basic needs
and opens a space for self-realization through human consciousness. Later socialist
experience transformed this vision into a planned society in which experts decided
on behalf of a classless society upon its common good. However, as a post-Marxist,
Habermas (1970a) thinks that we cannot control everything and there are always
technological and social changes that go beyond our expectations. Therefore, it is
neither desirable nor possible to create a totally planned society. However, that does
not mean that human control is totally out of the equation either. There needs to be a
balance between social control and technical change. In a sense, Habermas proposes
a soft planning approach that takes place in a limited range with more participants.
There are some communicative planning theories and models developed in that
framework. Sager (1994) provides a comprehensive example for such models.  In
this perspective, planning problems can be solved in two contrasting yet
complementary ways: one can trust expert judgment based on analytic technique or
discuss the matter and reach a group decision. These modes of problem solving are
reflected in the dichotomy of calculation versus communication. The planners have
to balance efficient goal achievement and democratic procedure. On the abstract
level it is a question of bounding the domains of instrumental and communicative
rationality in public planning.
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This new planning paradigm develops mainly on the basis of a broader conception of
rationality that is also relevant in a more interconnected and complex world, reflected
in the diversification of the “social.” The below given SITAR table shows the use of
different rationality conceptions and their corresponding planning approaches. As the
table implies, a new planning paradigm and practice entails first of all a new
rationality conception.
A rationality-based classification scheme for normative planning theories
Rationality type Paradigmatic core Corresponding planning
Theories
1 Instrumental rationality Search for the best
possible combination of
means for given ends
Synoptic planning, public
sector strategic planning
2 Bounded instrumental
rationality
Search for satisfactory
alternative, given an
unclear and partly
collapsed means-ends
scheme
Incrementalism
(disjointed),
Strategic choice approach
3 Communicative
rationality
Organize dialogue to
promote democracy and
personal growth and
search for a solution
agreed upon in undistorted
communication
Transactive planning
Dialogical incrementalism
4 Bounded communicative
rationality
Counteract structural
communicative distortions
to promote equal
opportunities and build
support for a reasonable
effective and fair
alternative
Advocacy planning
Planning as questioning
and shaping attention
5 Other type of rationality,
e.g., system-maintaining
types, like political and
ecological rationality
E.g.: Political rationality
preserves and improves
decision structures to
prevent indecisiveness and
conflict
Recalcitrant planning, i.e.,
planning emphasizing
other rationality types than
those above. E.g., radical
planning and ecological
planning
Source: Sager, 1994: 42
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3.4.2 Habermas and Communicative Planning
The use of Habermas’ ideas is very prevalent in such efforts. Particularly Habermas’
concept of communicative rationality is the most useful point of departure for a new
planning paradigm. As Pensky (1995: 107) observes “the general area of planning
and policy analysis is one of the most significant locations for the application of
Habermas’ critical theory.” At that junction it may be useful to give a brief
presentation of Habermas and the background of the concept of the communicative
rationality.
Habermas is a student of Frankfurt School organized around the ideas of Adorno and
Horkheimer. This school originated with the Institute for Social Research, founded in
Frankfurt in 1929. The school is best known for its “critical theory of society.” The
original idea of the school was to integrate normative philosophical reflection with
empirical social sciences in order to provide a basis for emancipation and a rational
society. However, following the Nazi experience and the Second World War,
prominent representatives of the school got more pessimistic about the future of
modern society and possibilities for emancipation, and thus criticisms of the school
on modernity has sharpened. Adorno and Horkheimer (1972), as well as Marcuse
(1969; 1971), put forth very harsh criticisms on modernity by pointing out the
totalitarian and repressive tendencies inherent in the instrumental conception of
reason, which they took as the dominant understanding of modern concept of
rationality.
Habermas became Adorno’s assistant in 1956 and developed into a very influential
philosopher, both in theoretical and practical debates in the post War Western
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Germany. In contradistinction to other figures of the school, particularly Adorno and
Horkheimer, Habermas did not lose his optimism about emancipation in modern
society. He has, actually, continued the original project of the school to integrate
philosophy and social sciences for political change towards a better world. In his
defense of modernity Habermas does not object criticisms of instrumental rationality
and gives a tribute to his predecessors for pointing out some immanent dangers in the
use of such type of a reason. However, Habermas does not accept identification of
modernity with the instrumental rationality and claims that this use of reason is just a
part of a broader conception of rationality, and sets forts for himself the traditional
Kantian role of philosopher as “the guardian of rationality” in its broader conception
(Habermas, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c).
As is already evident, in order to understand Habermas one needs to go into
modernity debate to some extent. Habermas is mainly in the position of defending
modernity against onslaught of postmodern critics like Paul Feyerabend, Michael
Foucault, Jack Derrida, and Richard Rorty.  Relativism and its political implications
are the primary questions for Habermas (Bernstein, 1985: 4). He mainly criticizes
particularistic and self-defeating character of those postmodern approaches and
stands for universalizing tendency of modernity, and thus, proposes to understand the
Enlightenment and modernity in more complex terms (Fleming, 1997: 1-17). In that
perspective he developed the concept of communicative reason based on inter-
subjectivity and a free and equal participation of parties to a dialogue. That is
proposed as a way to reach consensus without resorting to power and violence. He
defends “ideal speech situation” as a standard for rationality, which aims at “a
consensus arrived at in a discussion free from domination” (Habermas, 1970a: 10).
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In that conception what is rational is not given prior to a dialogue but rather an end
product based on the power of better argument in a real dialogue performed under
suitable conditions.
Habermas tries to stress that modernity or the Enlightenment is not just a call for
control or domination upon natural and social life, but also a project for
emancipation from all sorts of repression. In that sense, he perceives modernity as an
“unfinished project,” considering the deficit on the side of its emancipatory promise.
It is through the discursive or dialogical reasoning that the emancipatory aspect may
exert its power upon the cultural and political structures of the society. That broader
conception of modernity is basically expressed by what he calls “the communicative
action” (Habermas, 1981; 1990). Modernity can no longer base itself upon
metaphysical and religious conceptions of substantive rationality, but has to stick
with procedural conceptions following Kantian example of categorical imperative.
The universal character of Kantian philosophy needs to be preserved, but its
egocentric formulation replaced by inter-subjective or dialogical practices, according
to Habermas. That requires an “ideal speech situation” with the right to universal
access, the right to equal participation, and no subtle or overt repression.
In his effort to save philosophy/modernity both from conservative pre-modern
approaches as well as from destructive postmodern critics, Habermas resorts to a
larger conception of hermeneutics (Habermas, 1990: 1-4). Epistemology, for
Habermas, is concerned about the relationship between language and reality,
concentrating on the observable reality and testing the correspondence between our
utterances and what is the case in the empirical world. On the other hand,
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hermeneutics deals with a threefold relationship involved in human utterances. An
utterance, in that context, serves as “(a) an expression of speaker’s intention, (b) an
expression of the establishment of an interpersonal relationship between speaker and
hearer, and (c) an expression about something in the world” (Habermas, 1990: 24).
In other words, Habermas proposes an approach to knowledge, which takes into
account subjective, social, and physical reality all at the same time. In that
framework, it becomes possible to combine the philosophical and artistic aspects of
knowledge with empirical/explanatory knowledge of sciences.
Every use of language or interpretation upon reality is in need of providing reasons
or justifications by referring back to personal/subjective, normative/legal, or physical
conditions that are deemed as binding to the parties of an argumentation. In doing
this references participants of a conversation also refer to a shared conception of
rationality as an arbiter of debate that makes people reach some sort of a consensus
for action without resorting to violence or any other extra-rational tool to solve their
conflicts. A rational outcome, in that framework, is based upon sincerity  (subjective
truthfulness), appropriateness to the shared norms (legitimacy), and conformity to
physical realities (feasibility).
Raffel (1992) explains these conditions of rationality employed by Habermas with a
simple example of a professor requesting a student to bring water for him/her. In
such a position, which also includes a power relationship, the student, as the weaker
party subject to the request, may resort to three ways of objecting the professor
according to the criteria set forth by Habermas. The student may question the
subjective truthfulness or sincerity of the professor and ask whether the professor is
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thirsty or whether he/she is trying to put the student in a shameful position before the
others. Student may also refer to shared norms and question normative and legal
appropriateness of the request by telling, for instance, that he/she is not an employee
of the professor and thus the professor does not have a right to make such requests.
Finally, the student may also use physical feasibility argument and tell the professor
that there is no water accessible to bring in the seminar time.
Those threefold questioning is also related to Habermas’ more abstract classification
of “knowledge-constitutive interests.” There is a “technical,” a “practical,” and an
“emancipatory” interest, corresponding to control of the world around us,
understanding others, and freeing ourselves from structures of domination
(Habermas, 1970b; White, 1995: 6). Technical knowledge is rooted in labor, uses
empirical-theoretical tools to represent objective/physical reality, as employed in
natural science; practical knowledge is rooted in language, uses interpretive
approach, characteristic of social science; while emancipatory knowledge is rooted in
power relations, uses self-reflexive and artistic approach, appropriate for critical
thought (Fleming, 1997: 36-41).
As has been discussed, Habermasian conception of rationality draws upon all three
sources of knowledge not just “technical.” Those inputs from natural science, social
science, art and personal reflection come across and interact in the process of a
rational argumentation. The outcome is rational in a broad sense, as there is consent
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of capable participants speaking to each other in the framework of a “life world”31
providing some common elements and shared meanings for communication.
3.4.3 Globalization, Civil Society, and Public Sphere
Apart from the debate on modernity and its promises, one may also locate Habermas’
approach into the post-socialist world of triumphant market ideology. In that
framework, one may argue that the main problem for Habermas is how to reach
consensus or manage/administer/order a unequal/hierarchical/class society that is, at
the same time, based upon principles of freedom, equality, and individuality. In other
words, the problem is how to reconcile modern state and capitalism with democracy.
Adding new social movements (feminism, environmental movement, peace
movements, citizen initiatives, anti-colonialism) and growing interconnectedness and
intermingling between different cultures and ethnic groups in a globalization process,
the need for reconciliation becomes even more urgent. In that process it is getting
increasingly hard to define society as a Subject with clear goals and interests. Neither
the market nor the state elite is in a position to represent what is rational for a
diversified society with open borders.
What is proposed by Habermas, in that context, is basically liberal conception of
freedom of speech32 operationalized through various institutional mechanisms (the
parliament, the media, the courtroom, the academia, civil associations and
                                           
31 “Life world” is used by Habermas vis-à-vis “system” that is constituted by economic interests in the
market and bureaucratic interests in the state. Life world goes beyond these systemic forces and
provides some kind of a shelter for freedom. Individual experiences, family, small groups,
neighborhoods, various types of civil society organizations, constitute the life world (Habermas 1981).
32 In his criticism of Habermas, Rorty (1985: 173) claims that “valuing ‘undistorted communication’
was of the essence of liberal politics without needing a theory of communicative competence.”
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movements, etc.), both formal and informal. However, the concept of public is
enlarged to include informal networks of debate that provide the basis for formal
legal decisions. That is what Habermas calls “discursive democracy” which is the
interplay between “a multiplicity of ‘public spheres’ emerging across civil society
and a broad spectrum of formal political institutions” (White, 1995: 13). “The very
concept of ‘public sphere’ is to do with rational-critical discussion” in a multiplicity
of communicative avenues (McGuigan, 1996).
The idea of civil society is critical in that understanding of politics and public policy.
Institutional core of civil society is; (a) a government which is limited and
accountable, operating under the rule of law, (b) a market economy (a regime of
private property), (c) an array of free, voluntary organizations (political, economic,
social, cultural), and (d) a sphere of free public debate (Diaz, 1995: 81). Civil society
makes no sense under the total domination of instrumental or economic rationality
based upon means-ends type of relationship and expert knowledge (Dryzek, 1996:
115). It is not anti-thesis of the state but emerges in the conditions provided by the
state (Hall, 1995: 16). Otherwise, ‘civil society’ loses its meaning and turns into an
anarchical stateless situation with ‘nascent’ civil societies (Keane, 1998: 191).
In that context of multiple public spheres and a lively civil society alongside state
structures and capitalist economy, Habermas takes a position between
republican/communitarian and liberal models of democracy, trying to reconcile
common good and particular interests, collective identities and individuality,
responsibility and liberty, without sacrificing any. In that sense, Habermas’
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conceptualization coincides with cosmopolitan understandings of globalization
discussed above.
Habermas thinks that the language of state and market is basically a technical
language that is related to instrumental rationality. The political community at large,
on the other hand comprises the life world, which contains the potential for
communicative rationality. The problem, in that framework, is to save the life world
from total domination by the instrumental rationality of the bureaucratic state
(power) and capitalist enterprise (money). The Welfare State is criticized in that
junction by Habermas for “colonizing the life world.” In short, what Habermas
proposes is not elimination of the modern state or market, but their encapsulation in a
life world with multiple channels of communication. What is required is to strike a
balance between those two worlds by discursive democratic practices.
What emerges from all these debates is a new planning paradigm based upon free
communication among all parties in the context of future-oriented collective action.
This planning paradigm depends on “story telling” as much as technical analysis
(Forester, 1993). This communicative, dialogical, argumentative or democratic
planning aims at consensus among free subjects of a conversation as the standard for
legitimate policy making. It is also critical to note that “dialogue here is no longer a
simple ego-alter ego interaction but rather an encounter between mutually decentered
agents involved in a transformative event” (Dallmayr, 2001: 346).
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3.5 Assessment of Communicative Planning based upon Habermas’ Critical
Theory
3.5.1 A Critical View on the Goal of Consensus in Communication
Habermas provides planners with a very fruitful concept of communicative
rationality. However, his standards in defining this type of rationality also raise many
philosophical, political and practical problems. The most important problem in
Habermas’ communicative rationality is perhaps his strong stress on consensus as the
telos of communication. Consensus formation, in that theoretical context, “rests in
the end on the authority of the better argument” (Habermas, 1981: 145). However,
there is no guarantee that people shall reach a consensus even when there is an ideal
speech situation. “Rational disagreement,” for instance, is a pervasive fact in the
history of science, allegedly the most rational human activity (Brown, 1988: 192;
Healy, 1996: 171). Making consensus a value in-itself may not be appropriate in all
cases. Sometimes a consensus reached by a certain group of people may be
embarrassing for others, or for future generations. Who is going to judge the
rationality of consensus in that case?
Habermas’ emphasis on consensus for collective action is particularly problematic in
terms of democracy. Democracy necessitates dissent and opposition. By stressing
consensus as a criterion, Habermas shows an “implicit commitment to a
homogeneous public” (Young, 1990: 7). As Mouffe (1993: 141) puts it “there can
never be a fully inclusive ‘rational’ consensus” as long as the “political” is nor
erased, or turned into a purely technical process. Habermas seems to put a strong
emphasis on the “power of the better argument.” This stress may not always resist to
the significance of power and interest in the decisions reached for action.
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It is not also clear in Habermas how to “distinguish between a ‘rational’ consensus—
one based upon reasoned argument—from a consensus based upon custom and
power” (Giddens, 1985b: 130-131). It is not always easy to decide whether it is the
power of the better argument or the power of power to formulate itself as the better
argument in a real dialogue. That is a classical binary opposition between truth and
power. Considering discursive and ideological aspects of power rather than just its
sheer content of force, it is hard to make a clear-cut distinction between power
relationships and dialogical relationships. At that junction, Michael Foucault and
some other postmodern critics need to be taken into account.
Insofar as Habermas’ communicative rationality, as a basis for collective action, aims
at consensus and eradication of opposition, it may threaten the very existence and
meaning of democracy. That is why, one need to consider and reframe Habermas’
communicative rationality within the context of democratic planning. First, dialogue
should not be necessarily linked or predicated upon consensus. Consensus should be
one of the possibilities rather than a criterion for an ideal or successful
communication for collective action. Ideal communication, in that context, should be
understood literally as communication among different viewpoints and stakeholders,
without any external hindrance or coercive intervention. In that communication
process some differences might be eliminated while sometimes new and even bitter
differences might be generated.  Second, even when there is a consensus at the end of
a dialogue or communication process, this consensus needs to be considered as a
provisional one that is open to be challenged at any later time or context. Consensus
of whom, consensus at what time and place, consensus under what circumstances
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and in which sense, etc. are all legitimate questions as limits to the value of any
specific consensus.
Planning as a collective action oriented concept does, of course, need decision, but
such decisions need not be necessarily based upon unanimity or consensus in each
and every case. What communicative planning could reasonably target is decision
that is arrived after debate, inclusive as much as possible of controversies and
dissent. That practice and process would generate different perspectives, enhance the
informative ground for decisions, and provide a certain degree of legitimacy and
ownership for the implementation phase. On the other hand, this approach is
expected to make dissent and alternatives visible as a force of vitality for future
planning. With an effective monitoring and evaluation system in place, and provided
that the dialogue shall continue in the future, dissent or minority views in today’s
communicative decisions for collective action might raise to the status of tomorrow’s
majority decision.
Communicative planning, in that sense, does not necessarily produce and work upon
consensus or unanimity, but rather stresses the preservation of open channels for
future dialogue, guaranteeing the chance for different configurations of decisions for
future collective action. That means, consensus is needed, at most, on the principle of
continuing the dialogue and basic procedures of dialogue, rather than on the
substantial issues under debate in concrete decision-making contexts. In other words,
Gadamer’s and Rorty’ stress on the continuation of dialogue or conversation is a
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better guide than Habermas’ stress on consensus. One may argue that a more flexible
approach in that regard is also more practical and feasible.33
If communicative planning is not manipulated to create an image of unanimity and
consensus to hide antagonisms among different views and interests, or if it is not
used to create a “manufactured certainty,” the more feasible and practical function of
communicative planning would be to make different alternatives visible and provide
a transparent framework for making a choice in a certain context under specific
political conditions. That process would also show that the solution is not a technical,
neutral, impersonal and necessary result, which is beyond any political dispute, but
rather as an acceptable alternative for collective action for the time being, open to
political opposition and reformulation at a later date under new conditions. What is
critical in this process is to make sure that the choice is being made after the debate,
or that the final decision is really ex-post, not vice versa, which would reduce the
whole process into a meaningless manipulation.
There would certainly be a “pre-decision” or “draft-decision” similar to Gadamer’s
“pre-judgment” or “prejudice,” if the debate for collective action could not be
conceived as starting out of a void. However, final decisions or final judgments—
themselves “pre-decisions” or “pre-judgments for the future debates—need to be
made ex-post and with a reasonable influence of the communicative process.
Understanding rather than consensus should be emphasized as a standard or goal in
                                           
33 Processes that seek out consensus can actually endanger more conflict, consume more time and
resources, provide no guarantee for final policy and compliance, encourage peer pressure, exclude
dissidents for gaining consensus, generate bias in favor of status quo, and limit communicative
practices with trivial issues (Conlianese, 1999)
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that framework, “understanding that is open to renegotiation in time instead of
consensus” (Luhmann, 1998: 69).
Habermas speaks mainly within the context of nation state and bases his theory on
the legal and institutional infrastructure brought about by national practices. In a
globalizing world the boundaries of political community is getting blurred and thus
the potential participants of a dialog is also problematic in that new environment.
All these criticisms about consensus at the “domestic” level can be repeated for the
neo-liberal claims for certainty as formulated in “there is no alternative” slogan of
the 1980s at the global level. This “Washington Consensus” reflected in the practices
of the international agencies denies the political nature of planning and policy-
making by reducing everything into “technical” or “optimum” solutions. The
“technical” and “top-down” approach inherent in the international financial
institutions to developing countries, based upon the imposition of generic solutions,
can also be related to this debate on the value of consensus.
In that context, one should emphasize that the communicative planning is not just a
national but also a global requirement, if it is going to be meaningful under
globalization context. That means the current approach, if not the discourse, of the
international financial and other institutions needs a fundamental change towards
communicative practices and real dialogue. Dialogue with developing countries and
their governments should not be considered as a manipulative process to get their
consent for already drawn policy proposals, but rather as a real debate on the context-
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bound solutions reached after an open communication process.  That transformation,
in turn, partly related to a “deepening” of democracy and development of
communicative practices in the developed countries, which primarily shape and
control such institutions. Otherwise, communicative planning in developing
countries might turn into mere “talk” among powerless stakeholders.
One needs also underlie the fact that Habermas’ theory is developed under the
conditions of the rule of law in liberal democratic societies. What Habermas
proposes also requires a particular sort of political culture open to diversity and
difference. In other words, discursive democracy is a “deepening” of liberal
democracy, and requires certain preconditions made available by the former. In that
context, countries having weak democratic institutions and an elitist political culture
are not in a very good position to provide the larger framework for the operation of
discursive democracy. Discrepancies between “ideal speech situation” and real
speech situations, especially in the less developed parts of the world, who are not
only under the repression of authoritarian indigenous rulers but also dictates of
external powers (bureaucratic and capital), entails a more qualified approach.
Last but not the least, Habermas makes a sharp and clear cut distinction between the
“system” (economy and state) and the “life world,” attributing them respectively
instrumental and communicative rationality. In fact, this is an over-generalization
and does not pay adequate attention to communicative rationality in the system and
instrumental rationality in the life world. As Diaz (1995: 104) argues “neither
economy nor bureaucracy is as machine-like, instrumentally rational and determinant
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as Habermas tend to portray.” This point is particularly important for developing
participatory mechanisms within formal bureaucratic structures.
3.5.2 Beyond Habermas: Planning, Politics and Power in a Global World
In the below given visualization Friedmann (1987) gives an overall picture of
planning in relation with the territorial state, political system and bureaucratic
practice. As is evident from this representation, planning is a tool not only for system
maintenance and system change, but also system transformation. It is very hard to
draw a clear demarcation line between planning and politics. It is important to
distinguish between different types of planning (such as advocacy, innovative and
radical) in order to debate the connection and interaction between politics and
planning. In its technical definition based upon instrumental rationality and expert
guidance planning could easily be considered as a non-political, and even sometimes,
anti-political endeavor.  However, when it comes to advocacy planning,
communicative planning, radical planning, etc. one needs to consider the inherent
political characteristic of any planning activity.
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  Source: Adopted from Friedmann, 1987: 30
Planning at the national level cannot be totally separated from politics. One should
ask the question of “who plans?” and interrogate the legitimacy of planning as a
process of “deciding for others” (Sartori, 1987: Chapter 12). Forester (1993: 192-
197), for instance, underlies the fact that the planners are part of politics and make
political and ethical choices all the time, whether they like it or not. As expressed by
Heilbroner (1985: 97) “the prevailing interest system…not only designates the ends
for which [one] must plan his means, but…also establishes the calculus.” In that
context, one should accept that planning is a highly political process, both when
politics is considered as an authoritative redistribution mechanism and when it is
defined as a deliberation process on the common issues of a community.
Territorially Based System of Social Relations
System Maintenance
System Change
System Transformation
Political Practice
Bureaucratic Practice
Planning
System of Political Order
Allocative Planning
Innovative Planning
Radical  Planning
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Using Parson’s system view and identifying main sub-systems, Sager (1994: 38)
draws the following table, which gives a comprehensive picture on the connection
between planning and politics
A compound rationale for planning
Main aspects of
planning
Planning as
integration
Planning as
politics
Planning as
Production
Features defining
the planning process
1 2 3
1.Elements of the
planning rationale
Personal growth Aid for undistorted
communication
Correction of
market production
2.legitimizing bases Community and
the public interest
Overcoming
illegitimate social
inequalities
Efficacy in meeting
material needs
3.Kind of
emancipation
primarily aimed at
Relaxation of
mental bounds
Liberation Relief
4.Target areas for
the planned action
Integrative
system, i.e., self
and close
interpersonal
relations
Political system,
i.e., collective
decision-making
Economic system,
i.e., material
conditions
5.Main types of
rationality
Social rationality,
stress on ego
strength and
solidarity
Communicative
rationality, stress
on mutual
understanding
Instrumental
reason, stress on
goal achievement
6.Paradigms for
practice
Psychoanalysis Conflict-analysis Engineering
Science
7.Paradigmatic
planning theories
Transactive,
dialogical
incremental
Advocacy Synoptic
8.Sociological
perspective
Consensus view Conflict-view Neutral
9.Foci of planning Process-
orientation, citizen
participation for
consciousness-
raising and
empathy training
Primarily process-
orientation, e.g.,
citizen participation
as direct
democracy
Product-
orientation, e.g.,
citizen participation
for information and
smooth
implementation
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Planning in this context is related to politics in both its liberal and radical or
discursive meanings. In the former or liberal meaning of politics, redistribution of
resources is the primary subject of politics. In that context, planning, defined as
rational resource utilization, is directly related to the political process defined as a
redistribution mechanism. Setting priorities and making choices among alternative
uses of resources are integral parts of planning practice, as much as the source of
various political debates. With a strong emphasis on efficiency and instrumental
rationality, “the politician in the [liberal] technical state is left with nothing but a
fictitious decision-making power” (Habermas, 1970a: 64). Even when the political
system in liberal democracies operate effectively, they do so together with a
technical elite organized within the formal institutions or “think-tanks” connected
with the party in power (Fischer, 1993: 34).
Politics as a discourse or as deliberation process is also related to planning as a
process of forming consensus on the public policies and resource utilization. This
time it is not planning based upon instrumental rationality but a planning based upon
communicative rationality. However, the relationship between politics and planning
or power and knowledge is still there. As has already been argued, communicative
planning can solve the problem of instrumental rationality by broadening the public
space and opening planning process to different stakeholders, but it cannot solve the
problem of hegemonic ideology –as defined by Gramsci—and discourse as a built-in
power relationship –as described by Foucault. In that context, some planning
theorists focus on the role of unequal power in relationships and how they affect the
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understanding of representations of different forms of rationality. Flyvbjerg34, for
instance, shows, with reference to Foucault, that power defines reality and that
rationality is context-dependent in real planning practice (Stromberg, 1999).
Globalization and representation crisis of the nation state and national politics is a
very significant context for discussing the relationship between planning and power.
Representation crisis is reflected in the crisis of planning institutions particularly in
developing countries, as exemplified in the Turkish case analyzed in later chapters.
Conventional planning organizations are supposed to work on expertise and generate
best or technically optimum solutions for the community. In practice many of those
institutions are losing their power on the resource utilization and policy formulation
terms. The gap between what is planned and what is realized is growing under the
conditions of global and local processes out of the control of the central planning
bodies. As a related issue, and probably more importantly, the gap opens between
what public at large desires and what is planned in the official documents.
The relations between governments and planning bodies are also changing in that
process. Especially in the developing countries governments, under the pressures of
both international institutions as well as national clientele, take decisions that do not
respect in any sense to the priorities and objectives defined in plan documents35. As a
                                           
34 Flyvbjerg studied the history of the prize-winning “Aalborg Project,” an ambitious and
comprehensive plan of the late 1970s, intended to reduce private car use and promote public
transportation. This project finally turned out against the original objectives. In this case study that has
influenced significantly the planning literature, he emphasizes the force of deliberate distortion of
documentation, behind-the-scene negotiations, undemocratic coalitions and the dominance of
rhetorical persuasion (Lapintie, 1999: 11)
35 For instance, in the macro-economic policies the role of IMF and the World Bank, in trade policies
the WTO, etc may become more important for governments in urgent need of foreign financial
resources (aids or loans); while the interests of narrow party financiers might be more effective in
shaping the public investment choices that are supposed to be in line with plan priorities.
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result, plans lose their prestige and become superfluous documents. Planning is
closely related to action, and without action plans turn into ordinary reports. Under
these conditions some policy makers opt for more authoritarian solutions for the sake
of a stronger economic performance in developing countries. At that junction, it may
be useful to have some word on the relationship of democracy, power and planning
in developing countries.
Discussions about the relations between planning and politics in general and
planning and democracy in particular leads us to power as one of the central concepts
of politics. What is the effect of power on the processes and results of the planning
process? Is planning, as some radical critics would argue, nothing but a technical
cover for the justification and legitimacy of some powerful political and economic
interests in the society?36
Planning is about the definition of common interest for the society and action based
upon such definitions. Considering that “society” is not a unitary “subject” but rather
divided along economic (class, income, occupation, etc) as well as cultural lines
(social movements, minorities, religions communities, etc.), the difficulty of
formulating common interest becomes obvious. Using the concept of “hegemonic
ideology” developed by Gramsci, one may argue that planning in such a diversified
context creates an image of unified interest, and thus, contributes to the interests of
the dominant sections of society, who really shape the real content of planning.
                                           
36 Marxist criticisms of planning are illuminating in that regard. They argue that planning in capitalist
countries mediate conflicts between capital and labor, regulate some secondary conflicts within
capitalist class, and play an ideological function by hiding special interests of the capitalist class under
the concept of common good, as if society is a homogeneous entity (Sager, 1994: 51; Friedmann,
1987: 437-447).
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However, very difficult though it may be, democratic politics and planning in a
diversified society lose its meaning without some possibility of defining common
interest.  As Friedmann (1987: 27) argues “the state must maintain at least the
appearance of serving [public interest or the common good]. If it does not, its very
legitimacy may be in doubt.” That is, ideological use of common interest should not
be taken as an end to various possibilities of communication among different social
agents. Otherwise, common interest would be limited to a perfectly homogeneous
and harmonious platonic state. Just like the concept of rationality, the concept of
common interest needs to be put in a broader context. At the end, it is the political
process and political struggle that will determine “the outcome of tensions among
different rationalities in development decision-making” (Goulet, 1986: 131). In other
words, “future planning theory will have to address the Foucauldian concepts of
power/knowledge and productive power more seriously” (Lapintie, 1999).  Apart
from an ideal search for common interest it seems to be more realistic and
democratic to devise necessary mechanisms to deliberate and negotiate on the
content of the common interest in concrete contexts.
3.5.3 Planning, Democracy, Market and Freedom
On the background of the above discussion related to the relationship between
planning and politics, one needs to analyze more specific issue of planning and
democracy, or planning and freedom. There are different views about the relationship
between democracy and economic development.
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First, there are people who argue that democracy is harmful to development (Sen
1999). Those who support this view point out the experience of East Asia as a happy
combination of authoritarian rule and economic development. It is argued that an
authoritarian government is in a better position to harness national resources in
national development projects by transcending particular interests within society.
Chinese economic success is also pointed out as a case for this argument.
Authoritarian governments can keep working classes in check, press their wages to
increase competitiveness, provide stability for domestic and foreign firms, and
undertake large physical and social infrastructure investments. In a democratic
environment it would be difficult to make people sacrifice their short-term benefits in
return for long-term development benefits, which some early generations might not
even see in their lifetime. In that line of argumentation one has to wait until a country
reaches a certain level of development before transforming into a democratic polity.
Opposite to the first perspective, there are also people who advocate that democracy
is helpful to development. Those who support this view stress responsiveness of
democracy for the demands of larger community. They also stress transparency
brought about by democracy in devising and executing policies. Some corrupt and
failed authoritarian regimes are pointed out as the possible outcomes of an
authoritarian model for development (like some former socialist countries, some
African and Latin American dictatorships, etc.). It is argued that particularly in crises
times (hunger, macro-economic downturns) democracies are better performing to
protect vulnerable groups within society through an active media and other political
channels of pressure upon government (Sen, 1999).
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Amartya Sen (1999:13), for example, takes the oft-repeated argument that “poor
people are interested in bread, not in democracy,” and claims that such an argument
is fallacious at two different levels. First, democracy has a protective role, which is
particularly important for the vulnerable segments of society, and second, there is no
persuasive evidence that poor people prefer to reject democracy. It is usually elites in
authoritarian countries who make such arguments in order to legitimize what they
actually prefer to do.
There are also those who don’t observe any clear causal relation between democracy
and development. Those who express such views are usually social scientists
conducting systematic empirical analyses. Those empirical studies show no clear
correlation between democracy and (economic) development, either in negative or
positive way. There are successful democracies in terms of economic development as
well as failed ones. So are authoritarian countries (Przeworski, 1999).
However, those views have some significant limitations. First of all, it is important
how one defines democracy and development. Democracy might be defined in
various ways, formal or substantive. Development is also open to different
definitions. A broader conception of development cannot be confined to increase in
per capita income measured in dollar terms. Income distribution between different
segments and regions, quality of education and health services, environmental
degradation in the process of development, sustainability of growth in the long term,
are but some other elements in a broader conception of development. One may also
question the value of economic development without civil and political rights and
liberties. If we are going to judge development from a broader quality of life
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perspective covering freedom and participation in the decision-making processes,
then it is almost impossible to separate democracy from development (Bardhan,
1999: 93).
Moreover, after the end of the cold war and spreading of democracy almost all parts
of the world, development has to take place in a new international environment.
International organizations as well as individual countries and regional trading blocs
are increasingly stressing democracy as an important element in economic relations
(technical cooperation, trade, economic integration, capital movements, credits, etc.).
Authoritarian management of economic development is getting difficult in a global
environment valuing democratic practices, particularly under the concept of human
rights. Many developing countries do not simply have a choice to pursue
authoritarian rule and get the economic ties with the rest of the world intact.
In short, whatever its affects on economic growth, democracy has its own merits as a
preferable system of government based upon the consent of the governed and
providing some basic rights and liberties valued by a vast majority of people. It
should also be pointed out that a sustainable and broader conception of development
entails democracy as an integral element of social welfare. In addition to that, in a
new historical environment in which democracy is becoming a universal value, if not
a universal practice, it is getting hard for authoritarian models of economic
development to sustain support from the external world to their policies. Planning, in
that context, need to be redefined to meet the requirements of a broader conception
of democracy and development. In a pluralist and participatory planning practice
based upon participation as well as expertise, a balance can be stroke between some
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specific issues that seemingly create a trade-off between democracy and
development.
Indeed, in a highly complex and dynamic world, democracy should not be
considered just as an ideal, but rather as a requirement for managing uncertainty and
conflict. Democratic values, in this context, should guide state action that would be
effective, equitable, and participatory. Democratic values increase effectiveness via
heightening participants’ commitment to implement decisions because they are not
imposed from above; focuses policies on the problems of disadvantaged people; and
encourages the development of political wisdom in ordinary citizens by grounding
competency through broad and deep participation (Fung and Wright, 2000: 34-40).
One should also stress the fact that democracy and market do not always and
necessarily go hand in hand. Capitalism can take different political forms and the
spread of capitalism after the cold war does not guarantee stable democratic politics
in the long run. There is some sort of a relationship or a broad correlation between
democracy and the level of economic development in general and the level of market
autonomy in particular, though this is neither a necessary nor an automatic
relationship. However, even an international financial speculator, George Soros
(2000: 2), does recognize the fact that “if we care about universal principles like
freedom, democracy and the rule of law, we cannot leave them to the care of market
forces.” Those who see an automatic connection between democracy and capitalism
are, according to Soros (2000), “market fundamentalists.” Existence of markets and
openness to the international economic relations might be helpful and to some extent
necessary for the development of liberal democracy, but they are certainly not
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sufficient. Not only the present day examples but also historical experiences of
fascism and various kinds of authoritarian regimes in capitalist economies during the
1930s and later witness this argument.
The relationship between market and democracy might also be extended to the
relationship between planning and democracy. Is planning against democracy or
political liberties? The classical distinction between positive and negative
conceptions of freedom is a very important departure point in this debate37. “Does
freedom consist of our right to do something, or does it instead-or also-encompass
our right to protection from something” (Hickman, 1956: 184).  Those who describe
freedom as an ability to do something defend positive freedom thesis, while those
who defend freedom as the right to protection from something defend negative
freedom thesis.
Based upon the ideas of Hayek, one might argue that planning as an alternative to
market mechanism is a “way to serfdom.” It is neither efficient (due to information
deficiencies to distribute resources effectively among numerous alternative areas nor
liberating due to its emphasis on expert decision instead of the decisions of each and
every consumer in the market (Friedman, 1962: 4-11). This is basically a negative
freedom approach in political science, stressing limits to state intervention in private
sphere. Apart from this libertarian objection to planning, there are also significant
objections for planning due to its authoritarian and paternalistic implications. That is
                                           
37 Isiah Berlin makes this distinction in political philosophy and asserts that “the positive conception
of freedom is antimodern” (Mouffe, 1993: 37-38).
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basically the idea of an “authoritarian welfare state,” which does not result in an
emancipated society, despite its social functions (Habermas, 1970a: 58).
However, the relationship between planning and democracy might be constructed in
a totally different way, too. In that context, one may argue that planning is basically
an empowering process that overcomes inequalities of the market results and
involves a broader segment of the citizenry that are very ineffective or totally
excluded in the market (such as poor peasants, unemployed, disabled or
handicapped). Marxism in general emphasizes substantial inequality and criticizes
legal or formal liberties and equality before law (Klusmeyer, 1996: Chapter 9).
Marcuse (1969: 87), among many other socialist thinkers, for instance, argues that
collective ownership of means of production and planning are necessary conditions
for liberty.
Thus, broad generalizations about the relationship between democracy and planning
or freedom and planning are not very helpful. Indeed, there is an ambiguity and
tension between planning and freedom. Planning is, “inherently, partly controlling
and partly an exploration of new opportunities” (Sager, 1994: 58). It is not planning
in general but planning in its concrete forms and processes that may be reinforcing or
impeding for democratic practices. Planning, just like Foucault’s concept of power,
is a Janus-faced phenomenon. It may be both enabling and repressive. It is futile to
discuss planning in abstract terms and judge it in one way or another. What is more
meaningful is to search answers to questions such as what type of planning, planning
by whom, planning with which methods and tools, planning at what level, planning
for what, planning in which area, etc.
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If it is not reduced to simple consumer satisfaction, freedom as a social and political
concept needs “the company of other men [and] a common public sphere” (Arendt,
1968: 148). Planning in that context needs to be an enabling and inclusive practice in
the broader framework of democratic political process. The role of the planning in a
new global and local context is related to the new definition of state/society relations.
Transformation of the state/society relations along democratic practices shall also be
reflected in the transformation of planning. Looking from the other side, a
democratic planning process in the service of development in relatively
underdeveloped countries may also contribute to the democratization of state/society
relations. Emphasis on communicative rationality, inclusion of various social groups
into the planning process through participatory mechanisms, flexibility in the design
and implementation of plans, and transparency in the allocation of resources shall
contribute to the elimination of the gap between real social demands and the content
of planning documents as well as the gap between what is planned and what is
implemented.
It is important to strengthen the role of representative state organs (particularly the
legislative body) in the different stages of the planning process and avoid a total
control by executive (government) and bureaucracy upon the planning. That is not
sufficient, considering the problems of representation discussed above. What is
required is a broader participatory practice that shall include civil society
organizations (employers’ and workers’ unions, various associations related to
planning activities, etc.). Further than that, particularly in the developing countries, it
is also important to include unorganized majority through various means into the
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planning activities, particularly at the project planning level. Otherwise, participation
would be limited to a narrow organized section of society, and be biased towards the
ideas and interests of those who can participate in an organized environment. Such
mechanisms for developing a democratic planning practice are proposed within the
context of Turkish planning in the chapter six of this thesis.
3.6 A New Planner for a New Planning Paradigm
“No practical planning theory comes alive without its practitioners” (Beauregard,
1998: 93). Perhaps the most important point in institutionalization and
operationalization of new planning paradigm based upon communicative rationality
is to redefine the planner. It is also significant to identify the role of the expert and
technical knowledge vis-à-vis non-expert participants of a dialog. If rationality is not
in the monopoly of the expert, then what is going to be the role of the expert in a
process of argumentation aiming at reaching consensus or understanding in a non-
violent way? Is expert going to be just one party among others representing a
particular viewpoint or is he/she going to supervise the whole communication
process by the use of technical superiority?
There are no easy answers to such practical questions in real settings. In all
probability the old planning paradigm will not die and conventional planning
activities and expertise shall play its role in public policy. In other words,
communicative planning and planner will not replace but coexist with conventional
planning and planner. Though both conventional and new planner “tell and listen
‘practise stories’ all the time,” the dualistic nature of planning and planner should be
accepted (Forester, 1993: 188; Tehrenian, 1995: 10). In this dualistic world of
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planning, the discursive or argumentative notion of planning depends upon the
notion of planner as a participant in a political and social world (Forester, 1985: 59).
With an analogy to Popper’s (1979: 106) “epistemology without a knowing subject,”
what is needed is perhaps “planning without a planning subject.”
Are we going to make a distinction between different sorts of experts?  Probably yes.
One may distinguish between;
• Experts that are specialists of a particular field (transport, rural development,
health, etc.)
• Experts that have a broader perspective on planning with their
interdisciplinary background (planning experts).
• Experts that are specialized in communication and facilitation techniques.
• Experts that combine two or more expertise cited above.
All those different kinds of experts may have a legitimate role in the communication
process. However, their role in planning process shall be different. However, as a
general expectation, planning experts in communicative planning paradigm would
have a special expertise in communication techniques in addition to being specialists
in particular fields of planning. Planning education and curriculum should also be
modified in order to serve to these new requirements (Innes, 1998).
It is also possible to classify planning experts according to their institutional and
spatial connections and loyalties. In that context one may distinguish among local,
community, national, international and trans-national experts; experts working for
public agencies versus those working for private and civil institutions; and experts as
political activists or expert-cum-political activists that provide services to political
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parties, civil society organizations and social movements. There is going to be
planning bureaucrats in formal agencies engaged in communicative planning
alongside “radical planner” as a transformative community agent (Friedmann, 1987:
400).
The role of radical or community planning experts are important in that process,
particularly in terms of inclusion of unorganized sections of the society into the
planning process38. They need to act as mediators among different groups and
present some ideas about the technical feasibility of the ideas put forth by the
participants. They are also in a position to integrate different views into a more or
less consistent operational program to be implemented. That means communicative
planning requires different qualifications for planning experts or experts with
different qualifications within the planning process. It is not adequate to have experts
who are competent in subject matter wise but also experts who are competent in
communicative skills.
At the end the approach to experts and their role in the decision making process shall
also be determined in the communication process. Depending on the issue area and
other particularities of the situation each time this role definition need to be redrawn.
However, when all is said and done, one must probably accept that “the experts are
recognized by the existing experts” (Brown, 1988: 148).
                                           
38 Advocacy planning approach developed in the United States during the 1970s is but to reform
planning by transforming the role of planner as a representative of silent majority that is not well
organized to defend its interests against powerful lobbies and official bureaucracies. Feasibility of this
approach may be debated as planners shall still be taking their salaries from the government and could
more easily be manipulated by information from powerful interests groups (Yılmaz, 1999). However,
the demand for a more responsible attitude on the part of planners is an important element, and it
should be integrated into the education programs and socialization processes for planners.
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CHAPTER IV
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH PLANNING: PLANNING IN
THE CONTEXT OF TURKISH MODERNIZATION PROCESS
4.1 General Framework
As has been argued in the second chapter classical planning can be related to
modernity in its various aspects. Modernity as a mode of thinking entails increased
human control over the nature and society.  That means, first and foremost,
understanding the causal mechanisms and developing new technologies to
manipulate the current reality into some desired forms. Planning is a tool used by the
agency of the state in that context, based on an instrumental rationality shaped by
means-ends relationship.
On the one hand, modern planning is based upon the scientific and institutional
infrastructure of modernity, dealing with new problems generated by the
modernization processes (urbanization, poverty, environmental degradation, etc.). On
the other hand, it is a tool at the hands of states for further modernization, or a
catalyst for rapid and systematic change, under the uneven spatial development of
modernization processes39. As has been emphasized in the previous chapters, the
latter function of planning is particularly critical for countries, which are left behind
in the modernization process.
                                                          
39 Köker (2000: 14) refers to this aspect of modernization when he states that non-Western countries
have to achieve development in a very short period of time compared to Western societies, leading to
active human intervention (action) with the agency of the modern state and intelligentsia. Keyman
(2000a: 126) emphasizes the agency of the state in the Turkish context, stating that, “the Turkish
modernization is ‘state discourse’ par excellence.”
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In that context, it seems meaningful to study the history of planning in Turkey in
connection to its history of modernization and its will to modernize40. However,
Turkish case is not isolated from larger or global processes and need to be related to
developments outside Turkey. That is why Turkish case will be discussed in
connection to the changes in the global environment as has been presented in the
chapter three.
Some global trends in the modernity and planning concepts and practices have
already been discussed in the previous two chapters. It has been argued that, parallel
to changes in mode of thinking and material conditions in the modern economy and
polity, classical concept of planning based upon a particular conception of rationality
is facing a crisis today. What is emerging is a planning approach based upon a
broader conception of rationality, mainly defined in communicative terms, within a
new environment characterized by erosion in the capabilities of the nation state vis-à-
vis local and global processes. As a result of such processes classical conceptions
like absolute sovereignty of the state, inside/outside distinctions, etc. become largely
obsolete and/or demand new interpretations or re-formulations (Keyman, 2000a).
The topics that are going to be discussed in this and the following chapters are
reflections of these historical transformations and material conditions in the
framework of planning in Turkey. Before doing this, it would be helpful to give a
brief historical background for planning in Turkey. This historical background
comprises the rise of economic nationalism as part of broader development of
                                                          
40 Considering the heterogeneity among “backward” or “developing” countries, Turkish case might
not mean too much for the rest. However, despite this heterogeneity, there is a common point among
those countries, which might be called as a “development syndrome” (Köker, 2000: 107). In that
context, Turkish case would possibly shed some light on the general dynamics operating in the
process of modernization for a “latecomer” country.
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Turkish nationalism within the process of modernization efforts during the last
century of the Ottoman era and in the first decades of the new Turkish Republic.
4.2 The Ottoman Legacy and Economic Nationalism
4.2.1 The Ottoman Legacy and the Rise of Modern Turkish Nationalism
There is a need for brief background knowledge about the Ottoman past, particularly
Ottoman modernization efforts, in order to set the stage for discussing the
development of planning practices during the Republican Era in Turkey.
The Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and highly centralized
polity over a vast area. Especially after the conquest of İstanbul, a bureaucracy
recruited by systematic ways and educated in the palace has ruled the Empire. That
was more or less a meritocracy under the absolute authority of the Sultan. Therefore,
the Ottoman past represents a different structure compared to the European feudal
organization (Mardin, 1999: 242; Keyder, 1999: 20). There was no well-established
aristocracy with a considerable degree of autonomy from the center. The same goes
with cities, professional organizations and intellectual institutions. Under the “Millet
System” the Ottomans gave a significant degree of autonomy to religious
establishments, but even these establishments were somewhat used as agents of the
center to control the population and bring order to the society (Mahçupyan 1998;
Tezel, 1999: 6-8). In that sense, there is a “strong state” tradition positioning the state
beyond and above the society and its various elements (Heper, 1985: 16). Ottomans
considered state and religion as “twins,” but giving priority to the former more than
any other Islamic state (Mardin, 1999: 82). Everything, even Islam as the official
religion of the state, was considered as secondary to the state, its preservation and
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high interests. On the one hand, that is a very pluralistic arrangement, staying away
from assimilation and homogenization of the society, on the one hand, a very
monolithic structure when it comes to give a voice to these different groups in the
political arena.
The Ottoman Empire has been permanently involved into the European history,
though mostly as a military threat. In that sense, it has contributed to the formation of
European identity as “the other.” Its relations to Europe have been largely defined as
power relations. Thus, modernity in Europe has been felt first primarily as a change
in the relative powers, particularly in the form of military technology. That has
forced the Ottomans to take some measures to understand and adapt to new
conditions to preserve their relative power against the European powers. The agent
for this change was no other but the state and state bureaucracy, including some
sultans, like Selim III and Mahmut II. The problematic for the Ottoman Empire was
to preserve a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state against technologically and
ideologically superior nation states of Europe. Hence the Ottomans demanded a
modern army and a modern economy in order to “strengthen the state” (Köker, 2000:
126). In that framework, the Ottoman Empire has been subject to comprehensive
reform attempts during the 19th century, “the longest century of the empire” (Ortaylı
2001). This was not just a change under the influence and manipulation of foreign
powers but also a self-conscious search by the state elite to restore and transform the
system.
The most important concern of the Ottoman reformers was the state and its
preservation. Even most of the intellectuals transferring the modern ideas like
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positivism and nationalism were indeed state bureaucrats motivated by the idea of
“saving the state” (Mardin, 1999: 98). These were generally pragmatic persons trying
to find an ideological formula for the unity of the Ottoman population and new
institutions for progress. As İnsel (1995: 36-37) argues  ‘the statesman,’ in the
Ottoman context, cannot consider his position outside the state apparatus, and thus,
puts the preservation of the state as the single most important concern in his political
perspective. Such an identification with a central state structure with no concrete
social legitimacy and representation led to a hostile attitude towards any local and
autonomous power center, perceived as a threat to the preservation of the state.
Ottoman intellectual-bureaucrats (or intel-aucrats) were very much under the
influence of the French Revolution and culture during the 19th century. They have
adopted a positivist approach, and Enlightenment ideals like progress as discussed in
chapter two. Apart from traditional strong state tradition, this strong positivist
perception of modernity reinforced elitist approach towards social change in the
Ottoman context (Mardin, 1995).
The Ottoman intelligentsia developed a critical stance against the despotism of
sultans, particularly Abdulhamit II, towards the end of the 19th century. Their ideas
were converging around constitutional monarchy, which had lived for a short while
and then interrupted by the Sultan in 1871. Bureaucrats organized under the Union
and Progress Party succeeded to overthrow Sultan Abdulhamid and declared second
era of Constitutional Monarchy in 1908. From this date onwards the destiny of the
Empire was in the hands of reformist bureaucrats who represented modernist project
as well as nationalism in Turkey. They were an elite group that was concerned with
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independence from foreign interventions and unity of the Ottoman state. Moreover,
they were very much conscious about “being backward” vis-à-vis Europe in many
respects including economy.
As has already been discussed in the chapter two, modern planning developed in the
framework of nation states and modern bureaucracies. Turkish planning is no
exception. However, there are also conditions peculiar to the Ottoman social and
political structures, which had long reaching implications for the history of planning
in Turkey. Ottomans had already a strong traditional central administration, which is
generally considered to be a patrimonial one in Weberian terms. However, this state
structure started to transform with modernization processes. Among the modern
influences nationalism played a pivotal role in the transformation of the state towards
a modern polity.
Modernization or the aspiration for modernity seems to be a critical context for the
rise of nationalism as a political force. Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1991) are two
prominent theoreticians who have pointed out modern character of nationalism,
though in different terms and interpretations. For Gellner it is mainly related to the
transition from agraria to industria, which requires a homogeneous, flexible and
mobile workforce, whereas for Anderson it is an “imagined community” rising with
the help of print-capitalism, which created a new time/space for human
consciousness. Charles Taylor (1997: 43), in a sense, combines these modernist
explanations and declares that nationalism “cannot be understood as an atavistic
reaction. It is a quintessentially modern phenomenon.” In that explanation market-
industrial economy, bureaucratically organized state and democracy or modes of
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popular rule shape nationalist imagination made possible through a new time/space
conception creating simultaneity.
However, there is not one single route towards modernity, but rather diverse
modernities, according to Taylor. Once modernity becomes a force in certain parts of
the world and begins to exert its influence upon the rest, then traditional cultures and
polities start to modernize themselves. This happens, according to Taylor, through a
“creative adaptation” which by definition differs from culture to culture. That
process begins from the modernizing elite who aspires for modernity, but at the same
time, feels its dignity threatened. Later, according to Taylor, this elite movement
becomes a mass phenomenon through multiple means –spread of modernity itself,
charismatic leadership, and violence forcing everybody to take sides.
Indeed, at a first glance, Taylor’s account seems to fit into the rise of Turkish
nationalism in its general characteristics. As Parla (1999: 19) puts it, Turkish
modernization was a “defensive modernization” identifying with the powerful in
order to resist it. Turkish nationalism rose in the modernization process in an
imperial/dynastic context and it was first an elite and later a mass phenomenon41.
However, these factors might not make Taylor’s approach fit into various other
countries,  which  encountered  modernity  in  a  different  domestic and international
                                                          
41 The concept of elite and its role in the process of building nationalism need to be problemitized.
However, I shall not attempt to such a criticism in this thesis that needs to focus on planning issues
rather than general debates regarding the development of nationalism. It may suffice to point out some
general limitations of elite/mass distinction. First, the concept of elite –as well as the mass-- is a very
obscure concept because of significant differences among those put into the same category or because
of an uncertainty concerning criteria to be used in order to determine whom one should
include/exclude. Second, that conception does not pay much attention to non-nationalist elite.   And
finally, one needs to be critical towards passive characterization of “mass” vis-à-vis elite, in the
process of social change.
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contexts. Neither does it explain everything, with a simple elite/mass distinction, in
the process of modernization and the rise of Turkish nationalism. Take the category
of elite and their feelings about self-dignity. In order to speak about the dignity of
elite, one should already have an elite and a state structure for that elite to develop a
sense of dignity against a foreign threat.  That is why it seems to be significant to
make a distinction between people and elite who encountered and interacted with the
process of modernization through an already existing traditional state structure from
those who were stateless when the process began42.
The Ottoman case is an encounter with modernity in which the state is already there
with its bureaucracy and social organization. That was a “multi-national43” and
multi-religious state having a long tradition in statecraft and administration.
Nationalism for such a state structure would mean disintegration and loss of power.
The primary concern for the Ottoman elite was how to save this state structure facing
military and ideological threat coming from modernizing nation states of Europe.
They searched for an answer in three formulas: Ottomanism, Islam, and Turkish
nationalism. Ottomanism was aiming at something similar to US experience. It was
expected to unite different nations/ethnies and religions under one single political
structure. However, Islam became important as an integration tool when Muslim
population dominated the population of the Empire after the independence of many
non-Muslim nations in the 19th century. Turkish nationalism arrived as the last
                                                          
42 For some of the stateless elite living under an imperial domination, modernization might not mean a
threat to their dignity but could rather be welcomed as an opportunity to create their own state
structure.  A comparative analysis of Greek and Turkish nationalisms might be useful to see
implications of this argument. In short, modernity may be perceived not as an abstract process but one
functioning in multiple ways for different types of elite, and society.
43 To describe the Ottoman Empire as  “multinational” is indeed anachronistic, if the nations, as we
know them today, are essentially modern.    
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formula to maintain the state when even most of the non-Turkish constituents of the
Empire disintegrated from the center.
Elite discourse is open to modification from another point of view. When Taylor
speaks about “modernizing elite” he takes them as a uniform group. However, as
evidenced in the Ottoman case, modernizing and nationalist elite does not really form
a uniform group but reveal some significant differences with regard to their origins
and aspirations. The critical question here is which comes the first; the state or the
nation? It is clear that in the Ottoman context the state was there before the nation as
it is defined today. That is why, within the state-nation dialectic, it is the state that
defines the nation, not the other way around. However, to say that the state is
defining the nation is not enough. One needs also look at the content of this
definition and the rivalry among the elite on this content.
Looking into the debates within Young Turks movement as the focal context in
which early conception of Turkish nationalism was developed, there is at least a
significant distinction between Tartar migrants and indigenous Ottoman
intelligentsia/statesmen. The former were more ethnically oriented, whereas the latter
were more concerned with the future of the state rather than the nation. As Arai
(1992: 64) observes “Yusuf Akçura [a migrant], in contrast to Ottomans who seem to
have regarded Turkish nationalism as a means maintaining the Ottoman state,
regarded the Ottoman state as a means of preserving the advantages of Turks.” The
debate between Süleyman Nazif (an Ottoman) and Ağaoğlu Ahmet (a Tartar migrant
from Russian dominated areas) reveal similar differences in their conceptions of
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Turkish nationalism (Arai, 1992: 65-66). Such distinctions might be related to the
earlier distinction made above between state elite and stateless elite44.
Ottoman experience shows a combination of those two types of state and stateless
elites in its peculiar context. The first group, one may claim, tends to favor a more
civic –though elitist and statist-- conception of citizenship compared to the second
group which places more emphasis on ethnicity and decent from a common ancestor.
Ziya Gökalp is a paradigmatic example for the indigenous Ottoman intellectual45. He
formulated the general ideological framework for the Republican Turkey as well. His
concept of nation is not a racial or ethnic one but a fairly modern formulation
(Berkes, 1965; Parla, 1999). The model for Gökalp was first American nation, and
after the Balkan Wars, British one. Later Gökalp and some other Ottoman
intellectuals –such as Fuat Köprülü—came to the idea that “only the Turks’ having
their national ideal could save the Ottoman state from destruction” (Arai, 1992: 63).
Before this transformation in the minds of some important figures among
intelligentsia, “Ottomans attached to the term ‘Turk’ a meaning of contempt for
Anatolian peasants and nomads” (Arai 1992, 66). Even after the change in the
connotations of the term “Turk,” Turkish nationalism and Ottomanism were
essentially interchangeable terms for most of the Ottoman elite.
                                                          
44 One may also make a distinction between “periphery” (taşralı) and “center” (İstanbullu) elite. For
example, Mardin (1983: 58) notes that it was the leaders of the periphery elite who later established
the Union and Progress Society. One may hypothesize that periphery elite are more apt to stress
populist policies and ideas that, in turn, create a more suitable framework for the development of
nationalist ideas. On the other hand, center elite is expected to be more concerned about the
maintenance of existing power structures and show less enthusiasm towards radical ideas that might
disrupt the status quo.
45 Considering the “Turanian” or pan-Turkish ideas of Gökalp, one may object the state-centered
understanding of Gökalp. There are three general ideals of Gökalp: civilization, Islam, and Turkish
nationalism. The central idea for Gökalp, however, was civilization defined around the concern for
maintaining the state. Thus, one may claim that the Turanian ideal for Gökalp is not indeed an ideal
but rather a means in the service of the state.    
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4.2.2 The Formation of Economic Nationalism in the Context of Turkish
Nationalism
What do all these above considerations about the development of the Turkish
nationalism as part of Turkish modernization efforts tell us about economic
nationalism? One may argue that for the state elite economy was of a primary
concern so far as it represented the material infrastructure for maintaining state
bureaucracy, financing the defense against foreign powers, creating tranquility in
domestic politics, and increasing the capability of the state to control the society,
while for the elite not identified with nation rather than the state, economy is related
to the well being of the nation rather than that of the state. For the latter, it is not
sufficient to have a well functioning economy that will support the state, it is also
important to determine who or which ethnic group controls the economy. Of course,
it is hard to make a clear cut distinction between elites and generalize such policies to
each individual member, but it seems to be appropriate in general to expect such
difference of emphasis.  However, either in state-centered or nation-centered
conceptions of the economy, there is a strong drive towards intervention into the
functioning of the market and protectionism to reach non-economic objectives.
Turkish nationalism was a strong means for transforming imperial dynasty into a
modern state. The modern state was basically conceptualized as a nation-state, as
represented by the French model. Development of a modern concept of nation took a
very long period in the Ottoman Empire. Young Ottomans in the middle of the 19th
century and Young Turks (as part of the Union and Progress Society) at the turn of
the century are critical movements in the development of this concept. Nation
(Millet) for classical Ottoman elite meant a religious community organized under the
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central authority and supervision of the state. There were Muslim, Christian, and
Jewish “nations” officially recognized by the Ottoman Porte. They had a large
internal autonomy and lived side by side with other communities. However, Muslim
nation was not just another nation but also represented in the center. Gellner (1983:
77) observes this structure in the Ottoman case and states that Islam was both a high
(garden) and low (wild) culture. It was a Muslim state, but one above all religious
communities at the same time.
Muslim subjects, mostly recruited from among Christian subjects of the Empire in
the Balkan region, were appointed to the top-level administrative posts. This
administrative class dominated the Empire especially after the conquest of İstanbul
and substituted Turkish tribal chiefs. They had developed a rather rational and
universalistic high culture based upon a well-organized system of palace education
(the Enderun Mektebi). They have largely lost their original community allegiances
and became totally dependent on the state. They represent what Gellner calls
“memluk” individuals46. The future of the state and the individual members of this
group were identified to a great extent. That is why, if the state was in need of a new
political ideology to survive, it was this class that would first elaborate such an
ideology. As a result, their political ideas developed in terms of pragmatic concerns
related to the state and lacked a systematic philosophy or history (Mardin, 1983: 14-
17).  The Ottoman intelligentsia was recruited from among those state bureaucrats
                                                          
46 Indeed, Gellner derives this term from Egyptian historical experience. Just like the Ottoman
‘devşirme’ class recruited for state administration, memluks are slaves of the ruler, on the one hand,
and top level administrators, on the other. Empires need such a class when they start to create a state
structure independent from their original tribal roots. He argues that modernization destroys kinship
ties and universalizes the mumluk condition. Once everybody loses its indigenous or primordial ties
and becomes an individual, then states do not need specific methods for creating memluks as a
separate category. In other words, every member of the modern nation-state is apt to be a state
administrator because we are all memluks now (Gellner, 1983: 36, 102).
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who went through a modern education in military and medicine. However, one needs
to be careful in using the term intelligentsia without relating their ideas to the state
and their role in its functioning.
Ahmet Mithad Efendi and Beşir Fuat are two important figures for the development
of a new political ideology in the 1880s. Especially Ahmet Mithad Efendi stressed
the concept of people rather than nation and called for creating an “Ottoman Homo
Economicus” (Mardin, 1983: 47-48). Mizancı Murat Paşa is another important figure
in the late 19th century who was conscious of the people (mainly peasantry) as a
political concept. It seems that populism movement (Narodnichestvo) in Russia in
the 1870s had an important influence on the thinking of some of the Ottoman
intellectuals. Hüseyinzade Ali, as a migrant from Russia, was one of those persons
who transferred such ideas from Russia to the Ottoman Empire. He was also among
the founders of Union and Progress Society. Nationalist literature and nationalism
sprang out of this early populism and elaborated as a reaction to its critics (Mardin,
1983: 86; Berkes, 1965: 94-97).
“People,” in that historical moment, was actually referring to somewhat more literate
and better off section of the Ottoman population living in the Balkans. Nationalists
exalted people as an abstract category and they hoped that people would see their
true interest in changing the existing despotic regime of Sultan Abdulhamid.
However, “real” people were not so much interested in a revolutionary politics, a fact
that upset some of the members of the Union and Progress Society. Such
disappointments led them to a more elitist and top-down approach to bring about a
radical political change (Mardin, 1983: 109-123). From this time onwards an
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identification of elitism and Westernization developed in the unfolding of the
Turkish modernization (İnsel, 1995: 75). Such elitist and top-down approach adopted
by the Ottoman intellectuals towards the people may be a general tendency in many
other cases. As Gellner (1983: 124) observes nationalist ideology “claims to defend
folk culture while in fact it is forging a high culture.” Even glorification of people
and history is to change the reality into some desired forms that are rather modern in
its content. As a result of this, elite comes to a conflict with concrete people at some
point.
As has been stated above, the primary concern for the typical 19th century
intellectual/statesmen of the Ottoman Empire was to find a way to maintain the state.
In this process, they have developed some sense of consciousness about people and
their material conditions, partly under the influence of populist views imported from
Russia via migrants. However, for a full-fletched concern for a national economy or
for an economy in the hands of Turkish nationals one needs to wait for the
developments during and after the First World War.
It may also be informative to take a look at the economic situation of the Ottoman
Empire and its economic relations with the outside world during the 19th century.
Unlike many other European powers Ottoman Empire did not move from agraria to
industria, but felt its effects intimately, particularly in the field of military
technology.  This disruption in the relative power of the Empire led many
intellectuals to think upon its reasons and the ways to cure it. However, the reasons
found in the 19th century were basically administrative and cultural rather than
economic (Berkes, 1965: 38-40).  They thought that the solution to their
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backwardness was a simple transfer of means used by the Western societies.
Rationalism and intellectual “enlightenment” were highly praised without a sufficient
concern how to disseminate such values to the general public and turn them into
productive enterprises.
Construction of railways, development of Western style consumption in limited
circles, establishment of education institutions based upon the Western models,
giving trade concessions to foreign countries, and borrowing huge amount of foreign
money in order not to use in production but to finance wars, etc. characterize the
overall environment during the 19th century. Not only the economy but also the state
finance was under severe problems during the same period. When the opportunity for
further borrowing disappeared and the state had to repay its accumulated debt
towards the end of the century, almost a total bankruptcy emerged. Duyunu
Umumiye, which was basically an agent of foreign creditors, was formed to collect
tax revenues to pay foreign debts47.
Economic policies, including the construction of railways, were not mainly designed
to create welfare for the Ottoman subjects, but to integrate domestic market based on
the export of raw materials to the European markets as the source of manufactured
and luxurious imports. The location of railways48 at the beginnings of the 20th
century testifies this dependency. It was not serving to connect different parts of the
                                                          
47 Such foreign bureaucratic structures also contributed to the development of a modern bureaucracy
in Turkey. With the practices of Duyunu Umumiye, for instance, Turks learnt modern state finance
(Ortaylı, 2001).
48 That strategic role of railways lingered into the Republican period and motivated a massive effort
for nationalizing existing railways from foreign capital and building new railways connecting different
parts of the new state (Kuruç, 1987: 21-23). That transportation network was expected to serve
defense requirements and internal security purposes as much as economic needs.
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country in order to create an integrated domestic or national market, but rather
aiming at a connection between local and European markets (Pamuk, 1984). The
overall result was a transformation of the Ottoman economy to a periphery position
for the European center, though the country has never experienced a direct
colonization by the European powers.
Trade and credit relations with Europe were critical domains of unequal relationship
between the Ottomans and the Europeans. An important aspect of this relationship
was the central role played by non-Muslim-non-Turkish subjects of the Empire,
mainly the Jews, Armenians, and Greeks. That relationship created a radical change
in the classical power relationship between state elite and religious communities, on
the one hand, and Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, on the other hand. One may
argue that the dignity of the state elite was not only suffering from the superiority of
foreign powers, but also from a change in relative power among domestic groups.
Considering the centuries old superiority of the Ottoman political organization vis-à-
vis Europe and the privileged position of the Muslim bureaucrats within the Ottoman
polity, those changes in their relative power in domestic and external front brought a
very strong sense of loss of dignity. As put by Mardin (1999, 217), these
developments turned classical ethnic division of labor into ethnic competition, where
Muslim-Turkish group tried to capture many economic control points from
foreigners and minorities.
4.2.3 Policy of Economic Nationalism in the Early Republican Era
The history of Turkish modernization or Westernization goes back to the 19th century
Ottoman efforts to reform army and bureaucracy as a reaction to the relative decline
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of the Empire’s power vis-à-vis the European nation states (Karpat, 1996). This
process has been intensified and put into a more systematic form after the
Independence War and the foundation of the new Turkish Republic in 1923, under
the leadership of Atatürk. Nation building and “state-building49” have characterized
the early years of the Republic when the political elite envisaged a new and Western
type of society and economy. As a result, a strong central administration50 was
developed in order to transform society from above and create a new type of citizen
identity, de-linking from the dynastic past in a radical way. Thus, it is almost
impossible to explain the economic history of the Turkish Republic without relating
them to non-economic factors (Okyar, 1993: 12).
The First World War, and the Independence War following it, has created a historical
discontinuity in the Ottoman state. The Empire was disintegrated to a great extent
due to the defeat in the World War, and the Independence War could only re-
establish a state structure within a much-limited territory. There was not only a
radical shrinkage in the territory but also a radical change in the ethnic and religious
composition of population aftermath of the Wars. Most of the Muslims of various
ethnic backgrounds immigrated to the new state from former Ottoman lands which
were now under the jurisdiction of non-Muslim states, and vice versa. Put in simple
terms, the new state, which was to be institutionalized as a nation state, was a
                                                          
49 It was not, indeed, a state building from scratch, but culmination of a century-old reform movement.
The state was already there with its army and bureaucracy inherited from the Ottoman era (Ortaylı,
2001). The problem was a redefinition of the state or placing a new regime based on a modern
conception of nation, radicalizing the modernization process.
50 Mardin (1983: 16) claims that the “proto-nationalism” of Young Turks has been a consequence of a
new communication structure brought about by the organization of provincial administration, as part
of centralization efforts in the 19th century. Republican efforts for further centralization were built
upon this Ottoman legacy.
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religiously much more uniform community within a smaller territory. The state was
to “create” a secular Turkish nation51 from this population within its new borders.
Economic nationalism “assumes and advocates the primacy of politics over
economics. It is essentially a doctrine of state-building and asserts that the market
should be subordinate to the pursuit of state interests” (Gilpin, 1987: 26). One of the
major pillars of the nation building in Turkish case was creation of a self-sufficient
and diversified national economy under the control of Turkish nationals. That has
been attempted by means of economic nationalism which can be defined as a set of
protectionist and mercantilist policies organized by the nation state as an agency
(Aktar, 1996: 263). Not only the transfer of economy to Turkish nationals but also
development of a more integrated transportation and communication network under a
central administration were expected to give rise to the creation of a modern national
economy52. The founders of the Republic envisaged not only a new type of polity
and economy, but also a new type of individual. People and their environment are
expected to change simultaneously. Economy would play a locomotive force for this
comprehensive change (Kuruç, 1987: 17). That was the “strategic” choice for the
Republican elite that would shape the overall framework for day-to-day decisions at
a lower level of generality.
                                                          
51  It should be noted that ‘national’ or ‘Turkish’ in that early period of nationalism was almost
equivalent to ‘Muslim’ subjects of the Empire. That is also evident in the definition of Turk and
minorities in the Lausanne Treaty between new regime and the European powers.
52 Apart from general policies formulated with a strong nationalist element there were also some new
organizations like “National Economy and Saving Society” (Milli İktisat ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti) whose
main aim was to create a consciousness among the masses about the vital importance of creating a
strong and productive national economy. As Coşar (1995: 75-76) points out such organizations were
to do propaganda for the national industry.
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Relating economic nationalism and economic policies developed in that context to
the general debates in the previous chapters, it is clear that the reformist Ottoman
bureaucracy as well as Republican administrators used basically “instrumental
rationality” to overcome problems emanating from unequal spatial development of
modernization. A strong state tradition combined with a positivist epistemological
framework provided the legitimacy for this dominant approach to statecraft in
general and economic administration in particular. The bureaucracy had a privileged
position in that environment to define and implement “common good” for the
society. Society was not “mature” enough to be consulted in such matters in the eye
of intellectual/ bureaucrats with a Western type of education background. At that
junction one may argue that the strong state tradition of the Ottoman era was
continued in the modern positivist outlook of the bureaucracy.
Using Anderson’s (1991) terms one may claim that the Republican elite would create
a new physical and mental map for the masses for imagining themselves as part of
the same unified nation. The name chosen for the nation was Turk, but it was not
defined primarily in ethnic terms. Turk was, on the contrary, a modern concept and
represented the drive to modernize and catch up with the developed world. The core
problem was defined in terms of a civilization mission. This “constructivist” and
“modernizing” features of Turkish nationalism, as defined by the founder of the new
Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatürk, are presented in a clear terminology in Berkes. He
(1965: 145) states that Kemalism aimed at “creating a nation, making the world
recognize it, and making the very nation recognize itself”. İnsel (1995: 42) refers the
same phenomenon with a motto of the times that goes as “the state is in need of a
nation.” Constructivist and instrumental aspect of Turkish nationalism is apparent in
166
such sentences. When it comes to the modernizing aspect or its connection to
civilization, Berkes is no less clear. He claims that “Turk is either a Kirgiz or a Çavuş
before entering into civilization, s/he becomes really Turk only after entering into a
civilization” (Berkes, 1965: 159).
According to this interpretation Turk is not an ethnic concept but an identity
connected with civilized order (töre) and state sovereignty. Historical existence of
Turk depends on state, military and economy, particularly on industry, according to
Berkes (1965: 165). In such formulations nationalism is not only defined as a modern
project for development, but also as a concept based upon a reconstructed history53.
The end result is a strong will for modernity and development with an equal
enthusiasm for independence from the West or developed nations.
One may argue that the rise of fascism and ultra-nationalistic ideologies and political
structures in the 1930s in Europe had influenced and created a more ethnic and racial
definition of “Turkishness” for some of the state elite54. One may also argue that
ethnic definition of nation by the immigrant intelligentsia within the Young Turk
Movement provided a background for being receptive to such outside influences.
                                                          
53 When Berkes (1965: 113) evaluates Gökalp’s ideas he states that under the influence of the Western
civilization Gökalp redesigned what he calls “Turkish culture” (Türk harsı) according to the Western
characteristics. As a result, Gökalp “discovers” in the Turkish history, among others, democracy,
liberty, freedom of women, nationalism, and monarchy. However, looking from today’s perspective
one may observe that Berkes himself cannot avoid doing similar discoveries that were heavily
influenced by socialism and industrialization discourse at the time.
54 One may argue that democratic or civic nationalism develops not only due to local conditions
conducive for them but also because of global environment at the formative years of a particular
national identity. When there are Hitlers and Stalins around, it is hard to expect spread of ideas based
upon a civic conception of nationalism. However, civic nationalism/authoritarian nationalism might
be meaningless in many contexts as they may easily change from one type to another, depending on
internal and external factors.
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However, even at these times the dominant conception was rather a political
definition of nation determined by a state-oriented and modernist discourse.
In other words, for the founders of the Republic the concept of Turk was not the
opposite of any other ethnic group but rather an anti-thesis of the Ottoman subject or
of the universal Muslim community (Ummah) as the source of primary political
allegiance. In that context, citizenship is envisaged as the main tie between the state
and the people. Perhaps, as a reaction to the rise of Kurdish question and PKK
terrorism as well as to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and creation of many
“Turkic” states in central Asia ethnic conception of Turkishness gained more as a
political force and as a discourse in state policies55 in the recent decades. However,
despite such developments one may argue that the basic character of the republican
or Kemalist nationalism based upon civilization and citizenship is still the dominant
legal/institutional framework. However, as evidenced from ideas of Tartar migrants
and even some of the Ottoman intelligentsia like Gökalp, pan Turkish (Turan) ideas
have also survived as a secondary source of nationalist discourse in Turkish politics.
Economy was a central aspect of the civilization mission of the Turkish Republic.
Considering the Ottoman past dominated by the central state bureaucracy instead of
an aristocratic/feudal class, and lack of an indigenous bourgeois class at the turn of
the century, the agent of modernization was mainly the state, and thus, it was to
shape a new or modern economic environment. When the state enters into the
                                                          
55 One may also add the role of “globalization,” and its cultural confrontation with the local cultures in
the increasing power of ethnic nationalism. Globalization processes, among other things, has also
created new forms of inequalities and a larger space for comparisons between haves and have-nots.
When such changes associate with ethnic differences, it may fuel nationalist explanations regarding
relative deprivation of have-nots and political solutions based upon a nationalist ideology.
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economy as a strong force, it needs an ideological framework to organize its
activities. Economic nationalism seems to provide this ideological frame of
reference. As it is going to be discussed in later parts of this chapter, modern
planning in Turkey is heavily influenced and shaped within the framework of this
state-led economic nationalism.
Burnell (1986: 1-3) states that economic nationalism may be defined as a distinct
phenomenon as well as “a distinctive component or facet of nationalism as a whole.”
It demands official and unofficial discrimination against non-citizens, and ethnic
minorities, and protection of domestic market. However, just like nationalism, the
term economic nationalism is variable and rather vague. However, it may be referred
as a strategy of using economic means not for their own sake but for the sake of
reaching some non-economic ends like maintaining the political independence of the
state or preserving the nation from foreign domination. One may also relate
economic nationalism to Taylor’s concept of dignity. National manufacturing or
organization of a modern economy by nationals might be perceived as a sign of
coming to par with the other nations56 as well as economically better off minorities.
Creating a national57 bourgeoisie in Turkey has been a major driving force in
formulation of economic discourse and economic policies. This policy goes back to
                                                          
56 Burnell (1986: 107) quotes a question raised by Friedrich List, a German pioneer of economic
nationalism, which shows elements of dignity involved in economic nationalism: “who would venture
to maintain that nature has denied to nations other than England the means requisite for the
development of manufacturing industry?” Belief in the potential of the people or the nation was also a
strong aspect of the early republican era (Kuruç, 1987).
57 ‘Turkish’ in that early period of nationalism was almost equivalent to ‘Muslim’ subjects of the
Empire. In its classical period the division of labor within the Empire was such that non-Muslims
were active in trade and manufacturing while Muslims were engaged in agriculture, military and
bureaucracy. Increasing national aspirations and disintegration started first among non-Muslim
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the Union and Progress Party that dominated the last decades of the Ottoman
Empire.58 Economic nationalism was considered as a way to preserve unity and
independence as well as a source of providing financial inputs to sustain a large
bureaucratic organization. In other words, “the implementation of nationalist
economic policies and the creation of a national bourgeoisie had to benefit the state
in the long run” (Aktar, 1996: 283).
In that sense, economic nationalism is a way to combine state elite and stateless elite
aspirations. On the one hand, this policy favors nationals and makes a positive
discrimination on their side, and thus satisfies those who put their emphasis on the
nation rather than the state. But on the other hand, this policy was aiming at the
benefit of the state itself in the long run. In either the state centered or the nation
centered justifications, bourgeoisie was expected to be national before being private.
The policy was to create a “national” private bourgeoisie but nationality had priority
over privateness (Kuruç, 1987: 46).
After the Independence War, during the 1920s, the state had pursued “liberal”
policies but not for the sake of liberalism. Indeed, liberalism was considered as an
alien ideology, identified with capitalism. Liberalism, by its nature,  does  not  permit
                                                                                                                                                                    
nations in the multi-religious and multi-national Ottoman Empire, leading to a policy of pan-Islamism
and later pan-Turkism to preserve the unity. These efforts have culminated in the formation of a
nation-state after the First World War.
58 Calling people to use domestic products by boycotting imported goods and relating this preference
to economic and political independence starts in 1908 when Austria invades Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Later, during the Balkan Wars, Muslims are called to boycott non-Muslim’s shops. As a result of such
nationalist agitation, in 1913, Society for National Production (İstihlak-I Milli Cemiyeti) was
established to provide a more coherent organization for the promotion of national economy (Coşar,
1995: 77).  That legacy inscribes economic nationalism as a major element of Turkish nationalism and
provides a background for similar practices after the foundation of the Republic.
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discrimination between domestic and foreign capital, or a discriminatory treatment
towards minorities, whereas the new Republic had a policy of independent national
economy under the control of Turkish nationals.
It is obvious that this new class of businessmen to be created by the state were not
intended to be bourgeois in its European sense. The state would create “a national
bourgeoisie” that was not indeed autonomous from the state and its basic
preferences. There is not a free and autonomous conception of the market
functioning almost automatically under the imperatives of “invisible hand” of
competition in the sense of classical economist like Adam Smith. In that framework
there is not a private/public distinction based upon an autonomous market either. In
other words, the state elite did not envisage creating an alternative power center to
the bureaucracy but rather a dependent business class. Hence the new businessmen
were recruited from among small tradesmen and public servants (Buğra, 1997). It is
clear that such a policy would not be very favorable to the creation of civil society as
an autonomous power center vis-à-vis the state.
4.3 Etatism and Industry Plans During 1930s
4.3.1 The Rise of Etatism
Etatism was developed during 1930s under the global conditions of the Great
Depression and the new Turkish Republic embarked on industrialization through the
state economic enterprises (Boratav, 1982; Tekeli and İlkin, 1983). It can be argued
that etatist policies were a product of both the global conditions at the time and of the
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“economic nationalism” that the Republican elite inherited from the late Ottoman era
dominated by the Union and Progress Society59.
As has been discussed in the chapter two, one of the main sources of modern
planning is capitalism itself. By its unequal development and openness to periodical
crises capitalism leads to more and more state intervention that culminates in a very
complex modern state structure. The history of modern state as a reaction to the
problems of capitalism can be followed in Karl Polanyi (Buğra, 1997: 27-40). As it is
evident from the Great Depression of the 1930s, many states in the developed world
as well as in Latin America and Asia developed a more interventionist state to cope
with the problems of capitalism. Turkey is not an exception and she developed a
quick response to the crisis by a new international trade regime, new state institutions
and a new ideological approach to economic policy.
On the other hand, the history of the new Republic and its legacy played a very
critical role in the formulation of new policies. Economic nationalism is the major
factor in that context. Economic nationalism as part of a broader agenda of nation
building envisaged creation of a national bourgeoisie and reinforcing
domestic/bureaucratic control over the economic resources. Etatism further increased
the distance between the new regime and the liberal ideas. Etatism is also applied in
several other countries reputed for their economic nationalism, particularly in the
South America (Burnell, 1986: 77-80). Planning of a comprehensive and physical
                                                          
59 One may also locate political developments of the 1930s, including economic nationalism, within
the larger context of the political environment dominated by the totalitarian and authoritarian regimes
in Europe and elsewhere.  Keyder (1999: 150-153) stresses this factor by citing corporatist and fascist
arrangement in Europe and Latin America based upon “developmental dictatorship” as an alternative
to socialist path.
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rather than a merely indicative sort developed as part of this economic nationalism
and etatist development strategy.
From 1923 to the beginnings of the 1930s the state followed a rather liberal import
policy –partly as a result of some provisions of the Lausanne Treaty that put an end
to the Independence War—and established some mechanisms to promote private
sector. Indeed the new Republic had already developed a more active role for the
state in order to achieve economic development as part of the efforts to build an
independent and respectful nation state.
Atatürk’s various speeches reveal the consciousness of the leadership about the role
of economic development in building and consolidating a real independence going
beyond formal political independence. For example, in his opening speech to the
Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1922, he clearly states that the aim is full
independence and that “full independence can only be achieved by financial
independence ... because the organs of the state could only live with financial power”
(quoted by İnan, 1972: 33-34).
Compared to the modernization efforts during the Ottoman era the new Republic was
much more radical. The Republic has inherited many modernization ideas and
practices/institutions from the Ottoman times but also a sense of dissatisfaction with
partial and limited modernization that had ultimately failed (Ortaylı, 2001: 32).
Hence a very active role envisaged for the state, as an assertive state aiming to rise to
the level of other powerful nation-states, and the need to have an economic program
to achieve faster development were felt very early in the 1920s (Kuruç, 2000: 2-4).
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Ottoman economic policies during the 19th century were rather liberal as far as
international trade was concerned. That was because the powerful European
countries had concessions from the administration as a result of their financial and
political support or threats.  As Çavdar (1992) observes the top Ottoman statesmen
(like Ali and Fuat Paşa) and intelligentsia were generally “liberal-minded” during the
19th century. But this liberal approach and little or no protection for the domestic
business during the Ottoman era cannot be attributed solely to foreign pressures.
One of the reasons behind this economic liberalism was probably the fact that the
Ottoman bourgeoisie and the state elite were from different ethnic and religious
backgrounds, and there was no homogeneous ‘nation’ yet to be protected against
foreign competitors.
During and after the First World War, and particularly after the foundation of the
Republic, the state elite gradually changed its paradigm and shifted towards
protectionism in discourse and practice. The Republic was clearly a nation state
embarking upon a radical modernization process particularly in political and cultural
fields. No matter what the reality was, the new leadership assumed a homogeneous
“nation” to be served in the process of modernization. In economic field, to be
modern was to get industrialized. Turkish businessmen were to be supported by
custom duties, state incentives (Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu – Industry Incentive Law in
1927) and new financial institutions (like İş Bankası) in order to develop industry.
Customs duties could not be used as an instrument in these incentives due to
temporary international obligations, but other means were used.
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However, reaction of the private sector was very weak to the state incentives and the
worsening economic conditions in the context of the Great Depression paved the way
for the First Five Year Industrial Plan (1934-38). This plan marked the beginning of
a large-scale direct state involvement into the economy and reached its objectives
one year before the end of the plan period. Turkey has undergone important
developments in the food, shoe, textile and mining sectors by the help of state
economic enterprises, namely Sumerbank and Etibank.
During the 1920s, and particularly in 1929, Turkish economy experienced a large
current account imbalance. Almost half of the imports at that time was composed of
consumer goods. Investment goods comprised just 25 % of the total imports. Exports
were dominated almost 90 % by agricultural goods. With the implementation of
etatism Turkish economy started to give surplus in its balance of payments. That was
because of the new protectionist policy in foreign trade as well as of the import
substitution by state economic enterprises. This change also affected the composition
of imports, increasing the share of investment goods to half of the total imports and
replacing much of the consumer imports.
Turkish planning was the first planning experience after the Soviet planning and
Soviet expertise was used in the preparation of the plan (Boratav, 1982: 111).
However, it was not a socialist planning based on a total control on the means of
production and a repudiation of the private ownership. On the contrary, the plan
focused on those fields that were outside the capability of the private sector and even
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provided a favorable environment for private industrial investments60. In that
context, etatism was first and foremost a tool for nation building and justified on
nationalistic grounds rather than on socialistic or capitalistic ideological reasons
(Keyder, 1993: 32-33; IBRD, 1951: 8).61
With etatism the role of the private sector in economic development became
secondary,62 particularly at discursive level. Though etatism was not generally
interpreted as contrary to the overall objective of creating a national bourgeoisie
envisaged since the Union and Progress Society, there was less emphasis on private
initiatives and trade, and more faith on direct state activities and domestic market.
Economic development through industrialization led by the state economic
enterprises is the core idea which was expected to lift “the Turkish people toward
Western civilized standards” and “it was, in Atatürk’s words, a shortcut to speed up
the process of Westernization” (Okyar, 1993: 15)63.
                                                          
60 It is important to note that the Law No 3436, issued in 1939 for regulating state economic
enterprises, envisages ultimate transfer of state enterprises to Turkish nationals and businessmen. It is
also clear that the market prices had been preserved as the main regulatory mechanism both for the
private and public sectors.
61 There is also the view that etatism was not socialistic, but on the contrary, “it was a bulwark against
socialism” (Günçe, 1967).
62 That secondary position was more emphasized in discourse rather than in application of etatism. As
İnan (1972: 17) points out many of the project topics in the industry plans had a potential for helping
the development or generation of private industry. This observation supports Keyder’s (1999)
approach to etatist period as a coalition between the bureaucracy and industrial bourgeoisie.
63 General location policy for new industries reveals some of the nationalist concerns of the new elite.
They were distributed in western and central Anatolia and only two of them were located in İstanbul,
which was already the center of industry. The expectation was to distribute the benefits of industry
more equitably and to speed up modernization process outside İstanbul (Okyar, 1993: 16)
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4.3.2 Different Interpretations of Etatism
There were actually continuous debates during the 1930s about the exact definition
of etatism among state elite (Türkeş, 2001). The main uncertainty was related to the
limits of legitimate private sector activity or the demarcation line between private
and public sectors. Particularly the businessmen were sure neither about their social
status nor the concrete limits of state intervention. There were two main positions.
The first was the view of “moderate” etatists like Celal Bayar who defended that the
state should be involved in fields that are beyond the capability of the private sector.
The second or more radical view was defending the state involvement in certain
fields no matter what the capability of the private sector was. İsmet İnönü (the
second man of the Republic) was the most prominent figure of this second group.
Atatürk himself acted somewhat as an arbitrator between these two groups carefully
balancing their power in administration. However, these two official views shared a
strong pragmatism and had also some common enmity towards Bolshevik way
(Buğra, 1997: 155-159; İlkin and Tekeli, 1982: 79-106).
The pragmatism in the application of etatism may be related to the Ottoman heritage
of giving the top priority to the security and preservation of the state. In that
framework, as İnsel (1995: 188-195) argues, economic etatism of the 1930s was only
a subset of a broader (political) etatism. Economic etatism was a conjectural
preference considering the broader and more comprehensive state-centered approach.
Whether through the state economic enterprises or through state supported
businessmen, the state elite would shape the main economic decisions and the
distribution of investments throughout the country. İnsel’s argument seems to be
plausible considering the overall nationalist and state-centered approach shared both
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by moderate and more radical supporters of etatism. For instance, Celal Bayar, who
represents somewhat the liberal or moderate approach to etatism and industrial plans
of the 1930s, did not consider autonomous private sector acting with market
rationality. But rather, in the Industry Congress in 1936 (as cabinet member
responsible from economy), he states that, “an industrialist is a person who has
assumed a great patriotic duty in the national development war and considers the
requirements of economic nationalism side by side with his commercial interests”
(Quoted in İnan, 1989: 15)
The success of etatism during 1934-37 period created an enthusiasm around the
concept which was finally inscribed into the Constitution as one of the basic
principles of the Republic in February 193764. But that was also the time that
economic etatism started to lose its old attraction and feasibility under the conditions
of approaching World War II and negative effects of new conditions on the Turkish
economy. Turkey did not directly participate in that War but followed a war
economy that left the Second Five Year Industry Plan on paper, to a great extent.
There has been no official plan in the real sense of the term from that time on until
1960s.
                                                          
64 During 1930s a group called “Kadro” (Cadre) movement, organized around a journal bearing the
same name, tried very hard to prove that etatism was a third and novel system between liberalism and
socialism, rather than a conjectural economic policy. It was an eclectic approach based on Marxism,
corporatism and nationalism, culminating in a fascist understanding of a strong and autonomous state
that transcends all class conflicts (Karpat, 1996: 76-77; Boratav, 1982: 151-160).  İnsel (1995: 192,
301) considers Kadro as a political movement expressing one of the most extreme forms of
comprehensive (political and economic) etatism heavily influenced with the totalitarian regimes at the
time, leading also to “Yön” (Direction) movement during the 1960s. Though this movement (which
may also be seen as a demand for a “developmental state) was tolerated for a while by some important
official figures, it was later excluded and its credibility rapidly eroded (Türkeş, 2001).
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4.3.3 General Assessment of Etatism
When we look at the planning experience of Turkey during 1930s it is clearly a result
of interacting internal and external factors. Nationalism and nation building, on the
one hand, and conditions of the Great Depression, on the other hand, gave rise to the
formulation and execution of a state-led industrialization.  The plan was formulated
from above in an elitist way and consolidated the power of the Republican state
bureaucracy vis-à-vis the society. That is, beside repressive and ideological state
apparatus the state elite had one more tool to strengthen its power within the society
with its active and direct involvement in economy.
In that sense, one may argue that etatism increased the autonomy of the state and its
paternalistic practices, partly inherited from the classical Ottoman times and
particularly from the process of modernization from above by the agency of the state.
As İnsel (1995: 13) claims there seems to be a dialectical connection between
modernizing efforts of the state and conservative and seemingly closed character of
the society. These two poles mutually support and legitimize one another. In that
context, opposition to the state elite means opposition to modernity itself.
A large degree of autonomy of the state vis-a-vis society cannot be denied in the
planning experience of the 1930s (Buğra, 1997). That autonomy is partly related to
the Ottoman heritage of a strong central administration and partly to the post
independence conditions in which bureaucracy faced a large Turkish peasant
population after the immigration of economically better off minorities. However, As
Özbudun (1981) observes there were landowners and local notables participating in
the Independence War and exerting their influence upon the state during and after the
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Independence War. In that sense, considering heterogeneous social origins of the
elite and lack of a systematic political ideology, the Republican state has never
developed into a totalitarian structure. The successful process of state led
industrialization also benefited and increased relative power of some new social
groups and classes like industrial bourgeoisie, labour, and producers of raw materials
in agriculture, leading to increasing demands for autonomy of the society vis-à-vis
the state elite.
As the international environment changed towards a more liberal economic system
and the different interests started to play a more significant role in the domestic front,
it became harder to define a common national interest and execute etatist policies to
realize these interests. However, this particular trajectory of nationalism, economy,
and state interaction continued under various forms after the transition into the multi
party period.
4.4 General Assessment of Modernity and Early Planning Efforts in Turkey
Modernity is not a uniform and a-historical process. It is rather a multi-faceted
process, which is variable across different contexts. It would be wrong to equate
modernity with industry and leave outside other aspects of it like the modern state
with its large bureaucratic organization, nationalism, political institutionalization
based on popular sovereignty and culture of individualism. Each of these aspects also
transform in time. For instance, the 19th century industry –as well as democracy and
the state structure-- is not the same as that of the 20th century. Using Beck’s (1997)
terminology, there are “simple” and “complex” modernity. Moreover, each particular
society or geography encountered with modernity in its different socio-political and
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economic conditions. Thus, it makes a difference whether the “pre-modern”
structures are imperial, tribal, colonial, etc. It is also observed that these differences
have implications for the later developments in the modernization processes.
Particularly deliberate modernization plays a very important role in the political and
economic life of the societies that are left behind.
An important factor that emerges out of Turkish example is the central role of the
already existing state structure in the development of modernization discourse and
practices. That already existing state structure leads to a more “constructivist” and a
state-centered, top-down approach in a the modernization process with very
important implications in terms of overall political culture as well as planning as part
of this political process. Planning, in that context, is basically based upon
instrumental rationality of the state elite. The mission is to get industrialized and
catch the relatively more developed nations, on the one hand, and to preserve the
state and its power structure in the domestic front, on the other hand. Planning is
mainly a means for securing such ends defined by the modernizing elite.
What is observed in the Turkish case is that the economic policies are largely shaped
in a state-oriented and nationalistic discourse. However, the emphasis placed upon
the state vis-à-vis the nation changed depending on the conjecture. In the aftermath
of the First World War and during the 1920s, the main economic strategy was
“national economy,” which practically meant creation of a Muslim/Turkish
bourgeoisie with the help of the state. However, though this policy was never
completely abandoned, 1930s witnessed an etatist economic strategy giving priority
to direct involvement of the state into the economy.  In the final analysis, one may
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argue that both “national economy” and etatism were state-centered in so far as the
long-term goal was defined in terms of the major interests of the state –political
independence in external relations and social control in domestic politics65.
4.5 The Second World War and Aftermath
4.5.1 Etatism in Transition under new International and Domestic Conditions
Etatism as a practical tool operated very successfully during 1933-1937 period,
creating an industrial basis under the ownership of the state. Import substituting
industries like sugar, iron and steel, cement, textile and glass have been developed
under strictly protected domestic market. Economy grew very rapidly and the share
of industry increased in the gross national product.
Turkey has prepared its Second Five Years Industry Plan in order to enlarge the
industrial basis towards the end of the 1930s. However, approaching world war
conditions have largely hindered planning efforts. Though Turkey did not take part in
the war, she had to shift into a war economy and spend public funds for defense
purposes in order to face the increasingly risky environment. Therefore, etatism in
the form of creating state economic enterprises in industry practically ended.
This turn in the planning process also reveals vulnerability of the state-led planning
on the face of changing priorities of the state elite. Traditionally defense and in
broader terms the preservation of the state always presided over economic concerns
                                                          
65 That function of etatism can be related to the “colonization” thesis that has been raised against an
over-extension of the welfare state by Habermas. The broader the functions of the state undertaken by
instrumental rationality of the bureaucracy, the smaller is the space for the communicative rationality
to be operationalized by the civil society. İnsel (1995: 197) seems to emphasize the same idea by
stating that to protect a social section or group is, at the same time, to control them.
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for the state elite. Hence the sharp re-allocation of resources to the military needs
when there is a perception of a serious military threat. As a result of recruitment of
manpower for military in a labor-intensive agriculture dominated economy and
feeding a large army consuming much of the resources a high level of scarcity was
created in the market.
Bureaucracy became more assertive in its price controls, tax collection efforts and
procurement activities, leaving little room for an autonomous market during the war
years. National Protection Law (Milli Koruma Kanunu) and Wealth Tax (Varlık
Vergisi) are two important practices during the Second World War. According to the
former the government was authorized to determine production targets for the private
sector, to give permission for private investments, to nationalize factories and mines,
to control prices in all markets and to nationalize trade in some commodities. The
Wealth Tax, on the other hand, was discriminatory towards non-Muslims and
reflected chauvinistic atmosphere of the times (Keyder, 1999: 155-159). However,
these conditions also created a favorable environment for speculative activities and
rent seeking, contributing to capital accumulation in the hands of some tradesmen.
This was also a period in which the Republican Party and the state came under the
control of İsmet İnönü, after the death of Atatürk in 1938. İnönü is known with his
stronger dosage of etatism during the 1930s, compared to Celal Bayar. Atatürk had
somewhat stroke a balance between these two prominent figures of the Republic
during his rule. After Atatürk, the power shifted to İnönü and his closer colleagues,
creating a more favorable environment for the state interventionist approach.
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However, one should not forget that İnönü was not so much of an ideological
enthusiast either. Just like many other republican elite, he was basically a pragmatic
personality keeping a close eye on the changing conditions. That is why it should not
be a surprise to see İnönü defending a more liberal economic policy after the victory
of the liberal democratic forces in the Second World War. He has also shown the
statesmanship and necessary flexibility in transforming the single party system into a
multi-party democratic regime, rapidly abandoning his title of “national chief”
developed during the war times.
4.5.2 Planning Attempts During the 1940s
Though failed, there are a number of planning efforts observed during the 1940s.
Among them 1944 “Development Plan and Program After the War” prepared by the
Saraçoğlu government is the most significant one. The plan was prepared within the
spirit of the planning of the 1930s, under the influence of ideas of Kadro Movement
(Tekeli and İlkin, 1981). That was a plan that envisaged further state involvement in
transforming Turkey into an industrial country, emphasizing investments in heavy
industries.
This plan could not be implemented and short lived as a result of new international
environment shaped by the victorious liberal states under the leadership of the United
States. A US mission under the chairmanship of Thornburg visited Turkey and
prepared the so-called Thornburg Report in 1946, criticizing ambitious
industrialization targets of the 1944 Plan.
184
As a result of Truman Doctrine announced in 1947 Turkey and Greece were also
identified as two strategic countries to be supported against the spread of
communism. In that context, Turkey was to be supported by political guidance and
financial resources. Turkey has started to use US funds towards the end of 1940s
thanks to the containment policy against the USSR. However, foreign aid and credits
were not given without any conditionality. Turkey had to abandon its plan prepared
by more radical intellectuals and accept a new plan that confirmed the overall
economic advise of US experts. That is how Turkey prepared 1947 Turkish
Economic Development Plan, which marks the official end of etatism (Tekeli and
İlkin, 1981; Mortan and Çakmaklı, 1987: 28-29). In its English version, the 1947
Plan is called “Recovery Program for Turkey” As the name of the report itself
implies, it had been prepared within the larger framework of Marshall aid for
economic recovery program in Europe. That was basically a plan that was less
ambitious about creating a domestic industry, giving priority to agricultural sector
and infrastructure.
Considering these fluctuations in the plans and little official support and enthusiasm
in plan implementation, it may be asserted that the 1940s was practically a period in
which economic etatism ended in deed if not in words.  Etatism was still a
constitutional principle but even Republican People’s Party (RPP) leadership was
less enthusiastic about its practical use. One may argue that the Turkish state has
largely lost its autonomy vis-à-vis external world after the end of rivalry between the
great powers of the time and the victory of the liberal states. This loss of overall state
autonomy led to and represented by a loss of autonomy in preparing and
implementing plans, too.
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Turkey has entered into a multi party democracy leaving almost thirty years of single
party rule after the Second World War as part of İnönü’s and state elite’s preference
of being on the side of victorious liberal forces. On the other hand, RPP’s main rival
Democrat Party (DP) was defending a private sector oriented and open economy.  In
the context of the alliance with liberal forces and as a result of party rivalry İnönü
left its old etatist emphasis and approached towards a more liberal discourse in
economic policy making.
From this time on Turkey could no longer be called as an etatist country in the
technical sense of the term. In traditional periodization, it is taken for granted that
Turkey entered into a liberal environment particularly after 1950. However, as Yenal
(1999: 145-158) observes this periodization might not be correct if one approaches
etatism in its broader sense, as part of a broader concept of economic nationalism. In
this broader sense DP was no less etatist than RPP. DP was ready to use every means
to support a specific section of society to “create millioners in each neighborhood.”
Some discriminatory practices of DP against the minorities during the 1950s are also
significant indicators in that regard. In short, DP policies were not liberal in its full
sense and not totally outside the nation building efforts that could be traced back to
economic nationalism at the turn of the century advocated and practiced by the
Union and Progress Society.
4.6 1950s as a Prelude to a New National Planning Era in Post War Context
Democrat Party (DP) won a landslide election victory and came to power in 1950.
That was also the end of etatism and a private sector oriented rule in economic
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domain. The new prime minister was Adnan Menderes and the head of the Republic
was this time Celal Bayar. DP basically emanated from the cadre of the RPP and
developed close ties with businessmen and rural areas through its moderate views on
religious practices and its market oriented approach.
During DP rule Turkey has sent soldiers to Korean War and developed close ties
with the United States. In return, US government provided financial aids and credits
to Turkey in the framework of the Truman Doctrine under the cold war conditions
and facilitated Turkey’s acceptance in NATO. Global markets were favorable due to
the demand generated by the Korean War and the Turkish agricultural production
was growing during the first half of the 1950s. Combined with external borrowing,
these conditions led to rapid growth rates in economy. Due to deliberate priority
given to the rural areas via transport networks and mechanization (tractors), Turkey
has also witnessed the most impressive immigration from the rural to urban areas
during these years, creating a population boom in major cities and transforming
urban environment. It was expected that this immigration would stimulate private
sector led industrialization by providing cheap labor (reducing costs) as well as fresh
demand (increasing revenues). However, the private sector could not respond to this
shock with adequate investments and the cities increasingly became vulnerable to
unemployment and marginal employment.
The opposition of the new social forces vis-à-vis the state elite after transition to
multi-party politics in the 1950s was raised around concepts such as the “popular
will” and “national will.” Up to this stage, one may suggest, nationalism was mainly
an elite project imposed upon a former imperial context. From that point onwards,
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however, nationalism starts to operate within the context of rivalry of political and
state elite. The planning experience after 1960s was shaped under this new
environment, too.
As Buğra (1997) and Yenal (1999) observe DP did not like plans and presented itself
as a liberal party in economic policy. However, this does not mean that the DP had
not intervened into the economy. On the contrary, DP had used various means to
interfere into the market. Particularly in the second half of the 1950s DP enlarged the
public sector and tended to use state economic enterprises more and more in order to
solve economic recession. That period continued until the stabilization decisions of
1958. This episode in Turkish planning history supports the general discussion in
chapter two about the relationship between capitalist instability and planning. No
matter what governments defend in their discursive aspects, economic crises usually
lead to more active state involvement into the economy, with a debate on the need
for a more systematic organization of these interventions.
There was a problem of chronic trade imbalance in the Turkish economy starting in
the second half of the 1940s and going on throughout the 1950s. Import substitution
of the 1930s reduced the consumer goods imports but increased the need to import
intermediate and investment goods in order to operate new industries. That is, import
substitution policies did not actually substitute imports but changed their
composition. The further the effort to deepen the import substitution the more
difficult it is to find the necessary foreign exchange to import. With a limited export
capacity dominated by agricultural produce the natural result was dependence on
foreign credits or funds in order to finance increasing imports or trade deficit. Almost
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all developing countries except for oil producing ones encounter such a trade deficit
and balance of payments issues in the process of development. It is relatively easy to
establish new factories but difficult to operate them by earning foreign exchange.
1958 stabilization program devalued Turkish Lira as a means to improve balance of
payment problems of Turkey. There were also other considerations in the DP
leadership like establishing an “Economic Planning Office.” That idea was
developing due to critcism towards ad hoc policies that were perceived as the factors
leading to economic recession in Turkey. Another factor forcing the idea of
preparing a plan was foreign creditors. They were advising a plan that would
coordinate various activities and create transparency in the spending of foreign
funds. As has already been referred, this approach of international financial
institutions was a major element in the dissemination of planning in the developing
countries, including Turkey (Waterson, 1966)
DP government invited Tinberger66 and some other foreign experts to prepare Turkey
for a planned economy. However, DP could not found a planning organization due to
increasing political tensions and ultimately a military coup in 27 May 1960. One of
the most important priorities of the ruling military council after the coup was
founding a state planning organization and entering into a new economic growth era.
                                                          
66 Tinberger was one of the leading economists in the world specialized in economic planning at the
time. See Tinberger (1964) for his general approach to planning.
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Apart from conjectural need for planning one might argue that the strong emphasis
put upon a planned economic policy by the military had its roots in the
modernization process of turkey and its experience in the 1930s. Military has been a
subject and object of modernity throughout the 19th and early 20th century, taking
also the leading role in the national independence war. As has already been discussed
earlier the peculiarities of the Ottoman regime have given the military a privileged
position to act above society and different social interests. The military had a strong
support for modernization that was largely identified with industrialization. It was
also critical for the military to preserve the independence of the new state against
foreign powers. That is why a failure in economic policies and increasing
dependence on the outside world contributed to the coup against the civilian
government.
The intellectuals in general supported the army, particularly the university staff. That
was because the intellectuals in Turkey had socialized in a state centered
environment and given more emphasis on the state rather than liberal principles of
individualism and democracy. Given the positivist epistemological background of
most of the Turkish intellectuals it was hard to tolerate wrong policies of politicians
in the field of economic policy vis-à-vis scientific arguments of experts or planners.
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CHAPTER V
PLANNED YEARS: 1960-1980 PERIOD
5.1 A New Planning Framework and Organization in a New International and
Domestic Context
This part shall be on the planning experience of Turkey during the 1960-1980 period,
focusing particularly on the overall characteristics of planning approach and
organization. Although Turkey has never stopped its planning activities to date, these
two decades were the heydays of planning. The rise and fall of planning approach
during these years is expected to shed some light on the policies adopted after the
1980 and the possibilities for future course of planning in Turkey.
Turkey has entered into a planned economy practice at the beginning of the 1960s.
Planning was so much important for the period of 1960-1980 that this period in the
history of Turkey is generally known as the “planned economy years.” Turkey
embarked on rapid industrialization under five year development plans and import
substituting, protectionist policies in this new era.
As a developing country in the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey has
adopted a systematic import substitution development strategy with five-year
development plans, the first one being put into implementation in 1963. Looking
from organizational viewpoint the most important novelty in the planned period was
the creation of the State Planning Organization (SPO) as a constitutional agency
responsible for the preparation of five-year development plans and annual programs.
As has already been discussed, Turkey had a strong bureaucratic tradition amenable
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for top down approach in the economic policy formulation and implementation, and
a planning experience during the 1930s as a successful industrialization strategy.
Besides these structural and historical characteristics of Turkish politics favoring a
planned approach, there was also a favorable international environment for planning
at the time. Bretton Woods institutions and creditor countries supported planning in
the developing countries in order to discipline spending and guarantee the repayment
of the credits (Waterson, 1966: 31-36).  European recovery program and French
planning experience were also important examples for the use of planning in a non-
socialist environment (SPO, 1992). India as a democratic developing nation with
five-years plans was another source of inspiration for early Turkish planners (Küçük
1967). These plans in the capitalist world were not socialist plans substituting the
private sector and the market, but plans that basically aimed at supplementing the
market forces.
External pressures by international organizations were particularly a significant
factor in the initiation of planning efforts in the developing countries. As
Karaosmanoğlu (2000: 6-7), one of the early Turkish planners reports, Turkey was
no exception in that regard and particularly the OECD had strongly pressured the
Turkish government to adopt a planned approach towards the end of the 1950s,
recommending Professor Tinbergen as an expert to initiate Turkish planning67. There
                                                          
67 Some other leading planning experts in the early 1960s also emphasize the role of external agencies
in the development of planning in Turkey (Sönmez, 1967; Torun, 1967). However, in these
observations external pressures are cited side by side with economic hardships at the time and
domestic demands raised by the opposition. That means the initiation of planning in Turkey during the
early 1960s was neither totally domestic nor totally external, but a combination of both. Domestic
dimension was critical in that regard and, it would be very to explain “almost emotional commitment
to planning” in the administration after 1960 without evaluating the significance of this domestic
dimension (Sönmez, 1967: 12).
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was an unstable economic environment and the Menderes government accepted the
OECD recommendations.
The economic crises in the second half of the 1950s and the external pressures finally
made the Menderes government to establish a Coordination Ministry that would
create the nucleus of the State Planning Organization in 1960 (Mortan and Çakmaklı,
1987: 43). However, the government preferred to keep the planning studies
conducted by foreign experts and their Turkish counterparts secret,68 due to its
traditional ideological position favoring market forces (Buğra, 1997: 187). Despite a
very high degree of intervention into the economy by the ruling DP over the 1950s,
(which is observed to be the “Golden Age” of the State Economic Enterprises in
particular) and various anti-inflationary measures taken by the government towards
the end of 1950s, DP government insisted not to use the term “planning,” so far as
declaring that “we are against planning, because we favor a rational economy” in the
preamble of the 1959 Budget  (Sönmez, 1967: 30). That was basically a dogmatic
aversion towards the idea of planning despite changing international environment
that no more considered planning as a “heresy.”
Planning studies speeded up and became manifest after the 1960 military coup under
the National Unity Committee (NUC) rule. The failure of the civilian government
during the 1950s was largely attributed to its policies that were against the
imperatives of the scientific rules of economics. Thus, a strong emphasis on
                                                          
68 The resistance to the idea of planning by Menderes government may also be related to a nationalist
reaction to an external demand (Akad, 1984: 30-31). However, from the larger policies of the
government, one needs to be careful to consider this as a plausible explanation. It seems that
Menderes government was feeling the bureaucratic character of the planning that would favor the state
elite vis-à-vis the political establishment. Planning, in that context, had strong connotations with
respect to the single party rule during the etatist era in the 1930s, discussed in the previous chapter.
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“science” and “calculation” became integral to the planning period (Küçük, 1978:
272). Turkish planning started in this context as a plan to be imperative for the public
sector and indicative for the private sector. Imperative aspect of the plan was to be
realized by direct intervention in the resource allocation process for the public
agencies, while the indicative aspect was left to various incentive tools to guide the
private sector. That was actually adaptation of French planning in a developing
country context. However, Turkish planning approach and organization had its own
peculiarities as well. On the one hand, direct state involvement was more extensive
compared to planning in developing countries. On the other hand, one of the most
important aspects of Turkish planning was its comprehensive approach covering not
only economic but also social/cultural aspects (Mortan and Çakmaklı, 1987: 78-80).
The international creditors were demanding basically an economic coordination unit,
while Cemal Gürsel, as the Head of the State, was very enthusiastic about a
comprehensive planning covering social and cultural issues. Turkish planning was, in
that framework, different from planning in the developed countries and adopted
certain elements from some other developing country experiences, particularly from
the Indian example69. That was not a preference favored by the liberal international
institutions and creditor countries but a preference of the military administration at
the time, creating the overall planning framework for Turkey during the interval to
the democratic politics in Turkey.
                                                          
69 Indeed early Turkish planning experts visited India and had a meeting with Nehru, the prime
minister of India at the time. It seems that they had very positive impressions about the “socialist”
planning in India, which was actually akin to the “mixed economy” understanding prevalent in Turkey
(Küçük, 1967).
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5.2 Establishment of the State Planning Organization and the High Planning
Council
5.2.1 Establishment of The State Planning Organization (SPO)
The SPO was established on 30 September 1960 just a few months after the military
intervention of May 27, 1960, with Law No.91. Later, the SPO gained a
constitutional status with 41st and 129th provisions of the 1961 Constitution, bringing
the civilian rule. Some additional legal arrangements were also done in order to
define procedures for plan preparation and execution. The SPO prepared four five-
year development plans in that legal framework during 1963-1981 period.
The story about the establishment of the SPO reveals some basic characteristics of
planning in Turkey. It may be argued that the very name of this organization reflects
the state-centered or state dominated planning discourse and practice in Turkey.
Plans were “to ensure rational state intervention in the economy” (Uysal, 1986: 3).
The SPO, responsible for preparing these plans, was not simply a “planning office”
or a “planning bureau” but a state planning organization.70 It is established not only
by a law that could be revised by a civilian parliament with a simple majority, but
given a constitutional status, practically close to change by the ruling civilian
governments. Moreover, the SPO was not only simply designed to coordinate
economic policies but also given a mandate in social and cultural domains.
                                                          
70 Torun (1967) reports some of the debates among the political power and experts in the process of
establishing the SPO. He cites Tinbergen’s draft bill, the İnan draft bill and Colonel Türkeş (Şinasi
Orel) draft bill competing with each other. Tinbergen’s bill emphasized the need for foreign expertise,
while the other bills opted for a domestic capacity development with the help of foreign experts. The
accepted bill was basically the Türkeş-Orel bill with some modifications. The name of the
organization also evolved through these debates, from “central planning office” to “national planning
organization” and finally to “the state planning organization.”
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These characteristics of the SPO can be related to the overall approach adopted in the
1961 Constitution. A consultative assembly convened during the military rule and
prepared the Constitution, later adopted by the people with a referendum. As a
reaction to the unlimited power of civilian governments during the 1950s, the
bureaucratic and intellectual circles of Turkey introduced some new institutions to
check majoritarian tendencies in the Turkish democracy. The main idea behind these
new institutions was to strike a balance between “national will” incorporated by the
majority in the parliament and “national interest” as represented by the state elite
(Heper, 1992a).  As Mıhçı (2001: 173) states, “the SPO was established just three
months after the 1960 coup … as a fortress against political interference.” Among
these new institutions for limiting the power of political elite, other than the SPO, are
the Constitutional Court or Supreme Court, a bicameral parliament with a more elitist
Senate, a National Security Council with almost equal status to the government and
the military under the presidency of the Head of the Republic.
In an interview at the 41st anniversary of the SPO, Şinasi Orel, the first
Undersecretary of the SPO, an ex-army staff, explains how the planning nucleus
created during the Menderes government years with the help of the World Bank was
transformed into a national planning organization with a much ambitious mission
(SPO, 2001a).  In this interview what is emphasized is “technical” support of the
SPO, particularly the High Planning Council (HPC) to the government. As seen in
the first organization chart of the SPO, the High Planning Council is the highest body
in the general organization, with equal members from bureaucrats and ministers. It is
designed as a platform for reasonable debates between technicians and politicians to
arrive the most appropriate policies for the country. After arriving appropriate
196
decisions at the HPC, political members of the HPC were to defend the same position
in the Council of Ministers, following up these decisions down to the Parliament.
It is not difficult to see the overall aim of setting a balance between the political and
state elite in such arrangements.  The composition of the HPC is described in “the
General Rationale for the Law No.91 Regarding the Establishment of the SPO” as
follows:
Resources and demands should be compared in identifying the planning targets, so that what is a
necessity and what is possible need to be determined within this framework. The High Planning
Council has been composed by this consideration, creating a mixed High Council composed of those
representing political tendencies and authority and those representing science and technique (quoted
from Mortan and Çakmaklı, 1987: 116, emphasis added).
The HPC is expected to produce political consent on technically sound policies
which would then be discussed in the Council of Ministers and finally in the TGNA.
The political members of the HPC were the most important members of the Council
of Ministers and as the head of both organizations the prime minister was expected to
play a key role in turning the planners’ ideas into practice.  HPC was a platform in
which the prime minister and three other ministers were to sit with the
Undersecretary of the SPO and three main department heads as equal members.  Not
only the number but also the voting rights were equal for the political and
bureaucratic members of the HPC. Looking from Habermasian perspective discussed
in chapter three, that was basically an arrangement for achieving “scientization of
politics,” elevating technical knowledge of experts over the political will.
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The First Five Year Development Plan (SPO, 1963) bears the signature of the prime
minister with a short presentation. That was the signature of İsmet İnönü as the first
prime minister after transition into the civilian rule. In that prime minister’s
presentation as well as in the introduction section of the plan there is a very strong
emphasis on the significance of the planning for development under a democratic
framework. High hopes for the use of planning in the economic, social and political
development of Turkey are evident in the discourse of the plan document. Planning,
in that sense, was functional as a means for preserving representative democratic
politics in a developing country. However, considering the “scientization of politics”
aspect built in its organizational structure, it was also problematic in terms of more
substantive democratic practice.
In that context, one may argue that planning as organized aftermath of a military
intervention into the civilian rule resulted in conflicting ramifications in terms of
democratization process in Turkey. On the one hand, it has contributed to a more
responsible management of development process, with better channels of
communication between bureaucracy and politicians. On the other hand, it has
institutionalized bureaucratic guardianship over civilian politics and problematized
democratic decision making procedures.  These two aspects of planning and planning
organization have continued over the planned years. Civilian governments developed
their attitude towards the SPO in that context as well. They have eventually accepted
the benefits of working with such an organization in devising long-term development
policies in a responsible manner, while detested the bureaucratic power of the
organization at the same time.
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Original Organization Chart of the SPO
TGNA: Turkish Grand National Assembly
Orel also refers to the reaction of politicians to this planning approach in the same
interview referred above. He states that the politicians71 were at the opposition with
the idea that Turkey was in need of cooked rice (“pilav” in Turkish) not a “plan”
(SPO, 2001a: 4). It may be argued that the whole history of planning after the 1960
can be related to symbolism contained in this debate and its implications. What is
implied with this dichotomy is mainly the idea that the market and plan are two
incompatible concepts. As Mortan and Çakmaklı (1987: 16-17) point out this false
dichotomy  has  been  a  source of confusion ever since the beginning of the planning
                                                          
71 “Politicians,” in that context, means right wing politicians who came together under the Justice
Party (JP) after the closure of Democrat Party and execution of its leader during the military rule.
After a short Republican People’s Party (RPP) dominated coalition government under the leadership
of İnönü, JP came to power with a landslide electoral victory. RPP was traditionally close to the state
elite while JP represented majoritarian tendencies in the society.
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experience in Turkey. What further complicates this dichotomy is the ideological
implications of these two poles or positions rather than its technical content.
Preferring one to the other has traditionally meant basically a political preference
rather than a technical choice among different tools.
That debate between planners and politicians reveal the relationship between
planning and power. Politicians have never perceived planning as merely a technical
work and adopted various strategies to curb the power of the SPO. The ideological
divide was mainly between etatism and liberalism during the 1950s, but it shifted to a
divide between socialism and capitalism towards the mid 1960s (Yenal, 1999: 150).
In other words, it was not planning per se as a technical activity but planning in a
larger political and ideological framework that attracted some serious assaults from
civilian politicians. That is a clear example for substantiating earlier debates in
chapters two and three regarding the role of power struggle in the planning process.
That aspect of planning is to be openly evaluated and recognized in order to design a
democratic planning in a world of conflicting interests.
Apart from such ideological implications of supporting the idea of planning, there is
also the classical issue of the division between the state and political elite in Turkey.
In that context, one may argue that Heper’s (1992b) observation about the tensions
between the political and state elite during the democratization process in Turkey
determined the overall framework in which planners and politicians interacted. As
has been discussed in the previous chapter the attempt by DP to institutionalize
planning in Turkey with the help of the World Bank failed with the May 27, 1960
coup. That is, planning has not been introduced in Turkey as a civilian initiative but
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as a bureaucratic imposition upon the civilian governments72. Therefore, Turkey has
experienced the tension and continuous debates between the civilian governments
and planners about the use of planning and its organization.  That characteristic of
planning in Turkey might be explained as a “problem of confidence” between the
political and state elite. For the politician the planners were rigid persons with no
mandate from the nation, hindering the political initiatives for meeting popular
demands, whereas for the bureaucrats the politicians were irresponsible persons
hindering the most efficient or rational use of the public resources for development in
the name of their short-term political interests.
From some historical anecdotes it is understood that there were some bureaucrats and
members of the National Unity Committee (NUC) who tried to create a much
stronger SPO than the actual one. Attila Karaosmanoğlu, as a young academician and
one of the first planners in Turkey, refers to complaints raised by some of the NUC
members about the limited authority of the SPO in the draft proposals. In a meeting
on the draft proposal for the SPO one of the members of the NUC states his wonder
about why they want to give more powers to the SPO but planners refuse. This
member believed that the SPO should formulate policies and the government should
just implement them. Karaosmanoğlu, on the other hand, objects to this ambitious
approach and states that the planners do not want to substitute the government
(Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 10).
                                                          
72 What would have been the trajectory of planning in Turkey if the DP initiative had been successful
in establishing some sort of a planned approach towards the end of the 1950s? There is no possibility
to give a clear-cut answer to this virtual historical question. A certain degree of conflict or clash
between political and technical rationality is unavoidable, since planning, as seen in the previous
chapters, is by its very nature a political process.  That is a certain degree of conflict between Turkish
politicians and planners is just natural. However, it is clear that the civilian-bureaucratic relations in
the planning process would have probably been easier and more collaborative compared to the real
case, if the civilian governments themselves had initiated the institutionalization of the SPO.
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From such historical anecdotes one can trace the mistrust of the then ruling military
elite to the politicians. In a sense, the ruling military committee was more favorable
to planning than the planners themselves. In the root of this approach was mistrust to
politicians as much as a naive optimism about the use of expertise and technical
knowledge in development. This approach can be traced back to the particular form
of modernization in Turkey, characterized by positivist epistemology and state
centered or top down reform. It is assumed that there is one single true policy for the
nation and an impartial and technical planner could formulate this policy. Here one
may see the positivist epistemology and instrumental rationality as providing the
overall framework for the planning in Turkey. It was basically because of the self-
limitation of the early planners that Turkey had a more realistic organizational
structure for planning.
Dialogue, in this framework, is deemed as useful as long as it takes place among
technically competent and patriotic experts. Even the dialogue between the
bureaucrats and the politicians is considered as a one-way communication of
technical imperatives to the incumbent government rather than a fruitful encounter of
technical calculations and political considerations to open up multiple policy
alternatives before the public and the decision makers. It is clear from the historical
experience of the Turkish planning that the planners could never behave like a
Platonic “philosopher king” in the formulation, and particularly in the
implementation of the policies. However, this claim to be above politics dictating
technical rationality has continuously created a tension between political and
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bureaucratic parties in the High Planning Council as well as in some other platforms
for planning.
5.2.2 The Basic Planning Model and Process
Turkish plans were to be prepared in accordance to the three staged planning
approach recommended by Tinbergen. In this model the planning involved three
main steps or levels–macro, sector and project levels (Tekeli and İlkin, 1984: 1606).
At the first level a macro model is designed on the basis of macro variables of the
country such as population, targeted national income growth, required aggregate
investment level, etc. That was usually a kind of Harrod-Domar type model
developed within a Keynesian approach. At the second stage, sector-wise targets are
determined on the basis of the macro variables and an input-output analysis for the
main sectors of the country. Finally, at the third stage, concrete projects are identified
and evaluated for each sector (Küçük, 1967). That was basically a top-down planning
approach, which did not take too much into consideration particular bottom-up
demands. However, in practice the concrete content of the investment programs,
which were the main means through which plans were to be implemented, were
determined through an iteration process in which some bargaining took place
between investment agencies, the SPO and the government.
There is almost two years between the start and end of the planning process. The
basic structure of the process for the whole planning period is as fallows. The process
of planning starts with a strategy document proposal, prepared by the SPO and
submitted to the HPC. The HPC discusses the document and takes it to the Council
of Ministers for the final government directions to the planning process. The SPO
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takes this strategic directive from the government and combines it with inputs from
various sector-wise and issue-based Ad Hoc Committee studies in order to prepare a
draft five-year development plan.
After a long preparation process in the SPO a new draft plan is prepared and
submitted to the HPC. The plan is discussed and, if necessary, modified in the HPC
and later in the Cabinet. Then the plan goes to the Budgeting and Planning
Commission of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). After the
Commission adopts the plan with some adjustments, it is sent to the general
assembly of the TGNA for the final debates and ratification. When the plan is finally
adopted by the TGNA it is enacted and gets ready for the implementation phase.
The five-year development plans are implemented by annual programs, which define
yearly macro level and sector wise targets and policies. In addition to the role of the
annual programs as instruments of implementing plans, they are, at the same time,
indispensable as an opportunity to revise the plans in accordance with the changing
priorities and conditions. As an appendix to the annual programs the SPO also
prepares the annual investment program by collecting project proposals from various
public agencies through a circular of the prime ministry.
Both annual programs and annual investment programs are taken to the HPC by the
SPO Undersecretariat , and upon the HPC’s ratification, submitted to the cabinet.
The final word on the annual programs belongs to the cabinet. Officially these
programs need to reflect plan priorities and modify these priorities in accordance
with the changing international and domestic conditions. However, in practice, these
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annual programs give the political authority to implement its own agenda with little
concern to the priorities of the plan.
The relation between the plans, programs and the budget is also problematic. Plans
and programs cover macro and sector wise targets, basic priorities and projects to be
implemented. Some of these projects belong to the consolidated budget agencies,
while others are undertaken by the state economic enterprises, local administrations,
special funds, revolving funds, etc.  Turkey attempted to institutionalize a program-
budget system during the 1970s but failed due to the resistance by the traditional
bureaucracy in the Ministry of Finance. That is why there is no clear connection
between various elements of the budget (like investment and recurrent budgets).
Apart from the bargaining process and debates among the government, the SPO and
the public investment agencies, there was also the mechanism of establishing
permanent and temporary Ad Hoc Committees to take input from business
organizations, experts in the public agencies and academia. Reports prepared by
these committees in the process of preparing development plans are significant
documents in the planning process.
5.2.3 Ad Hoc Committees (AHCs) as a Participatory Mechanism in Planning
Despite the general top-down and state-centered approach towards planning there is a
very significant participatory mechanism called as Ad Hoc Committee Reports in the
Turkish planning after the 1960. That mechanism was actually imported from the
French and Indian experience and adopted to Turkish conditions (Küçük, 1967). The
planning process envisaged a number of Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) meetings under
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the coordination of the SPO. The main idea behind this mechanism was twofold. On
the one hand, it is believed that such mechanisms would provide a platform for a
fruitful dialogue particularly with the business sector and academia. On the other
hand, such mechanisms were seen as a tool for increasing the legitimacy of the plans
and their acceptance by the society.
In an environment of weak civil society these AHCs could play a positive role in
terms of institutional dialogue between the public and the private sector (Öniş and
Webb, 1992: 17). Unfortunately that has not happened very much and the democratic
element in the planning process remained limited.  Despite a corporatist discourse
dominant in the Turkish political history (Parla, 1999), Turkish planning experience
reveals that there is a lack of strong institutional infrastructure and communicative
practices even among bureaucracy and business, let alone labor and other civil
society organizations. Some observers attribute this failure to form a neo-corporatist
organization of state-business relations to the particularistic approaches and rent-
seeking behavior in the government-business relations (Buğra, 1997: 355).
In their legal and institutional format the temporary or permanent AHCs were
suitable as a participatory mechanism for dialogue among equal parties and search
for cooperation or consensus on policy alternatives. However, they could not be used
in that spirit due to two basic reasons. First, the traditional bureaucratic culture was
too much hierarchy-oriented for such a practices, and second, the political authority
was ready to impose its will on a particularistic basis with little consideration to the
institutional deliberation in such platforms (Türel, 1996: 1053).
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Despite all such limitations the very existence and practice of AHCs should be
considered as a valuable asset for a future democratic planning experience in Turkey.
More than forty years of inefficient use of this mechanism devalued AHCs and
reduced their practical importance. However, such institutions could be revitalized
within a new context, provided that they have been reformed and given a much
stronger mandate in the planning process. In that sense, AHCs are one of the main
differences of the planning after 1960s compared to the planning experience during
the 1930s.
AHCs formation, their working format, head of the AHCs, basic agenda, rules for
dissemination and publication of results were all under the mandate of the SPO. In
that context, AHCs in their original form does pose some problems in terms of “ideal
speech situation” as defined by Habermas and communicative planning theorists.
The use of AHCs, their reform in a new planning paradigm and their organization
based on communicative rationality will be elaborated in the next chapter of this
thesis.
5.3 Planning and Politics in Turkish Context
5.3.1 Planners vis-à-vis Politicians and the Autonomy of the Planners
There were high expectations for development under a plan at the beginning of the
1960s. The first generation of planners were ambitious about their ideas and
formulated a technically coherent set of policies for development envisaging
important sacrifices from some sections of the society for the long term benefit to the
whole nation. Planners believed that increasing investment volume, requiring more
financial resources or more saving, could only increase the economic growth. That is,
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the most pressing issue for the planners was to raise enough resources to finance
development programs. Apart from some administrative arrangements, raising taxes
and reforming the whole tax system and undertaking a land reform were among the
most radical proposals of the planners.
Remembering the state autonomy debate in the chapter three of this thesis, one may
argue that the Turkish experience reveals conjectural nature of state-society relations.
That is, autonomy of the state and the nature of state-society relations are not abstract
categories to pass on general judgments, but rather historical and context-dependent
phenomena to be reassessed in each case.
Turkish planners were pretty much autonomous from the politicians and political
pressures under the conditions of the military rule during their plan preparations.
After a short interval, however, democratic politics returned and a coalition
government was formed under the leadership of İnönü. İnönü himself was very close
to the planners and supported their work.  However, İnönü was not alone in the
coalition government. Some members of the coalition government were totally
against the land reform proposal and a radical change in the taxation increasing the
tax burden of big landowners. They have persuaded İnönü that such reforms were not
politically feasible. Planners insisted on their proposals and İnönü had to make a
choice between his political allies and the planners. Planners lost this conflict and the
Undersecretary of the SPO and three department heads resigned as a result. This
clash in 1962 proved that the formal power of the SPO in the HPC was no guarantee
for the real autonomy of the planners. The limits for the autonomy of the planners
were rather determined by the political power struggle (Sezen, 1999: 88-89).
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This clash between the planners and the politicians was a real test for the degree of
autonomy enjoyed by the planners and they came to know their limits vis-à-vis the
political will. From this point onwards, one may argue, the SPO became rather a
technical handmaiden to the political process rather than an organization dictating its
technical rationality upon the governments. One may argue that this conflict in the
relations between the planners and the politicians emanated from role confusion. On
the one hand, particularly under interventions on the democratic process, the planners
acted as if they are the politicians responsible for the definition of the common good
and tried to make some basic political preferences. On the other hand, politicians
could not refrain themselves from intervention at the technical or daily functioning of
the planning process (Üstünel, 1966: 276). It is interesting to note that this conflictual
relation started with the İnönü government that was much more favorable to the idea
of planning. In the later era when the right wing Justice Party (JP) came to power as
a heir to DP of the 1950s, the conflict between the planning experts and the
politicians became more open, ending with further resignations and a reshuffle in the
planning staff. As Torun (1967: 70) observes, as a planner in this early experience,
the planning organization could not “found its place” in the Turkish administration.
The limited role of the SPO in practice might also be observed from its relatively
weak power on the social planning compared to its economic planning mission.
Despite the comprehensive mandate of the organization, economic sectors and the
units responsible for economic issues have historically predominated the agenda of
the SPO.
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In that context, organization of public investments has been the primary
responsibility of the SPO and given a special emphasis in its operations. The
reasoning behind the macro plan model adopted by the SPO since its beginning is
summarized by Kuruç (2000: 5) as fallows: building the nation state upon strong
foundations required economic growth through industrialization, which in turn
necessitated investments as a means to expand the national savings for further
growth. That is why the planning organization focused on the public investment
budget more than anything else. That is, despite the great enthusiasm on the need for
social planning during the foundation process, which may also be interpreted as a
will for social engineering, the SPO has traditionally performed a rather humble
function of stimulating economic development through public investments and
incentives for the private sector.
Karaman (1994: 4), as an experienced planning expert specialized in social planning,
expresses the frustration of social planning in the history of Turkish planning by
observing that social sectors have been treated as “residual” in the resource
allocation process. That is, planners set macro growth targets, identified economic
sectors that would contribute to growth targets, determined investment levels for
such sectors based upon capital/output ratios, and then turned to social sectors to see
what could be done with the remaining resources. As a strong advocate of social
planning, Karaman (1994: 6-7) points out the linkage between economic growth and
cultural change and perceives a deviation from “comprehensive” planning in the real
application of planning in this context.
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These events or historical results show that despite the rhetoric of positivism and
expertise, it is rather politics that rules in the developing countries.  In other words,
social engineering in discourse is not usually the practice in most of the cases. That is
mainly because of the need for a developed rational bureaucracy as well as scientific
competence to turn instrumental rationality into a powerful tool for formulating and
implementing policies. In that sense, “developed” countries are more amenable to
instrumental rationality than the “developing” countries, despite more enthusiasm
over the concept of planning in the developing world. Myrdal (1960) seems to be
correct in asserting that the developed capitalist countries use planning without
raising much noise, whereas developing countries praise planning without putting
plans into practice.
Referring back to Bauman’s (1991) insistence on the “social engineering” character
of modernity as part of the Enlightenment idea of the rule of the reason in chapter
two, it can be argued that this discourse could easily be transferred into the non-
modern or modernizing parts of the world, but without an effective application in
practice. Without the necessary expertise and bureaucratic infrastructure, planning
remained rather limited in many parts of the world relative to the declared policies.
There are even some countries in the post war developing world which had just a
“ritualistic planning” (Agarwala, 1985) as an ideological tool for external and
domestic audience, rather than a planning in the real sense of the term as a means for
action. Turkish planning was in no sense ritualistic, particularly in its beginning, but
without the necessary framework conditions, it had to be limited in practice relative
to early expectations.
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At that junction one may also stress a crucial deficiency in almost all plans since
1963. That deficiency is the lack of a clear connection between plan targets or policy
priorities and the necessary financial resources or means to reach these targets or to
achieve these policies. As a political preference plans contained all shorts of positive
policy statements but no clear indication as to whom or what social sections the
burden of the plans would be reflected. That characteristic of the Turkish plans
constituted an important obstacle in the successful implementation of the policies due
to financial constraints and lack of well-defined action programs. As a result, there
has been a very loose connection between the five-year plans and respective annual
programs and investment programs, and a loose connection between programs and
budgets.
5.3.2 State Autonomy Debate in Turkish Planning Context
Going back to the debates on the autonomy of the state, it seems that one has to make
a distinction between the autonomy in terms of formulating “national interest” above
and beyond any particular conception in the society and autonomy in terms of the
capacity to put this formulation into practice. For Buğra (1997: 38), for instance,
state autonomy means “the power to take independent decisions,” whereas state
capacity means “the power to implement decisions.” Although Turkey has a strong
state tradition in terms of the former, it seems to lack very much in terms of capacity
to impose its conception upon the rest of the society (Öniş and Riedel, 1993: 92).
Indeed, without well-institutionalized state-society relations in a democratic context,
strong and weak states become two faces of the same phenomenon. That is what
Heper and Keyman (1998) call “double-faced state” in which case strong and weak
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manifestations of the state are not contradictory but rather complementary sides of
the same phenomenon.
Apart from society-state relations, the state, and thus the state planning, is also
increasingly under the effect of the international powers and processes. In an age of
“globalization” the idea of connection between different parts of the world in
multiple channels and through multiple actors seems to be the common sense.
However, that should not mean that the different parts of the world were isolated
units before the globalization discourse. Particularly the so-called underdeveloped or
developing world has long been subject to “outside” forces and processes that
transformed it into a very different landscape. It is not enough to formulate policies
autonomous from the sub-national groups but also from non-national or supra-
national conditions and agents. Center-periphery distinction underlined by the
dependency literature in development economics has long been and still is a very
important issue to be addressed in the debate on the autonomy of the state in
formulating and especially in practicing planning in a developing country context.
This debate is also reflected in the assessment about the success of planning in
Turkey. Some observers argue that Turkey has failed in its planning due to problems
inherent in the nature of planning itself. They claim that planning is not an efficient
way of distributing resources compared to the market, producing sub optimal results
in the long run. On the other hand, some others defend planning and argue that
Turkey has never implemented planning in the true sense of the term. They claim
that planning has been used as a tool in the hands of the incumbent governments to
guise their wrong policies in a technical framework, or worse, that the politicians
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totally ignored what is written in the plan documents and implemented their own
short term agenda. There are similar debates in the overall assessment of planning in
the developing countries (Todaro, 1992: 423).
This thesis approaches the autonomy issue in a different context. The main argument
in that regard is the connection between and asymmetry in the domestic and
international autonomy. The main departure point is the idea that democratic state-
society relations are a very important element for the autonomy vis-à-vis the external
world. That is, democratic states are considered to be less open to external
imposition, though they are more open to external dialogue and interaction. In that
context, without a democratic or communicative planning extending to the larger
society, it is hard to formulate and execute plans against the impositions of the
international political and financial power centers.
Autonomy in planning is not only related to the relations with the “outside” but also
closely related to the character of domestic politics. Democratic planning as part of a
broader political democratization would also close the gap between the demands
raised by people and policies implemented by those in the position of representing
the nation or the citizens. That is, an ineffective planning is part of the representation
crisis in many developing countries. As has been emphasized in the chapters
regarding general theoretical and practical debates in planning, it is not possible to
overcome representation crisis in planning without attacking broader representation
crisis of the state.
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Democratization, in that context, has a double function in domestic and global
relations. It is expected to reduce the gap between the people and governments
through various participatory mechanisms and strengthen the governments vis-à-vis
the external pressures that are against the interests or views of the larger society. This
idea to combine technical competence and democratic process in a global
environment shall be discussed in the framework of a new planning model for
Turkey in the next chapter.
5.4 Overview of the Planning During 1960s: First and Second Five-Year
Development Plans (FYDPs)
The First Five Year Development Plan (1963-1967) marks the beginning of the
planned era for Turkey. In that sense, it should be read not just a technical document
but also a political document.  This is perhaps the most important point that
differentiates this plan from the rest of the plans prepared afterwards. This political
aspect is also evident in the clear support and commitment of political authorities at
the time. İsmet İnönü, then Prime Minister, the second man of Republican Turkey
after Atatürk, personally backs this plan in his introduction to the plan document. In
this opening part, İnönü stresses the role of planning in a democratic model for
development and condemns “arbitrary conduct” in economic management. He does
not only address public agencies in his remarks but also calls the whole nation,
including the private sector, to follow the basic priorities and objectives of the plan
for democratic development. This strong emphasis on “democratic development
model” seems to underlie the positive role attributed to planning in preventing
further military interventions due to irrational economic management by civilian
governments in Turkey (SPO, 1963).
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With this clear political support for planning it should be expected that the First Plan
was also one of the most effective plans in terms of reaching its objectives. However,
there is no objective way to measure the success of planning. The same results might
be interpreted in very different and sometimes contradictory ways by different
observers. For those advocating planning the 1960s was a successful decade for
planning in terms of economic growth and stability. For some other observers like
Akad (1984), for instance, Turkey could perform even better without plans during
these years due to favorable post war international economic environment73. There is
no need to go into deep arguments for or against such rival approaches. What is
considered as a criterion in this overview is the consistence between the plan targets
and realizations. This criterion is used as a meaningful measure of the effectiveness
of planning.  In that part an overview of 1st and 2nd FYDPs will be given and similar
overviews will be done for the other periods74.
These two plans were prepared on the basis of a 15 years Perspective Plan covering
1963-1977. An import substituting development strategy is accepted by both plans.
Basic policies adopted in these plans are high growth rates in national income and
production within a stable  environment,  improvement  of  basic  infrastructure,  and
                                                          
73 As a success criterion one may compare Turkish performance with the developed and developing
country growth averages during the 1960s. According to the 3rd FYDP (SPO 1972, 6) that makes this
comparison, Turkish growth rates under planning are higher than average developed (4.8%) and
developing country (5.6%) growth rates in the same period. However, the plan adds that the gap
between Turkey and the developed world in terms of per capita income enlarged due to very high
population growth rate of Turkey. Per capita income in developed OECD countries moved from
$1.850 to $2.601, while that of Turkey only increased from $243 to $350 during 1960-70 period.
From such numbers one may argue that Turkish performance was neither outstanding nor a failure,
but in line with the general trends of the times.
74 Data used in these overviews are collected from FYDPs and their support documents published by
the SPO.
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inward-oriented industrialization with the leadership of the public sector. One
significant difference between the 1st and the 2nd FYDPs is the emphasis on the role
of the private sector in development. 2nd Plan has given more weight to the private
sector investments and underlined incentives to encourage private sector projects
(Tekeli and İlkin, 1984: 1606).
In the light of these policies 1st Plan growth targets for agriculture, industry, services
and GNP are respectively 4%, 12.3%, 6.8% and 7%. These targets were realized to a
great extent. Realized growth rates for agriculture, industry, services and GNP are
respectively 3%, 10.9%, 7.2% and 6.6%. In the context of rapid growth strategy, the
share of fixed capital formation in the GNP increased in the 1st Plan period, from
17% in 1963 to 19.3 in 1967. These investments were realized mainly through
internal financial resources. The share of the public sector in total investments
increased in the context of this inward-oriented import substitution development
strategy. This share climbed to 36% in 1936 from around 30% in 1963.
The 2nd Plan covering 1968-1972 period also realized its targets to a great extent. The
most important divergence was in the agriculture sector with 1.8% growth rate
realization versus 4.1% growth target. On the other hand, growth realizations in
industry, services and GNP were generally in line with growth targets. Average
realized growth rate for GNP was 6.3, reasonably close to the 7% growth target. The
2nd Plan preserved the basic strategy and the policies of the 1st Plan. The share of
public sector in investments decreased slowly in that period but preserved its level
around 30%.
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Success in the realization of the Second Plan is particularly important because it has
been implemented under a new political context. JP, as the center-right party heir to
DP, has ruled the country under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel in this period.
In his opening address to AHC studies for the Second Plan Demirel stresses the
emerging consensus on the need for planning, but also underlies the fact that “plans
should not be an iron jacket.” (SPO, 1966). In this opening address he also stresses
the need for public-private partnership in plan preparations, notes the increase in the
number of AHCs from 21 in the First Plan to 67 in the Second Plan, with a clear
acceptance that Plans create the background for political-economic decisions.
From these results it can be argued that the 1st and the 2nd FYDPs were generally
effective and performed their function as a guide for action. Despite the limits to the
autonomy of the planners, 1960s could be considered as a relatively favorable
environment for the planners to affect political decision making on the basis of
technical knowledge. However, as shall be discussed below, the success of the
planners were not totally independent from the dominant domestic and international
conditions. When the conditions changed the success in the plan implementations
rapidly deteriorated.
5.5 Planning in Crisis: Politics and Planning in the 1970s
5.5.1 General Context of Planning in the 1970s
Although 1960-1980 period is generally known as the planned years in the history of
the Turkish economic policy, it seems reasonable to make a distinction between
1960s and 1970s. There are two important reasons for this distinction. First, Turkey
has gone through a “coup by memorandum” period on May 12, 1971 with significant
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implications for political and bureaucratic processes. Second, global conditions have
changed to a great extent due to the demise of the Bretton Woods system and oil-
shocks. The internal and external conditions during the 1970s created a political and
economic turmoil and demanded strong measures to overcome the negative effects
upon the economy. However, Turkish governments could not respond to this
environment with timely policies but instead opted for more short-term policies
(Buğra, 1997: 205). These short-term policies, however, only increased the burden of
adjustment towards the end of the decade. This option for short-term policies was
also an option for less planning.
Import substitution development strategy could not be sustained during the 1970s.
After the first and second plans Turkey has increasingly faced a balance of payment
problem due to low exports and increasing import of investment and intermediary
goods (Mıhçı, 2001: 178-179). Towards the end of the 1970s Turkey entered into a
severe economic crisis and a political turmoil. The ideological division between the
left and the right turned into street violence and the whole social fabric was under
threat. Under a very heavy external debt burden and increasing violence in politics
Turkish governments lost their stability. That was also a period of coalition
governments with no stable rule and clear direction. Politics was reduced to street
violence on the one hand, and a zero sum game in the rivalry among political parties
on the other hand. In that period of economic and political uncertainty planning
could not function as an effective tool for increasing certainty and bringing stability
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to government policies. That was a clear indication for the significance of the
political process for a successful planning75.
For a short period during the interim years of a technocratic government under the
military guidance at the beginning of the 1970s, the SPO regained its technical
autonomy and added a new department to its organizational structure responsible for
ameliorating the regional imbalances. That was, however, just a transitory and
conjectural position and its effects waned as soon as Turkey reentered into a normal
democratic process. In that process the gap between the plan targets and realizations
enlarged and planning lost much of its attraction under an increasingly uncertain
environment.
In theory plans were to be imperative for the public sector but only indicative for the
private sector. Indeed, planning in Turkey could not be imperative even for the
public sector (Sezen, 1999: 33-34). Its indicative function for the private sector
should also be considered with great suspicion particularly after the 3rd Plan covering
1973-1977 period.  Although the SPO was given the authority to distribute incentives
for the private sector investments, it could not set clear priorities and distribute those
incentives in accordance with the plan. Particularistic and daily interventions into the
planning process were evident in the distribution of incentives that did not serve
larger policy objectives.
                                                          
75 The same lesson about the close connection between political conditions and success in planning
can be drawn from the South Korean planning experience. Planning efforts in this country largely
failed during 1950-1965 period due to unfavorable political approach to planning and political
instability. South Korea entered into a successful planning phase after 1966. The importance attached
to planning by the political authority and the general political stability is stressed as main factors
bringing success after this year (Cole and Lyman, 1971: 208-209). South Korean experience also
shows that what is important is not planning per se but its specific form and particularly its relations
with the broader political process.
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In spite of radical changes in the domestic and external environment Turkish
planning could not show the necessary flexibility to adopt into the new conditions.
First and foremost, the basic import substitution development strategy could not be
revised in order to add a strong export-oriented component during the 1970s. Under
this strategy Turkey could not avoid severe balance of payment problems despite
growing foreign exchange remittances from Turkish guest workers in Europe. As
Akad (1984: 12) observes, this was not only a collapse in the economy, but also a
deep crisis in the dominant economic ideology that could not overcome the mounting
problems.  In that context, the 1970s was a decade in which the old has gone but the
new had not yet arrived.
The limits on the autonomy of the economy and the state vis-à-vis the external
shocks as well as the autonomy of planning from the political conditions were clearly
more visible in the 1970s. Without a nation-wide dialogue and bargaining process to
determine common good, on the basis of which the whole planning work need to be
erected, the common good defined by the planning experts in isolation from the
social and political realities was bound to be wishful thinking rather than a real plan
to be considered as an action oriented process. Neither violence nor ideological
slogans could produce even a transitory consensus for action. In that environment,
Turkey was rapidly moving towards a new stabilization program with the IMF
towards the end of 1970s, in order to overcome its external debt problem.
Put in a different perspective, one may argue that the failure in the classical
democratic process during the 1970s to bring out realistic and legitimate solutions to
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social and economic issues led to a total bankruptcy and a clear loss of autonomy to
the remote international institutions with no democratic accountability. From this
point onwards IMF conditionality and the imperatives of the global market would
further reduce the effectiveness of domestic plans.
The 1970s ended with the January 24, 1980 Decisions envisaging a new development
strategy based on outward-oriented development strategy and liberalization in order
to integrate the Turkish economy to the global markets. September 12, 1980 coup
which brought a military rule until 1983 implemented the January 24, 1980
Decisions with great vigor and prepared a new political environment for the later
democratic era. Planning was to continue within this new context with rather
different functions.
5.5.2 Overview of the Third and Forth Five-Year Development Plans (FYDPs)
Development plans in Turkey prepared during the 1970s should be interpreted in the
above given general background. 3rd FYDP was prepared with an elitist bureaucratic
spirit within the political milieu determined by the March 12, 1971 military
intervention through a memorandum, leading to formation of a technocratic
government composed of various party members and some bureaucrats. That is why
the Plan had more ambitious targets, and it was accepted in the Parliament
reluctantly in order to return back to the normal civilian rule (Tekeli and İlkin, 1984:
1607).
3rd Plan was prepared with a particular emphasis on the relations between Turkey and
the European Community (EC). That is why it was prepared on the basis of as new
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Perspective Plan covering 1972-1995. In this Perspective Plan there were targets
regarding income level and production structure in 1995, the year in which Turkey
would reach to a level to enter a customs union with the EC.
Apart from general policies favoring rapid industrialization, this plan stressed the
importance of reducing external dependence in the field of capital goods sectors.
That is the plan was targeting a new stage in the import substitution industrialization.
Turkey had successfully substituted consumer goods in the relatively easy stage, but
at the expense of increasing its dependence on intermediate goods and capital goods
imports. In that context, “producing machines that produce machines” was not only
considered as a necessary stage in industrialization, but also as one of the key areas
for creating a modern society in the full sense of the term.
3rd FYDP covering 1973-1977 years was put into implementation in an uncertain
international environment characterized by oil shocks. This Plan had more ambitious
targets for agriculture (3.7%), industry (11.2%), services (7.7%) and GNP (7.9%)
compared to the previous plans. However, starting from this Plan there has been
growing divergence between plan targets and realizations. Realized growth rates in
this Plan period in agriculture, industry, services and GNP were respectively 1.2%,
8.8%, 7.3% and 5.2%.
Even this 5.2% growth rate seems to be rather high considering very rapid increases
in oil prices and stagflation in the international markets in the first half of the 1970s.
This high growth rate in the 3rd Plan period could not be financed with internal
financial resources and Turkey started to use more and more external finance in order
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to realize internal investments. For instance, the ratio of fixed capital formation rose
to 25.9% in the last year of the Plan (1977), while domestic savings decreased to
20.4% in the same year. The share of public sector increased in this expanding
investment volume and reached to 36.7% by 1977.
These data show that Turkey could not implement an adjustment policy and adopt
itself to a high cost energy environment by appropriate macroeconomic and
industrial policies. That was because the cost of adjustment was not politically
feasible. Short-term, ad hoc policy was perceived as a more feasible alternative in an
environment of political turmoil in which dialogue between different interests and
groups was almost none existent. Without a political culture favoring compromise
and bargaining among different actors and no strong institutional mechanism for
dialogue, each sector and group tried to preserve its relative position with little
concern for the long-term effects. Planning was less and less effective in that context
as a tool for anticipating long-term trends and providing effective measures for
improvement.
With an interim period in 1978, 4th FYDP was put into implementation, covering
1979-1983 period. Policies adopted in this Plan could be summarized as rapid
industrialization based upon public sector, improvement in the balance of payments,
and creation of a self-sustainable economic structure. These policies and even more
ambitious targets of the Plan (growth rates of 5.3% in agriculture, 9.9% in industry,
8.5% in services and 8% in GNP) compared to the previous plans reveal the fact that
Turkey could not adopt to the new internal and external conditions with this Plan but
instead insisted on the traditional policies. Despite the ambitious targets, of all the
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plans realizations were the worst in that Plan period (0.3% in agriculture, 2.4% in
industry, 2.2% in services and 1.7% in GNP). Looking at the gap between the
realizations and targets one should doubt whether there was a plan in a real sense of
the term in this period. With this experience Turkey could not continue with its
traditional planning with little concern to the “external” environment and political
situation in the country. Actually, the Plan lost all its meaning with the worsening
economic conditions, particularly the balance of payments, and with the 24 January
1980 Decisions giving a new direction to the Turkish development strategy.
Domestic savings and fixed capital formation decreased to a great extent during this
plan period, respectively to 16.5% and 18.9% in 1983, the last year of the Plan
period. On the other hand, due to relatively more grave consequences for the private
sector investments, the share of the public sector increased up to 43.3% in 1983.
Considering the private sector oriented policies of January 24, 1980 Decisions, it is
interesting to see a rapid increase in the share of the public sector in total
investments. That increase should be interpreted in a different way. First, the
composition of the public sector investments is as significant as its volume. The
composition of public sector investments after this policy turn changed significantly,
favoring infrastructure projects over productive sectors. Second, that was a transitory
period in which private sector was not yet ready or confident about the new policy
environment.
5.6 A General Overview of Planning During the 1960-1980 Period
Turkey applied an import substitution development strategy based on protectionism
and a national comprehensive planning during the 1960-80 period. In retrospect it
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seems that the planned years were basically a part of the state building and nation
building efforts of the new Turkish Republic in its broader modernization project.
Economic development, particularly generation of a sound industrial basis, was at the
hearth of the planning efforts, which aimed to change the structure of the Turkish
economy. Despite some participatory mechanisms like Ad Hoc Committees brought
by the new planning approach, the main characteristic of planning in Turkey
continued to be a top-down, state-centered and expert based. In that sense the
planned years were a continuation of planning during the 1930s. However, this time
planners had to work in a multi-party environment in which the autonomy of the
experts had significant limitations in implementation phase, if not in formulation of
the policies. This experience shows that without a well functioning relation between
politicians and bureaucrats it is very difficult to operationalize planning under
democratic conditions.
Neither society al large nor representative bodies have been an effective agent for
planning in Turkey. Under the general conditions of weak civil society, Turkish
planning could not incorporate different viewpoints and interests in a broader
framework for action. A limited participation by business through AHCs proved to
be increasingly ineffective. Governments and the Parliament played an obstructive
rather than constructive role in the planning process. They were effective in
hindering effective application of plans but could not put forth alternative systematic
guidelines for action. In sum, plans revealed serious problems of ownership in the
social and political domains.
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In that context, changing international conditions increasing uncertainty and raising
the need for structural adjustment could easily put plans on more shaky grounds.
Without a democratic will formation “inside,” it was increasingly difficult to resist to
the demands for change coming from “outside.” As has been discussed in the
previous parts this inside/outside distinction itself lost much of its meaning under
growing interconnectedness or globalization. When Turkey reached 1980 it had to
make hard decisions in terms of its traditional policies and institutions responsible
for their application. The pendulum was moving towards “free market” or neo-liberal
policies and away from the idea of national planning.
Despite this state-centered discourse and top-down instrumental planning during the
1960-90 period, one should also pay a close attention to development of new
planning mechanisms like AHCs and HPC in that process. No matter what they did
achieve in practice, such mechanisms provided a valuable asset for the development
of future planning in Turkey. Particularly AHCs created a culture of democratic
planning in Turkey, which is open to be reformulated and reengineered. In their
original form they don’t totally satisfy the requirement of “ideal speech situation” as
formulated by Habermas and communicative planners. And in their application there
is a weakness developed over a long period of ineffective planning. However, it is
still possible to develop such mechanisms in order to deepen participatory or
communicative planning in a broader scale in Turkey. That heritage from the
planning in the 1960s shall be elaborated in the next chapter in the context of
proposing a new planning paradigm with novel participatory planning mechanisms.
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CHAPTER VI
GLOBALISATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PLANNING IN
TURKEY SINCE 1980
6.1 Globalization as a General Context to Interpret Evolution of Planning in
Turkey during the 1980s
6.1.1 Globalization and Asymmetric Positions of the States
As has been discussed in chapter three globalization debates have dominated the
social and international thought during the 1990s. The end of the Cold War, the
dissolution of the rivalry between the West and the East, and growing
interconnectedness mark the emergence of globalization debates. One of the major
arguments put forth in these debates is that the state is increasingly losing its power
on national economy, and various other domestic policy areas.
However, globalization debates are usually taking place in the form of totalities of
global forces and the state power, neglecting individual experiences, particularly
those of the developing countries. Although even the most powerful countries are
losing economic control due to internationalization of production and finance, in
Held’s (1995, 82) words, “the position of those at the lower end of the globalization
hierarchy, experiencing the strongest effects of unevenness” deserves a lot more
attention.
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This chapter attempts such an analysis in the context of changes in the Turkish
planning experience. The main hypothesis is that even though the formal
organization of planning, its name and legal standing remains more or less intact, the
content of planning has transformed substantially since 1980. In other words, what
Beck (1997, 138) observes for political parties in a “complex modernity” context –
“constancy of form but change of content”—may be generalized to other institutions
like planning agencies. However, it will be shown that despite these changes in
content, Turkey could not yet reform its planning along with the conditions of
uncertainty characterizing the global environment and transform its planning
procedures according to communicative rationality, as elaborated in the chapter
three.
As has been discussed in the previous chapters, planning in Turkey goes back to
1930s. This early experience was confined to industrial plans that were aiming at
import substitution in some basic consumer goods and intermediate inputs. The
World War II that was followed by the “liberal” policies of the 1950s interrupted that
experience. Turkey has started to prepare comprehensive five-year development
plans aiming at a systematic policy of import substitution since the early 1960s.
Today Turkey is in the period of its 8th Plan. However, there seems to be a major
shift in the development strategy of Turkey since 1980. That shift can be summarized
as a transition from the state-led, expert-based and inward-oriented development
strategy to an outward oriented development strategy based on free markets and the
private sector. In that process the nature of the Turkish development plans and the
planning organization has changed substantially.
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The transformation in the Turkish development strategy is not a unique experience
but rather shared by many developing countries. Though happened during the 1990s,
Indian experience regarding transformation from a planned to a market economy, for
instance, is very similar to Turkish case (Shariff, 1995). As Kuhlman (2000:1)
observes, “since the early 1980s, and even more since the fall of communism in
Europe, development planning has lost much of its appeal.” In most of the
developing countries, the objective of establishing a self-sufficient and diversified
domestic economy has been replaced by policies favoring integration into the world
markets and specialization in certain sectors during the 1980s and 1990s. In other
words, there seems to exist some general forces operating at the global level that
shape the policy range for those countries beside their “internal” dynamics.
Moreover, under the new conditions it is getting increasingly difficult to make a clear
distinction between external and internal.
International forces, guiding the states to adopt certain policies and rule out others,
depend not only on the “invisible hand” of the markets but also on the visible
institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, among others. In that sense, the
developing countries differ from the developed countries that have more autonomy
and better means to respond to this new environment. Having said that, it needs also
be emphasized that this imposition from “outside” was not a simple and one-sided
phenomenon but rather operated in relation to the political background of each
country and found “internal” counterparts, blurring the “inside/outside” distinction.
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In that context, this chapter is also expected to shed some light on the overall
experience of the developing countries in the example of Turkey and try to show that
there are alternative ways of responding to globalization beside the present one, even
for the developing countries.76 However, one must be very careful not to over-
generalize individual experiences to larger groups. In addition to some major
differences between the developed and developing economies, each cluster,
especially the latter, has significant variations within itself (Amin, 1997). Therefore,
there is a need to enlarge our understanding of various individual cases parallel to
more theoretical efforts to understand the overall trends of the present times.
In the following sections, the Turkish planning experience will be discussed on the
background of neo-liberal and cosmopolitan globalization perspectives that have
been presented in chapter three of this thesis. It will be argued that Turkey has
followed the neo-liberal framework in its transformation of economic policies and
planning practice since 1980, like many other developing countries. That neo-liberal
preference preserved the legal and institutional aspects of planning but reduced its
effectiveness and legitimacy. However, there is also an alternative that has not been
considered seriously up to date. That alternative is neither going back to conventional
past planning mechanisms nor defending a minimalist state devoid of any planning,
but opting for a democratic planning in a global context.
                                           
76 As Weiss (1998) observes powerless state is a myth even under globalization conditions. Japan and
Germany are still two significant countries for arguing in favor of an activist state in economic policy.
The power of state, in that context, should not be discussed in abstract but related to concrete analysis
of particular states and their institutionalization.
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6.1.2 Neo-liberal Globalization and Planning in Developing Countries
While developed countries were in the process of consolidating national capitalism,
newly established and economically backward countries were in the process of
nation building, state-building and economy-building, especially after de-
colonization in the 20th century. The route to real independence was linked to
building a self-sufficient economy for most of the new nations, attempted either
under socialist or mixed economy policies, both of which envisaged a widespread
direct state interference into the economy. De-linking from global capitalism was
considered as the most appropriate way to change relatively inferior positions of
those countries. Central planning in socialist countries and drigiste or etatist policies
in many non-socialist developing countries were framed under import substitution
strategies.  National development plans have been an integral part of such efforts. As
has been discussed in the earlier chapters, national development plans became one of
the key elements for modernity and catching up the modern countries via
comprehensive state intervention and agency.
Resurgence of neo-liberalism during the 1980s, upon the background of economic
problems of 1970s, attacked exactly at those powerful aspects of the state in
developing economies—its welfare aspect and protective aspect as well as direct
state interference into the markets through central planning and other means. New
right governments in the U.S.A. and the U.K. led this new spirit, which was to be
followed by most of the other developed and developing countries, and be
institutionalized into the practices of international agencies like the World Bank and
the IMF.
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The new spirit and policies, labeled as the “Washington consensus,” have been
imposed on developing countries under the stress of foreign debt crisis, in the form
of conditionality. In Taylor’s (1997: 145) words “half the people and two- thirds of
the world lack full control over their own economic policy” due to this “consensus”
imposed upon most of the developing world. The orthodoxy of the new policies is
perhaps best described by “there is no other alternative” slogan used by Thatcher in
the British political context. Many other conservative leaders, among whom Turgut
Özal in Turkey was probably the most early and prominent one in the developing
world, later adopted this slogan.
In sum, neo-liberal globalization stresses the validity of the classical economic
analysis both for the developed and developing countries and announces the failure
of socialism and import substitution policies, as well as the welfare state, in a global
competitive environment (Lal, 1985). As part of this process, development
economics as a distinct discipline has lost much of its former appeal as well (Leys,
1996). After the development of post-Fordist flexible production and networking by
the transnational capital, particularly finance capital, it is claimed that those countries
following market-friendly policies will gain, while those insisting on state control
will lose, this time not by being exploited but by being excluded from the production
and exchange relations (Keyder 1993, 24-25; Beck 1997, 48-49). Traditional form of
planning is not an effective tool for development in that new environment but rather
an obstacle for being included into global market networks. Globalization, in that
context, cannot be isolated from worldwide power relations configured around
Western modernity (Keyman, 1995: 54).
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6.2 Repercussions of Globalization on Turkish Planning Since 1980
6.2.1 From Import Substitution to Outward-oriented Development Strategy
Turkey entered into an outward-oriented and market-based development strategy
after 1980, via a radical departure away from the previous import substitution
development strategy characterized by extensive protectionism (Öniş, 1997). The
process started with the January 24, 1980 stabilization program announced by the
right-wing civilian coalition government at the time, but continued under the
surveillance of the military following a military coup in October 12, 1980. Through
the repression of all opposition, among which labor movement and radical left-wing
organizations were primary targets, the military-backed government prepared the
ground for a successful implementation of the new economic development strategy.
Deputy prime minister responsible for implementing this economic stabilization
program was Turgut Özal who was the top technocrat responsible for drawing up the
January 24, 1980 stabilization program and who later became the prime minister of
Turkey in 1983 elections held under the conditions of the 1982 Constitution.
Özal’s Motherland Party (MP) was to be the main instrument of reforming the
economy and redefining the role of the state along neo-liberal premises, throughout
the 1980s. Being the former Undersecretary of the State Planning Organization,
beside his experience in private sector and the World Bank, Özal was a strong
advocate of privatization, direct foreign investment, free trade and free movement of
capital. Based on an eclectic liberal-cum-conservative-cum-nationalist ideology—
with the famous slogan of uniting three tendencies—he gained a strong popular
support and parliamentary majority to continue to the reform process until the end of
the 1980s. One should also note that a legal ban on the former parties and party
leaders leaders until 1987 and veto of many candidates in 1983 elections were also
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leaders until 1987 and veto of many candidates in 1983 elections were also effective
for the recruitment of the new political parties and political figures.
Increasing exports to solve the main bottleneck before economic growth was the top
priority in early years of the Özal government. That objective was realized to a great
extent and Turkish exports increased from $ 3 billion level in 1980 to $ 7 billion in
1984.  Put in different terms, export/GNP ratio increased from 4.2 percent to 11.7
percent during the same period. Meanwhile structure of exports changed toward
manufactured products that today comprise around 90 % of all exports.  Growth rate
also resumed and GDP grew around 5 percent on average during the 1984-89 period
(SPO, 1998). Trade liberalizations in early 1980s have been taken one step further
into liberalization of capital accounts towards the end of 1980s. All these
developments made Turkey more open to the world markets and diversified its
interactions with the external world mainly through trade, capital movements and
tourism.
6.2.2 Five-Year Development Plans of the 1980s
Turkey prepared its 5th and 6th FYDPs during the 1980s. A brief description of these
plans and their effectiveness in implementation would help to understand the effects
of new development strategy and the new global environment upon the planning pro-
cess in Turkey.
5th Plan is actually the first plan prepared with a new spirit under a very different po-
litical environment. 5th Plan covering 1985-1989 period was put into implementation
after a transition program applied in 1984. With this Plan Turkey has abandoned its
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traditional import substitution policy and adopted an outward-oriented development
strategy for integrating Turkey into the international economy. In that context, the 5th
Plan emphasizes reduction of state intervention into the economy, liberalization in
foreign trade and foreign capital, increase of basic infrastructure and housing invest-
ments, and amelioration of regional imbalances.
5th Plan targets and realizations are respectively 3.6% and 0.8% for agriculture, 7.5%
and 6.5% in industry, 6.5% and 5% in services, and 6.3% and 4.7% in GNP. Consid-
ering the international environment during the plan period and structural adjustment
process in Turkey, the realization level is fairly successful.
Domestic saving and fixed capital formation ratios (respectively 22.2% and 22.5%)
improved to a great extent relative to the previous plan period. The share of the pub-
lic sector in total fixed investments decreased parallel to the private sector and out-
ward-oriented development strategy. More important than that, the composition of
the public fixed capital formation transformed. The share of infrastructure increased
while that of industry rapidly decreased in the total public fixed capital formation.
With all these qualities, the 5th Plan may be accepted as a turning point in the Turkish
planning. Although the basic format and procedure as well as terminology in the
planning remained largely intact, the whole philosophy behind the plan changed in a
radical way. From that plan onwards planning, particularly five-year development
plans, gained a ritualistic character. As put by Mıhçı (2001: 171) “planning after
1980s turned into letters of intent for the international financial circles.” They have
been prepared mainly due to the constitutional framework for planning. The content
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of the economic policies were largely shaped by the Prime Minister Özal himself and
by the stabilization programs or structural loan agreements with the international fi-
nancial institutions. FYDPs were used as documents to present some basic data for
bureaucracy and academia and introduce new policies in a comprehensive way.
Ironically, the plans and the SPO were successfully manipulated in order to reduce
the effect of planning in Turkey and transform the economic administration. Besides
its function as an advisory body for the government, the SPO retained one important
function even after this period and this was its responsibility for preparing the
investment program for budgetary and non-budgetary public agencies.
Investment programming is indeed an implementation rather than a planning
function. SPO was also used as an implementing agency for distributing incentives
for private investments, giving incentives for foreign direct investments, operating
free trade zones, etc. That is, the organization was no longer planning government
policies but acting as a tool to implement them. That function gave a new, though a
transitory, popularity and power to the SPO in the public. However, many of such
implementation related functions and units of the SPO were transferred to the
Treasury by a Decree enforced in 1991. From that year onwards the organization lost
much of its popularity and became a relatively passive agent compared to the other
economic policy units.
6th Plan covering 1990-1994 is in a sense the continuation of the previous plan, based
upon the new outward-oriented development strategy. The main approach in this pe-
riod was to increase liberalization and the role of the markets. The Plan envisaged a
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transfer of resources from the public to the private sector, and some measures to re-
duce consumption and increase investments.
Growth rate targets were set higher for this plan period compared to the previous
one: 4.1% in agriculture, 8.1% in industry, 6.7% in services and 7% in the GNP.
However, the economy went through a crisis in 1994, the last year of the Plan, due to
deterioration of the balance of payments, high level of inflation, and increase in the
public sector barrowing requirement. The crisis, and the April 5, 1994 Decisions
taken to curb the crisis, caused a rapid slowdown in the economy, enlarging the gap
between the plan targets and realizations. Realized growth rates were 1.6% in agri-
culture, 3.8% in industry, 4.1% in services and 3.5% in the GNP
Despite these negative results, the ratio of domestic savings and fixed capital forma-
tion to the GNP increased respectively to 23% and 24.4%. The share of the public
sector in total fixed capital formation decreased significantly in the same period, re-
ducing up to 20.2% under the effect of the April 5, 1994 Decisions. These data show
that the crisis in 1994 was mainly a financial crisis focusing on the public sector with
limited negative effects upon the private sector or the real sector.
The 6th Plan was prepared during the rule of the Motherland Party, which was re-
placed by a coalition government of the True Path Party and Social Democratic Peo-
ple’s Party. These two parties were heirs to the two main center right and center left
parties of the 1970s, which were banned during the early 1980s under the decisions
taken by September 12 military administration. Under the leadership of Süleyman
Demirel, the new government coming to power in 1991 brought forth a short-term
238
and ad hoc policy formation in Turkish politics. Among short-term actions of the
government were generous subsidies to certain agriculture products, reduction in the
required age for retirement, distributing provincial status to certain cities, etc. In that
context, it was hard to expect the new government to take a plan prepared by their
main rival MP serious and use its policy advices.
That episode in the planning history of Turkey also reveals the weakness of the
planning process against changes in the government. Without a real consensus
behind plans, including parliament and civil society, it is hard to expect ownership of
a plan prepared under the previous administration from a new government. Thus
Turkish plans lose much of their meaning in such transition periods. However,
despite serious divergences from the plan in some specific issue areas, the new
government basically adhered to the outward oriented development strategy
implemented under the MP governments under the leadership of Özal. Neo-liberal
discourse continued alongside short-term and ad hoc policy formulation. As part of
Turkey’s attempt to integrate into the world, Özal had applied for full membership
into the European Union (EU) in 1987. The new government also pursued the goal of
signing a Customs Union Agreement with the EU in 1995, as part of the broader
process of integration with the Union as a full member.
6.2.3 Turkish Public Investments in a Global Context
As has been observed in the previous chapter, planning in Turkey or the State
Planning Organization (SPO) has been mainly focused on the public investments
since the early 1960s. Beside overall planning and policy formulation activities, the
SPO’s role in practice or day-to-day implementation has been defined mainly around
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public investments and resource allocation. Tinbergen’s77 three stage planning model
was accepted for the organization of planning activities; namely macro, sectoral and
project levels (Tinbergen, 1964; 1967). Planning was to be indicative for the private
sector and imperative for the public agencies. This imperative aspect has been
expressed in the resource allocation for different sectors, regions and projects more
than anything else. That is why it would be informative to look at what has happened
to the investment policies of Turkey after 1980, in order to draw some conclusions
about the repercussions of globalization over the Turkish planning experience.
The public investment strategy of Turkey has been geared towards the improvement
of social and economic infrastructure, making more room for private sector
investments in the manufacturing industry since the beginning of the 1980s.  Since
then, the public sector has focused on the development of energy, transport &
communications, and agricultural infrastructure. Only Priority Development Regions
are excluded from this general investment policy in order to decrease regional
disparities (SPO, 1995).
As a result of above-mentioned overall strategy, the share of infrastructure
investments (economic and social) in the total public sector investments has
gradually increased, from nearly 55 percent in 1980, reached the level of 80 percent
of total public sector investments in the early 1990s. Meanwhile, the share of
manufacturing sector in public investments has declined steadily from 26.3 percent
in 1980 to 5-6 percent level in the first half of the 1990s78. The relative share of
                                           
77 Tinbergen actively involved in the establishment of the SPO and preparation of the First Five Year
Development Plan and his approach to planning dominated the future course of planning in Turkey.
78 Turkish Five-Year Development Plans and Annual Programs.
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public sector investments also changed considerably during the same period. The
ratio of public sector investments to GNP decreased from 9 % in 1980 to around 5 %
in the 1990s. Putting this relative decline in public sector investments in another way,
the share of public sector was 40 % and that of private sector 60 % in 1980, while the
same shares were realized as 23 % and 77 %, respectively in 1998 (SPO, 1998).
Public sector investments increased their share as a result of recent economic crises
in Turkey, which affected the private sector investments relatively more than the
public sector investments. Today, the share of public sector investments in total
investments is around 30 % and that of the private sector around 70 % (SPO April
2002: 36). However, despite the relative increase in the public sector investments, the
structure of the public sector investments remained stable. It can also be argued that,
this relative increase would rapidly erode when confidence resumes for the private
sector investments.
The relative decrease in the amount, as well as the change in the composition of the
public sector investments could be interpreted as part and parcel of liberalization
policies and outward-oriented development strategy adopted from 1980 onwards.
The main logic behind the replacement of public investments by private investments
in the manufacturing sector was to increase competitiveness in tradable goods
through the dynamism of private enterprises. The underlying assumption was the
“economic principle” –or the behavioral assumption of orthodox neo-classical
economics—, which means the private entrepreneurs are more efficient than public
enterprises due to the motive of profit maximization (Lal, 1985: 104).
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The process of liberalization and free market-driven economic policy has continued
and deepened during the 1990s with a growing emphasis on the need to channel
private sector finance even into some traditionally public sector dominated
infrastructure investments (basically, energy and transport) via models like build-
operate-transfer. In addition, a special emphasis, particularly from 1990 onwards, has
been placed on increasing investments in health and education sectors in order to
improve basic health conditions and to raise the number of well-educated and skilled
people in a rapidly growing population. As a consequence, the combined share of
these two sectors in total public investments, which was about 6.0 percent in 1985,
reached the region of 15.0 percent after 1993 (SPO, 1998). Since mid-1980s there
has also been an increasing private sector participation in these sectors that are
deemed as critical in the development of human resources. According to provisional
data for the year 2002, the share of education and health sectors in the total public
and private sector investments is respectively around 17 % and 7 % (SPO April,
2002: 35).
These investments in human resources are not only emphasized to increase the
welfare of the population, but also considered as vital for increasing competitiveness
in a global international economy. A young, skilled, disciplined and healthy working
population creates comparative advantage via raising productivity of national
enterprises and attracting foreign investments. Capital movements, direct foreign
investments in particular, are getting more and more liberalized and playing a more
significant role in the development process. That is why, Turkish development
process is more and more focusing on attracting foreign sources of finance by means
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of privatization, BOT type projects, liberal capital markets and relatively cheap and
educated labor force.
In the early stages of export promotion competitiveness was mainly secured through
relatively cheap labor, which could be achieved by the suppression of the labor
movement by military rule and legal continuation of restrictions in the later years.
However, this policy was not sustainable in the long run, and parallel to
democratization and growing social discontent, Turkish governments abandoned
incomes policy and started to act more sensitive towards the demands of labor class
instead (Önder, et al., 1993: 1-2).
Exports, which were perhaps the single most important achievements of new
policies, have slowed down towards the 1990s. That was largely because inadequate
production capacity due to low level of investments in the productive sectors. Liberal
policies during 1980s used earlier idle capacity and increased the level of capacity
utilization but failed to develop sufficient additional capacity particularly in the
manufacturing sector (Ayanoğlu, 1994: 95-100). The private sector did not substitute
the public sector in the manufacturing sector to the extent it was expected. Price
incentives under idle capacity, cheap labor and a restricted domestic demand led to a
high level of exports in earlier years, but that policy reached its limits when capacity
utilization saturated and domestic demand started to grow. The result was ironically
the resurgence of balance of payments difficulties, which were the original cause of
initiating the neo-liberal policies.
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When it comes to the efficiency of the public sector investments there is also a clear
failure particularly evident in the 1990s. Increasing short-term policy framework in
the Turkish politics during the 1990s and loss of bureaucratic barriers to political
demands led to over-programming in the public investment programs. That is, the
investment programs included too many projects with little resources to finance those
projects. Under these conditions individual projects could get very limited allocation
leading to increasing completion times, raising costs and a general inefficiency in
resource utilization. As a result, the Turkish citizens could not get necessary services
in adequate amounts and in a timely manner despite a sizeable public spending.
PEIR Report (2001) prepared by the World Bank staff in close collaboration with the
Turkish counterparts contains a detailed analysis of this problem. According to the
report, this problem can be explained on the background of ineffective screening and
limitation on inclusion of many new projects into the investment portfolio particu-
larly at the second half of the 1990s. Average completion time was 6 years in 1994,
but over 1995-99, 3455 new projects were initiated of which 2399 were multi-year
projects and the residual 1456 were single year projects.  By the end of 1999, the
public investment program consisted of 5321 projects with an estimated cost of US$
150 billion and an unfinished balance of US$ 105 billion (equal to 70 percent of the
estimated total cost of projects in the public investment portfolio).  Based on the ap-
proximately US$ 5 billion allocated in total to all public investment in 2001, it is es-
timated that the current portfolio will take, on average over 20 years to complete.79
                                           
79 It should be noted that the year 2001 was a crisis year in which public investment funds declined
radically. The normal volume of public investment funds in recent years has indeed been around US$
10 billion. Using this figure completion rate of public investment portfolio is around 10 years. How-
ever, this is still a very long period for a sustainable program.
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An incomplete investment does not constitute an asset to the public sector.  Spending
on a much-delayed investment can constitute a significant waste of public resources.
In a context where the share of public investment in GNP has declined, the indication
that a substantial part of ongoing public investment is of low value should raise seri-
ous concerns about the sustainability of public sector services and infrastructure sup-
port for the private sector.
Below given table from the PEIR report indicates the completion ratio, measured as the
ratio of cumulated investment spending over the estimated total cost of the portfolio.
It is observed that there is a decrease in the completion ratio of total public invest-
ment from 47 percent in 1995 to about 35 percent in 1999.
Completion Ratio of Investment Portfolio
By Budgetary Agency 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1 Consolidated Budget 41.1 32.9 30.4 28.7 36.5
2 Autonomous Agencies 50.9 52.6 36.4 38.1 36.9
3 SEE 50.2 39.1 25.0 29.2 29.4
4 Bank Of Provinces 38.1 35.1 32.0 31.4 28.1
5 Sub-Total (1+2+3+4) 43.3 34.5 29.2 29.0 34.7
6 EBF 58.3 60.5 65.7 62.8 N.A.
7 SEE UNDER PRIVATIZATION 49.0 60.2 52.1 44.2 44.3
Grand Total (5+6+7) 47.1 39.6 35.3 34.1 34.6
                  Source:  SPO
The World Bank mission identifies the problem in investment portfolio and relates it
to; (1) the inclusion of high number of new multi-year projects into the public
investment program, (2) decreasing investment allocations due to fiscal restraints,
and (3) increasing cost of existing project portfolio over time via revisions. Though
these are accurate representation of the problem, it does not go into deeper and more
political aspects. The World Bank approaches the problem as a purely technical
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problem and avoids bureaucratic, political and social framework conditions creating
a suitable environment for the rise of the problem at the first place.80
This “irrational” structure in the public investment program continued till today with
no clear solution within the existing planning process that is supposed to be rational.
Rationalization efforts over the 2001 period decreased the number of projects and the
average completion period to some extend without attacking the structural causes
that led to the problem in the first place. It seems that the emphasis on efficiency
raised by neo-liberal discourse could not prevent this inefficient public spending but
probably generated it due to neglecting efforts for creating an appropriate mix among
the state, market and civil society.
It has also been increasingly clear that without an effective and efficient state, with
multiple channels to the society, there is little chance neither for the state nor the
markets to function effectively.  Various economic and financial crises in Turkey
during the 1990s reveal this close and intimate relationship between the state and the
market. It seems that, without a new planning paradigm based upon communicative
rationality, respecting all relevant parties or stakeholders, the state/market dichotomy
shall not solve Turkey’s developmental problems.
6.2.4 Transformation in the Functions and Organizational Structure of the SPO
What Beck (1997: 146) writes about political parties in a new milieu is largely
applicable to the planning organization in the Turkish context: “their names and
                                           
80 It is interesting to note that the World Bank (1981) had indeed made similar analysis for Turkish
investment budget just at the beginning of neo-liberal policies in Turkey. Coming back and identify-
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organizations continue to exist but are filled out with new contents.” The State
Planning Organization of Turkey also continued to exist with the same name and
with an even larger organizational structure and staff after 1980 but filled out with a
new content in the new policy environment.
Considering neo-liberal market-based policies from 1980 onwards, growth in the
organizational structure and manpower of the SPO looks like a paradox. However,
the SPO is no longer having the same content or functions. One may further argue
that the new role given to the SPO is just opposite of what it was originally designed
to perform (Türel, 1996: 1055). Instead of intervening into the economic
development process and directing it, the planning organization assumed the role of
transforming the planned economy into a market economy via structural reforms and
encouragement of the private sector. This new role was somewhat imposed upon the
planning organization from two different but complementary sources; the party in
power ‘within’ and international organizations like the World Bank and the IMF
from ‘without’81. This is by itself a micro level manifestation of how the classical
“inside/outside” distinction in the context of nation-state paradigm becomes
problematic under the conditions of globalization.
Effects of international agencies are visible especially in their demand for structural
adjustment in the Turkish economy. Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) given by
the World Bank had a very important effect on the priority set of the Turkish
                                                                                                                           
ing similar problems after more than 20 years imply ineffective solutions when there is not a political
commitment beyond technical analyses.
81 It is not easy to identify the demarcation line between ‘local’ and ‘global’ in this process. The
situation is rather akin to what Robertson (1992) calls ‘glocalization’ whereby it is hard to think of
them independent from each other.
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planning. The first SAL was signed on March 1980, and especially after the third
SAL signed on May 1982, specific regulations for the public sector came to the
agenda. Furthermore, in the fifth SAL there was a specific condition that the Fifth
Five Year Development Plan strategy and preparations should be in conformity with
the content of the SAL agreement (Önder et. al., 1993: 122). In other words, planning
document is expected to be in conformity with the policies of transforming Turkish
economy along neo-liberal principles.
However, it is hard to say that the pressures from the international institutions were a
total imposition upon the Turkish government. Rather than an imposition, it was
actually a reinforcing factor for the government that had already internalized such
policies. But, in any case, one has to note that, beside global market constraints there
are usually constraints of international agencies for the governments of developing
countries. Those institutions limit the power of governments for autonomous
decision making, problematize democracy and representation in political front, and
put their support on the benefit of some parties against others. That is an important
difference and peculiarity of most developing countries compared to the developed
countries.
The SPO acted as one of the most important counterparts of international agencies
during this process. Although its name and basic organizational structure remained
intact, overall organization of the SPO has undergone some important modifications
in the process of transformation of the economy along neo-liberal policies. One of
the most important changes was restructuring of the High Planning Board (HPB),
which is the top decision making body of the SPO.
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Originally HPB was composed of equal number of politicians and bureaucrats but
the representation of bureaucrats has been gradually decreased. Today there is only
one bureaucrat, who is the undersecretary of the SPO, as a permanent member of this
board and it functions like an inner cabinet (Türel, 1996: 1055). On the other hand,
some new boards like Money and Credit Board and Coordination Board have been
strengthened, which focus on conjectural day-to-day decision-making rather than
long-term planning (Aslan, 1998). On top of these changes other bureaucratic
institutions like Central Bank and Treasury have been promoted vis-à-vis the SPO.
This change in relative position of economic agencies can also be interpreted on the
background of the globalization debate. As Panitch (1996: 92-93) observes, those
agencies that have stronger international links gain, while others lose power, in the
neo-liberal globalization. The claim that “the Treasury and the Central Bank in
Turkey are acting as agents of the IMF” (Boratav, et. al., 2000: 29) is meaningful in
that context.
Another important change is the reduction in the effectiveness of temporary or
permanent Ad Hoc Committees (AHCs). The AHCs have been an important tool for
participatory planning modeled after the French and Indian example. These forums
played a valuable role to provide a platform for dialogue particularly between
industry and the state and legitimized the overall planning process. However, they
have been ineffective during 1980s and lost their attraction despite their formal
continuity (Türel, 1996: 1054).
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One should also touch upon change in the style and discourse in planning process.
First, there has been a growing stress on the concept of strategic planning rather than
rational comprehensive planning. Indeed, that conceptual shift has been parallel to
the general trend in the developing world and the policies of the international
organizations like the World Bank (Agarwala, 1985). Strategic planning is barrowed
from practices of firms in oligopolistic markets and underlies uncertainty in an
economy interacting with and vulnerable to external forces. That planning approach
has been widely applied in the public sector as part of rising managerial
understanding (Bryson and Roering, 1987). However, despite this new discourse it is
very hard to claim that Turkey has effectively adopted this strategic planning
perspective. Strategic planning discourse has rather been used to eliminate the
effectiveness of the classical planning than to create a new and effective planning
approach. In other words, planning has been deformed rather than reformed in the
Turkish case.
Second, in conformity with the growing emphasis on strategic planning, the plans
and annual programs started to stress qualitative targets rather than quantitative
targets. Particularly the Seventh Five Year Development Plan has been prepared in
that spirit, which envisages institutional and legal reforms rather than quantitative
production targets in critical issue areas. Even for the production, demand and trade
figures there is a change in the terminology of the plan documents. The term
“estimation,” in sector wise tables, for instance, has replaced the term “target” in
order to signal that the numbers are not imperative but rather indicative.
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Finally, there is now more autonomy for public investment agencies and
municipalities in terms of resource allocation for particular public projects.
However, this autonomy is usually exercised in a highly ‘politicized’ manner in
which political elite at local and central level makes arbitrary interventions for
narrow group interests. Without inclusion of diverse groups within the process and
development of accountability at the local and central level, more autonomy ends up
with technical and democratic inefficiency. The current state of the public investment
stock is a clear indicator for such inefficiency, which is overextended to a large
number of projects almost all of them subject to long delays and high cost overruns
(SPO, 1995; PEIR, 2001).
All these changes were brought about by a top-down approach that increased
efficiency in some respects but reduced the self-esteem of bureaucracy and
politicized the decision-making process to a large extent (Öniş, 1997). It may be
necessary to make some informal interventions into the operation of the bureaucratic
mechanism in order to bring about a major shift in the operation of the public
organizations along different policy premises. However, without a re-
institutionalization, these temporary interventions lead to a vacuum, which is likely
to be filled by powerful interest groups rather than democratic initiatives of the
citizens. Moreover, in a highly oligopolistic market, weakening of planning
organization does not lead to a well functioning market but rather to various rent-
seeking activities. This is particularly important in the case of privatizing former
public monopolies.
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In short, the SPO has been transformed along neo-liberal premises during 1980s and
its future organization is still uncertain. As Turkey moves along a deeper reform
policy that aims at privatizing even some traditionally public sector dominated
infrastructure investments and devising new institutions like competition board,
consumer protection law, etc. there is an increasing need to rethink about the role of
the SPO. Structural adjustment policies to transform economy from protectionism
and state-led industrialization can be divided into two main stages. The first stage,
which has largely been completed during 1980s, was a relatively easy process as it
involved destruction of barriers (legal or institutional) rather than creation of new
institutions. However, Turkey is now in the second stage of structural adjustment,
which requires new institutionalization for a healthy functioning of the market.82
Worsening income distribution, inflationary pressures, vulnerability to exchange rate
and financial instability, increased corruption are all accompanying transition to
liberal policies (Taylor, 1997: 150). Markets may be important relative to earlier
failure of over-intervention and over-protection, but it is certainly not a panacea to all
problems. As cases like Somalia, Afghanistan, and many other countries in Africa
and Asia show, without well-organized state apparatus, there is no chance for
democratic governance and an orderly market. There is no global substitute for such
institutionalization. As Stiglitz (1999) correctly observes, external agencies may even
“short-circuit” people’s learning abilities in the developing world and reinforce their
impotence. Provision of lucrative opportunities for domestic bureaucrats employed in
                                           
82 The World Bank seems to recognize this in its 1997 World Development Report. In other words,
after so much experience and some obvious failures, the Bank rediscovered the importance of the
state, the rule of law, and well –functioning institutions in the development process.
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international projects also created a tension within local bureaucracies and speeded
up bureaucratic degradation (Hirschmann, 1999).
Economic crisis in 2000 and 2001 forced Turkey to reconsider its whole legal-
institutional structure under close scrutiny of the international financial institutions.
The relationship between politics and economic management has been the key area
for reform in that process. What the IMF and the World Bank advised in that regard
is establishment of autonomous regulatory bodies. Turkey has since established such
regulatory bodies for banking (High Board of Banking Supervision and Regulation),
telecommunication (High Board of Telecommunication), energy (High Board of
Energy Regulation), and tobacco.  There are various remaining areas yet to be put
under such autonomous regulatory bodies, like water. The main idea behind this
institutionalization is to cut the ties between political and economic domains.
Considering partial, particularistic relations between politicians and business, open to
widespread corruption, such regulatory bodies may look a “rational” way out.
However, there are problems in this approach. First and foremost, insulation of
economic domain from politics proper may raise significant problems in terms of
democratic politics. That is, attack on particularistic relations between political elite
and business may turn into a general dissociation between politics and economics,
generating a democratic deficit in bureaucracy. Second, these regulatory bodies are
staffed still in a political environment characterized by particularism, leading to
institutionalization of specific interest groups. Third, such novelties are not well
integrated with the broader bureaucratic establishment in Turkey, generating tensions
particularly between ministries and regulatory bodies.
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It may be argued that there is a growing discontent about the present situation of the
economy in Turkey that may lead to a political will to rethink about a better
institutional set up. However, there is not yet a clear direction adopted and the
planning is basically in a stage of transition. That transitory stage makes it so much
important to put forth alternative ideas and provoke broader discussions for the
realization of a more democratic and efficient system of planning. Applying Ulrich
Beck’s terminology into planning (Gleeson, 2000), Turkey needs to consider the
possibility of “reflexive planning,” accepting uncertainty as part and parcel of
planning in a democratic and global context.
6.3 Five Year Development Plans During the 1990s
6.3.1 Seventh Five-Year Development Plan
During the 1990s Turkey has entered in a new environment that marked with the full
effects of globalization, with its uncertainties and instabilities, leading to periodic
crises. It is important to analyze the plans prepared in this period in order to get the
new directions for a realistic reform agenda in the field of planning.
7th FYDP coving 1996-2000 period, put into implementation after a transition pro-
gram in 1995, is yet another change in the basic structure and discourse on planning
in Turkey. This plan was indeed representing the culmination of the basic policy
preferences developed over the 5th and 6th Plan periods. These basic policies can be
summarized as (1) globalization and competition as its indispensable component, (2)
flexibility in the labor market, (3) technological change, and (4) regulatory and su-
pervisory state (Türel, 1997: 33).
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The most important difference of the Plan is its stress on the “structural reform proj-
ects”83 (20 reform areas) rather than quantitative targets and all encompassing sector-
wise content of the previous plans. The Plan was prepared after a serious crisis in the
economy in 1994, which pointed out the limits of the prevailing policies and de-
manded more radical changes in the economic policy.  The basic philosophy behind
the Plan was the need for the realization of the so called “second generation struc-
tural reforms” in Turkey. Turkey has taken a significant road in the direction of lib-
eralization by lifting many limitations and legal barriers before the private sector and
foreign trade since 1980. However, this period was a relatively easy one with fewer
requirements for creating new institutions. The second-generation reforms, on the
other hand, required creation of new institutions for an effective functioning of the
market and stable growth environment.
That was a new arrangement, which was based on reform projects rather than classi-
cal sector wise classification of the previous plans. The plan emphasized qualitative
changes through legal and institutional reforms rather than quantitative production
and foreign trade targets. Sector wise quantitative targets were downgraded and the
plan presented alternative scenarios for macro variables. Turkey was envisaged to
grow 5.5 or 7.1 % according to the worst and best growth scenarios.  That was also a
novelty which implies a change towards “strategic planning” approach instead of
comprehensive planning.
                                           
83 These 20 reform projects include fields like the development of human resources, structural reforms
related to agriculture, industry and integration to the world, efficiency in the economy, regional bal-
ances, and environment
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What is clear in the 7th Plan was a new conception regarding the functions of the
state in the economy. As a natural outcome of structural reforms since 1980, the plan
envisaged a regulatory and supervisory state in the economy. That conception was
actually shared by the World Development Report 2000 of the World Bank.
What is underlined both in the Turkish 7th Plan and the World Bank report is the role
of the state and state institutions for an effective functioning of the markets. Turkey
has undertaken many liberalization reforms without preparing its state structure for a
really autonomous market regulated by specialized agencies and laws. Despite the
“free market” rhetoric used during the 1980s the state preserved its traditional control
and continued its particularistic interventions into the economy. That is why the lib-
eral policies did neither reduced uncertainty for the private sector (Buğra, 1997) nor
eliminated rent seeking and corruption. On the contrary, liberalization and privatiza-
tion policies were used in a particularistic way to open new and even larger opportu-
nities for distributing rents in a particularistic manner.
7th  Plan, in that context, aimed at a very intensive legislative activity in order to cre-
ate a well-developed institutional infrastructure for the functioning of the markets.
However, that was not politically feasible and most of the reform proposals in the
Plan remained on paper. Since at least mid-1970s the ties between plans, annual pro-
grams and budget were very loose and plan realizations were far away from plan tar-
gets. That is why there was a very low public attention paid to the 7th Plan debates in
the Parliament (Konukman, 1997).
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Erosion in the credibility of plan activities was clear in this process. Once again,
what was formulated in the plan could not be implemented due to lack of ownership
on the part of the political parties and the civil society. That was also an example for
the failure of plans that could not raise political and popular support via participatory
mechanisms. One may argue that this failure has ultimately led to the crisis in the
Turkish economy and imposition of international conditionality by the IMF and the
World Bank towards the end of the 1990s.
7th  Plan is also important as a plan that introduced the Economic and Social Council
as a new and participatory institutional mechanism in the planning process. That was
a platform to bring the government, business and labor together in order to set na-
tional priorities and basic policy objectives. However, this corporatist arrangement in
the planning process failed and could not produce effective results in its practice. As
Türel (1997: 35) observes its membership was dominated by the public sector (2/3 of
the total membership) and its primary concern was to hinder the labor demands for
wage increases after the radical erosion in the wages in 1994. That was a “dead-
born” mechanism that could actually play a very positive function if it had been de-
signed and operated in a different way. In the recommendation part of this chapter
the possibility of using this platform within a new participatory planning perspective
will be explored.
6.3.2 Eight Five-Year Development Plan
8th Plan, covering 2001-2005 period, has been prepared at the end of 1990s as the
first step for the Long Term Strategy covering 2001-2023 (SPO, 2001), whose last
year is the centennial of the Turkish Republic. The Long term Strategy sets ambi-
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tious targets. It envisages 7 percent average annual growth over the 2001-2023 pe-
riod (whose 30 % would stem from total factor productivity), converging per capita
income level to those of EU countries in 2023. It is also targeted to raise Turkey
among top ten countries in the world at the end of this period with $1.9 trillion GNP
in absolute terms.
Turkey has been given a candidate country status for full membership to the Euro-
pean Union in Helsinki Summit in 1999, after a great disappointment on the part of
Turkey in its exclusion from the process in Luxemburg Summit in 1997, determining
new EU enlargement strategy. That positive development is reflected in the 8th Plan
documents. In the “Basic Targets, Principles and Policies of the 8th FYDP” (SPO,
2001b: 25), it is declared that:
The European Union shall be one of the focal points in Turkey’s globalization process. In line with the
Helsinki Summit decisions where the candidate status of Turkey for membership was approved, nec-
essary steps shall be taken towards realization of the membership target. During the Plan period, ef-
forts shall be accelerated for taking measures for meeting the Copenhagen criteria and adaptation of
the Community legislation (Acquis Communautaire). The National Program for the Adaptation of the
European Union Acquis to be prepared shall be in accordance with the general targets and priorities of
the 8th Plan.
That emphasis on the globalization and regional integration process for the overall
framework of planning is a continuation of the 7th Plan approach. Establishment of
an Ad Hoc Committee for Globalization (SPO, 2000) for drawing up the general
strategy for the Plan also shows the strong emphasis on the new policy environment
shaped outside the national borders. Though this is just one out of 98 AHC reports,
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the AHC report on globalization is a significant document that recognizes the new
conditions for undertaking development efforts and particularly the need for rede-
fining the role of the state in the development process within this qualitatively differ-
ent environment.
Though the general approach in the 8th Plan can be considered as a continuation of
7th Plan there are also some differences in the format and the content of these two
plans. First, there is a return to the classical format of previous plans. Although the
structural reforms projects identified by the 7th Plan were largely preserved under
different names, the 8th Plan returns to the classical sector-wise evaluation and plan-
ning format. 8th Plan also preserves the emphasis put upon legal and institutional ar-
rangements in the 7th Plan.
There are also some content-wise differences between these two plans. Leaving aside
sector-wise and specific issues, it can be argued that there is a more cautious ap-
proach to globalization in the 8th Plan compared to the 7th Plan. The 8th Plan stresses
that the “globalization process, besides its significant opportunities, may also lead to
some adverse effects” (SPO, 2001b: 2). In that context, the 8th Plan underlines re-
strictions on the macroeconomic policy tools under liberal financial markets, in-
creasing risk of financial crises (as observed in the South-eastern Asia), distorted in-
come distribution among and across countries, cultural monopoly due to globaliza-
tion of demand and uniformity of consumer preferences (SPO, 2001b: 2-3). Under
these considerations 8th Plan does not advise inward-looking policy but a more cau-
tious balance between favorable and adverse effects of globalization. In other words,
8th Plan adopts the same outward-oriented and liberal development strategy and the
259
need for structural reforms to take full advantage of a more competitive global mar-
ket, but also stresses the risks in the process.
These differences between 7th and 8th Plan should be interpreted as a natural outcome
of changing political conditions in Turkey. 7th Plan was prepared by a coalition gov-
ernment of center right (True Path Party) and center left (Social Democratic People’s
Party), whereas 8th Plan was prepared during a coalition government of nationalist
left (Democratic Left Party), nationalist right (National Action Party) and center right
(Motherland Party) parties. It should also be emphasized that 7th and 8th Plans were
prepared under different global conditions, too. Relative to the 7th Plan, the 8th Plan
has been prepared in a period of crises in the world, undermining a simple and opti-
mistic approach to globalization.
Alongside its FYDP Turkey has also prepared a “National Plan” for the EU. That
was a plan that contained detailed commitments of Turkey regarding political and
economic harmonization with the EU. Turkey has identified its short, medium and
long term actions in this Plan to be undertaken in order to converge the EU standards
and start negotiations for full membership. Issues regarding various economic and
social sectors were planned under the coordination of the SPO, while political issues
and commitments were drawn according to government policies as well as National
Security Council decisions. The National Plan has an “action-plan” format with cer-
tain time limits and financial considerations. It is objective-oriented (preparation for
full membership) and thus, it has a better prospect for implementation compared to
the FYDPs.
260
6.3.3 An Overview of FYDPs during 1990s in Turkey
Despite various changes in the plan formats, in the organization structure of the SPO
and in some policies, FYDPs in Turkey continued to lack a clear strategic vision and
a strong link to actual budget expenditures and other implementation processes like
legal and institutional reforms.
Turkey went through various economic crises, changed many governments and de-
veloped new international commitments towards the European Union during the
1990s. All these developments required a better coordinated and strategic planning
and effective policy formulations in order to solve domestic issues and adopt global
and regional conditions. It might have been possible to develop a new planning per-
spective and propose a new organizational structure for planning in that turbulent and
crisis-ridden environment. However, planning could not gain its old popularity and
the SPO could not reform itself to adopt into the new environment as an effective
agency.
The old planning was passé, at least in the political establishment. However, the neo-
liberal policies of the 1980s were also a failure considering the inflation, low growth,
periodical crises, deteriorating income distribution and lack of technological prog-
ress. Leaving aside some ad hoc changes in plan formats and in the organizational
structure of the SPO, a new and effective planning paradigm could not develop and
gain legitimacy in the political arena.
There are basically two deficiencies that could not be addressed in reform efforts re-
garding planning in Turkey. First, Turkish FYDPs and annual programs could not be
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evolved into a strategic planning perspective with an “action plan” format for im-
plementation. Plans continued to retain their “comprehensive” approach without
clear priorities and costing for policies. Almost every sector and issue have been
given priority, which means political authority could not make tough policy deci-
sions through planning. That aspect could be related to the ad hocracy and short-term
policy in Turkey during the 1990s as well as inadequate bureaucratic guidance to
make politicians perceive the results of their actions in a long-term perspective.
Apart from lack of clear priorities plans have not provided a clear time frame and
financial requirements for various policy statements. That is why policies lost their
credibility and plans turned into no more than a “letter of intent” or “wish list.” If a
strong costing element could have been incorporated into the planning process to-
gether with a resource constraint, the bureaucracy and the government could not es-
cape from making choices in a transparent way.
The second major deficiency of the plans is their weakness in terms of political
commitment and social ownership. The plans are formally prepared by governments
and adopted by the Parliament. However, they have largely lost their significance in
political debates and transformed into bureaucratic documents. The limited political
input in the planning process, in turn, led to lack of “political will” during the im-
plementation phase.
The issues related to the effectiveness of the plans in terms of implementation are
related to a weak participation on the part of civil society, too. Though the plans
continued to use AHC mechanism and some other channels to get input from busi-
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ness and academia into the planning process, these mechanisms played largely a ritu-
alistic role with little impact on the overall shape of the plans. Without necessary
budget and clear rules for functioning and reporting, the AHC mechanism lost much
of its attraction on the part of civil society and reflected just the ideas of a few active
participants under the guidance of the SPO experts.
Weak and ineffective participation in the planning process not only decreased the
legitimacy of the plans but also reduced their quality and effectiveness in terms of
their preparation and execution. Without a strong participatory mechanism at macro,
sector, region, agency and project levels there is little hope for reforming planning in
Turkey.
In short, planning in Turkey remained largely a technical issue based upon instru-
mental rationality of planners working under parameters set by political environment
and international financial institutions. With no clear political commitment, financial
programming and social ownership, plans have been doomed to remain as wishful
thinking that could easily be neglected when political exigencies and/or international
pressures dictated different courses of action. The last episode, in that context, is the
February 2001 crises and policy changes in its aftermath.
6.3.4 February 2001 Crisis and the PEIR Report
As part of Turkish efforts to reduce long lasting inflation problem Turkey has started
to implement a stabilization program with a strong emphasis on predetermined for-
eign exchange rates, monetary policy, more discipline in government spending and
privatization. Turkey has unilaterally invited the IMF in 1999 to monitor its reform
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process and its efforts to bring stability to the Turkish economy. With this program
supported by the international financial institutions, Turkey could reduce wholesale
price index from 62.9 % in 1999 to 32.7 % in 2000, reducing average real interest on
government barrowing substantially in 2000. However, Turkish Lira over-
appreciated in the process, government spending could not be taken under discipline
and privatization efforts largely failed.   In this process Turkey faced a rapidly
growing foreign trade deficit and significant reduction in its foreign exchange re-
serves, and a rapid erosion of confidence in financial markets and banking sector.
Combined with political conflicts between coalition government and the Head of the
Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the anti-inflation policies of the government lost their
credibility in the public. As a result, Turkey changed its program abruptly, depreci-
ating its currency more than 100 percent with immediate adverse effects on the fi-
nancial sector in February 2001.
The 8th Plan covers 2001-2005 and it is still in effect. However, 8th Plan is one of the
unluckiest development plans considering the fact that one of the most devastating
crises of the Republican Turkey occurred in the early months of the first year of the
Plan implementation. The crises and following developments in political and admin-
istrative environment changed the policy parameters in a radical way and marginal-
ized the Plan as well as the State Planning Organization in policy formulation and
execution process.
Kemal Derviş became a state minister responsible from the Treasury and Central
Bank in order to curb the February 2001 crisis. Derviş was one of the high-ranking
officials of the World Bank at the time and the Prime Minister Ecevit invited him for
264
assuming this political post. From this point onwards macro economic policies of
Turkey have been shaped by Derviş in close consultation with the IMF and the
World Bank to rescue Turkey from its deep economic and financial crisis. New
stand-by agreements signed and various structural adjustment loans84 with strict con-
ditionality put into force in this process. Not only the SPO but also the government
has been largely marginalized in policy formulation and execution after the crisis.
One of the most important documents in this period is Public Expenditure and Insti-
tutional Review (PEIR) Report (World Bank 2001) prepared through joint work by
the World Bank and Turkish experts. In the opening pages of the report it is argued
that; “underlying the immediate triggers for this and previous crises is a deeper
problem of governance which is manifested in serious, non-transparent and unsus-
tainable imbalances in public finance” (PEIR, 2001: i). The report makes references
to Special Ad Hoc Committee Report on Fiscal Transparency and Public Finance
prepared in the context of 8th FYDP (SPO, 2001b) and the Fiscal Transparency Re-
port prepared by the IMF, stressing the deficiencies in the institutions of collective
decision making in government. There are three major problem areas identified in
this report:
Aggregate fiscal management is weak. Due to off-budget and quasi budget activities
and lack of a functional classification system for budget Turkey could not measure
and thus manage its public expenditure effectively. That is why Turkey could not see
                                           
84 The World Banks’ “Programmatic Financial and Public Sector Adjustment Loans” (PFPSAL I and
II) signed by the government of Turkey, respectively on July 10, 2001 and March 22, 2002, basically
replaced plans and programs. PFPSAL I provides US$ 1.1 billion and PFPSAL II US$ 1.35 billion,
with strict conditionality regarding banking sector, agriculture, social security, and budget. Turkish
Treasury under Derviş coordinated formulation and execution of these loans, whose policy prescrip-
tions are fully supported by the IMF loans as well.
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the scale of public debts before the February 2001 crisis and take the necessary
measures in a timely manner.
i- Strategic decision-making or policy formulation is neglected and there is
not an effective policy-plan-budget linkage. Due to insufficient informa-
tion and lack of costing for different policies, plan priorities remain on
paper without any accountability on the part of agencies responsible for
implementing plans. With its current restricted structure and cumbersome
procedures budget does not reflect priorities and encourages off-budget
mechanisms.
ii- Excessive but ineffective budget controls create inefficiency. There is a
tight and centralized control focusing on rigid compliance with regula-
tions without considerations for increasing managerial discretion and as-
suring efficiency. That structure also forces agencies to generate off-
budget mechanisms to escape from rigid controls, fragments the system
and results in inefficiencies.
As a result of all such deficiencies the consolidated budget of the central government
remains as a partial and non-transparent expression of total public expenditure.
The consolidated budget of the central government indicates total expenditure of 36
percent of GDP in 1999, and this is not a full measure of government spending.
Adding in the non-budgetary funds, revolving funds, social security institutions and
local government would boost the total to 46 percent of GNP. The addition of quasi-
fiscal activities would boost the total expenditure by an additional 10 percent of GNP
(PEIR, 2001: iv).
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Among this expenditures interest payments comprise 35.9 percent and wage expen-
ditures 23.6 percent, adding up to 59.5 percent of total central government spending
in 1999. Considering 10.1, 10.5 and 20.6 average OECD values respectively for in-
terest, wage and interest plus wage expenditures in total spending, Turkey’s peculi-
arity is clearly observable (PEIR, 2001: ix). In this context, Turkey does not have any
room for social transfer spending and investments. In other words, with its very high
external and internal debts resulting in very high interest payments and an inefficient
public personnel structure, Turkey does not have a meaningful tool for social and
economic development programs and projects.
The diagnosis and institutional reform proposal contained in the PEIR reform gives
important ideas for overcoming the current problems in Turkey with a sustainable
approach. However, there are some problems with this PEIR report that would
probably make it less feasible in the actual implementation phase.
First of all, the PEIR report does not have a clear political commitment but reflects
bureaucratic or technocratic concerns. The report seems to be a product prepared by
close collaboration with the Turkish bureaucracy in the Treasury, SPO and the Min-
istry of Finance. It seems that the Turkish technocrats have used this opportunity to
raise their long held ideas and criticisms for the existing structure. With the weak ties
between the Turkish political process and bureaucracy, the experts and administra-
tors of the Turkish institutions seem to prefer to communicate their ideas via the
World Bank experts who are supposed to have more credibility and better access to
political authority. That may have some practical benefits but not a sustainable solu-
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tion to the long term problems of Turkey that require a close and better communica-
tion directly between Turkish politicians and technocrats in various institutions.
The second major weakness of the PEIR report or the World Bank approach is its
neglect concerning civil society organizations, particularly the business and labor
organizations in the process of preparing the report. In that sense, the report remains
somewhat a joint product of World Bank and Turkish professionals or experts with
little concern on the part of neither political authority nor civil society. That problem
goes at the heart of the issue since the underlying assumption in the World Bank
approach seems to be a belief in the technical solutions to essentially political issues.
Using Habermas’ (1970a) terminology elaborated in chapter three, the main
weakness in the World Bank approach is “scientization of politics,” based upon
instrumental rationality, neglecting the link between politics and planning. That is
where one should draw a limit to the applicability and legitimacy of such reports
albeit their very important technical merits for a reform process.
6.3.5 November 2, 2002 Elections and A New Political Context for Planning
Within the turbulent economic conditions, coalition government in Turkey could not
sustain it power and decided to held early elections on November 2, 2002. That
election has been one of the most interesting elections in the history of Turkish
democracy in terms of massive changes in the composition of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly. Thanks to the 10 percent threshold, all political parties, except
Justice and Development Party (JDP) and Republican People’s Party (RPP), failed to
send MPs to the Parliament. JDP gained one third of votes, which have reflected in
almost a two third majority in the Parliament. After a long period of coalition
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governments, Turkey has returned to a single party government with a solid majority
in the Parliament.
It is too early to assess probable implications of this recent political development in
terms of planning. However, taking previous experience of Turkey into account, it
seems very likely that this new political environment will profoundly affect the role
of planning and the functions of the planning organization. New government de-
clared an “Urgent Action Plan,” (UAP) listing major reforms to be done within the
first year of the government. The coordination of the UAP is given to the State Plan-
ning Organization. This preference signals the intention to revitalize the SPO vis-à-
vis the Treasury and international financial institutions.
There have also been very rapid developments regarding the full membership into
the European Union in the first months of the government. Party chairman R. Tayyip
Erdoğan could not be elected as a MP because of his past imprisonment, and thus,
JDP had to offer Abdullah Gül as Prime Minister, due to legal and constitutional pro-
cedures. However, Erdoğan actively worked for gaining a date for starting negotia-
tions between Turkey and the EU for full membership in Copenhagen Summit of the
EU. The result has been a conditional date, stating that the EU shall start negotiations
as soon as possible if Turkey realized political criteria for full membership at the end
of 2004. This development and uncertainties in international relations of Turkey,
particularly the approaching US intervention in Iraq, and Cyprus problem between
Turkey and Greece under new UN proposals, seem to shape the main agenda for the
Turkish politics. Here again, it is very interesting to observe the joint and interactive
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“external” and “internal” developments shaping the overall framework for any sub-
stantial issue, including the future of planning in Turkey.
It seems that Turkey has to deepen its democracy and strengthen its economy in or-
der to solve legitimacy crisis of the political system in the eyes of Turkish citizens
and preserve its active involvement in her global political position. Both democratic
and economic dimensions may be linked within a democratic planning perspective.
This is a possibility whose realization requires not just the support of the govern-
ment, but also bureaucracy and broader civil society. However, it is too early to be
either optimistic or pessimistic.
6.3.6 General Evaluation of the Planning after 1980
Turkey has been largely integrated into world trade and capital movements during
the 1980s. That transformation also affected the planning process and discourse.
Instead of a comprehensive rational planning focused on optimum allocation of
resources, the planning efforts were put to the service of structural adjustment
policies along neo-liberal premises. Plan rationality has been substituted by market
rationality discourse in that transition.
However, these two rationalities are mainly dependent upon the same conception of
universal instrumental rationality (Lal, 1985; Dahrendorf, 1968). That is why the
justification is the same for both type of rationality. The issue is optimum allocation
of resources and the problem is which method is best for that purpose. Neo-liberals
favor demand and supply forces, while traditional planning approach stresses expert
knowledge. Turkey has abandoned expertise and turned towards markets as a
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mechanism to achieve economic prosperity. That was not just a national decision.
International environment and ‘intervention’ by the international institutions played a
significant part in that ‘choice’. Ironically, it was experts from remote international
organizations that ‘recommended’ abandoning expert-guidance in the domestic
economy.
However, change in the Turkish development strategy cannot be solely based on
international environment. It is clear that the traditional inward-looking development
strategy and conventional planning did not any more work in the case of Turkey 85
towards the end of the 1970s. It was the inadequacy of then current strategy that
brought about the new approach based upon market-orientation. Under these
conditions, it would not be wise to go back and use the traditional means to cure
problems of the new approach.  However, it is not wise to continue with the new
approach either, which succeeded in some respects –particularly in increasing
exports—but failed in many other domains –like income distribution, inflation,
macroeconomic stability, vulnerability to external shocks, etc.. In that context, the
more appropriate answer is probably not an either or choice between an ineffective
planning and an imperfect market. There are various alternatives in between, which
may also add a strong democratic element into the development process beside
instrumental rationality of optimum resource allocation.
                                           
85 There may be two reasons for this failure: either the failure of the tool itself or the failure in not
using it appropriately or misusing it –or else a combination of both. Whatever the reason, one thing is
clear that the strategy had reached its limits within the context of economic crisis toward the end of
1970s.
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That alternative in between may be called as communicative planning or democratic
planning. The issue here is not just substitution of one form of instrumental
rationality with another, but opening the space for different forms of rationalities.
That approach may be related to deliberative democracy model developed by
Habermas, as explored in chapters two and three, favoring communication between
free and equal participants. The state is not withering away but changing its present
form and function in this response to globalization. Instead of a paternalistic or
authoritarian state, there is a possibility of “negotiation state” (Beck, 1997), which
would supervise the markets as well as facilitate interactions among various groups
within the society.
Development of a regulatory and supervising state is indeed reflecting the spirit of
the 7th Plan of Turkey covering 1996-2000 period. Globalization and regional
integrations, particularly the Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU
and prospects for a full membership, are at the background of this Plan whose
strategy document clearly recognizes their importance for the future policies of
Turkey. Publication of an Ad Hoc Committee Report on Globalization and Regional
Integration before the preparation of the Plan also witnesses these considerations.
Although the 8th Plan has a more cautious approach compared to the 7th Plan, the
same considerations and general direction of planning can be identified in the 8th
Plan (2001-2005) as well.  The SPO did also organize an AHC Report on
Globalization in the preparation process of the 8th Plan, with a stronger prospect for
full membership to the EU after the Helsinki Summit decisions that identifies Turkey
as a candidate country.
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Although the 7th and 8th Plans recognize the significance of globalization and the
need for re-institutionalization in various domains, there is not yet a clear path to be
followed in order to create a democratic reform process. Insufficient political and
social ownership for the plans have so far created a clear failure in the linkage
between plans and actions.86 In the context of Turkish planning, the idea of a
communicative planning is still an open alternative. Planning can be rescued from
being a tool of the state elite and experts by devising mechanisms to involve different
groups and individuals within the larger society. Society in that case would not just
mean business elite and academia but different groups of civil society from
environmental groups to village communities. At the macro level the state, business,
labor and academia may collaborate better to devise macro-level plans, while on the
project level all those who are affected from consequences of specific projects or
programs may have a voice. A real and extensive decentralization and incorporation
of the NGOs within the deliberation process are also critical elements for a
democratic planning.
In sum, planning should be a humane planning that empower its participants and stop
forcing those disabled by market forces to accept their situation as a fate.  In that
framework, different rationalities, beside technical instrumental one, should have a
legitimate saying in the decision making process. Virtue needs to be part of this
process as much as impersonal technical rationality and private self-interest. There is
a room for experts as well as laymen in that conceptualization of planning. However,
this time experts would not be above others  (Kennedy, 1996).  In  other  words,  they
                                           
86 Ownership of plans in the body politics is indeed one of the central elements in measuring the
“quality of planning” (Chakravarty, 1991: 10).
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have to accept a modest position of facilitating others to make their own minds and
provide them with the necessary means. In that understanding, the loyalty of the
planner should not be fixed to a narrow state elite but enlarged towards the larger
public.
It is not absolutely necessary to change the name of the planning organization or its
legal standing in a radical way. Such an effort may even harm the goal of reaching a
different planning practice. The challenge is rather to think of new mechanisms and
new concepts to be incorporated into the current planning process. A revitalization of
Ad Hoc Committees might be a starting point. Novel forms of participatory project
preparation, evaluation and application might be another tool. Cooperating and
coordinating macro level decisions with the representatives of civil society
organizations (business, workers, civil servants, etc) is yet another tool. These
changes need to take place within a context of a deliberation process participated by
the planners and others, on a permanent and flexible basis.
Simple mechanisms or tools are not meaningful in themselves. They need to be part
of a change in overall understanding of planning. Thus, there is a need for a different
discourse on planning, with a strong democratic element internal to its application
rather than a technical discourse. However, such a discourse cannot be separated
from the larger issue of effective freedom of speech and empowerment of citizen
initiatives. In that sense, development of democratic planning should be considered
as part and parcel of broader democratization of Turkey along with its grand project
for becoming a full member in the EU.
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Participation by diverse groups within the planning process would provide two major
benefits. On the one hand, it would increase the legitimacy of the plans and programs
as well as specific projects and policies in the eyes of the public. On the other hand,
it would increase efficiency of the planned actions by directing resources into those
areas that are most demanded by the society. Of course, this process should not be
considered as a smooth one devoid of power politics and conflicting interests. One
needs to remember Foucault and his contribution to the politics of discourse at this
junction. Conflict should be accepted as part of the process as much as possibility of
a consensus. The problem is to create an institutional environment and a broader
discourse that would reduce the domination of one group or narrow interests and
increase accountability. However, planning process should not be a substitute for
politics proper and should not hide political divergences by turning them into simple
technical issues.
Finally, one needs to point out the fact that developing countries are relatively more
receptive or more constrained by the changes in the world, and especially in the
developed parts of the world. That fact can be observed throughout the history of
planning in Turkey from 1930s up today. That is why, it is also very important to
observe changes in the developed world and their repercussions on international
institutions for a relatively easy transformation towards democratic planning in
developing countries.  Robertson’s (1992; 1995) glocalization concept is to be
stressed and adopted to planning at this junction. More democratic global governance
may facilitate more democratic forms of planning in various localities, and vice
versa.
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This agenda is broader than reforming the planning process and planning agencies
and mechanisms. That is why recommendations regarding a new planning
framework developed in this thesis should be interpreted within this broader reform
agenda stimulated by the global trends as well as acute economic crises in Turkey
over the last decade. A new planning paradigm would hopefully create synergies for
other reform areas and provide a general framework for a more effective state/society
relationship in a global environment.
6.4 Mechanisms for Communicative/Democratic Planning in Turkey
6.4.1 Communicative Planning as a Realistic Alternative in Turkey
Habermas’ communicative action theory may not look very suitable for many devel-
oping countries with weak democratic institutions and an authoritarian political cul-
ture, dominated by a small state or political elite. However, it is going to be wrong to
make broad generalizations. As has already been stressed on various occasions, de-
veloping countries are not uniform. They share some general characteristics but, at
the same time, differ in their economic as well as political experiences. It is also im-
portant not to be over-ambitious. A country may not apply communicative rationality
in all fields of political practice, but successfully adopt communicative practices in
specific fields like planning, creating a suitable environment for future applications
in a broader framework. This is a process, and through experience, political culture,
too, may develop along the communicative practices across various fields.
A significant enabling factor in that regard would be development of a positive
global environment for adopting communicative practices in planning and public
policy. A critical assessment and reform in global institutionalization is necessary for
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such a development. In that context, international institutions may foster this process
by adopting communicative practices in their relationships with individual countries.
Most of the international agencies already declared their support for participatory
policy formation and implementation. However, as the recent Turkish relations with
the international institutions prove, this new approach is not as strong in practice as it
is in discourse.
In a new global context characterized by new epistemologies and complexity, deep-
ening of democracy at global, national and local levels become part of development
process. As Sen (1999) correctly emphasizes, democracy is today gained a universal
appeal, and democracy and development are no longer perceived as separate and of-
tentimes conflicting ideals. In that sense, democratization of state/society relation-
ships and strengthening of civil society, in connection with communicative planning
may solve problems of development within democratic framework. Turkey, and
other developing countries, should overcome “there is no alternative” or “the TINA
syndrome,” and see that there are alternatives in all situations (Amin, 1997: 151).
This syndrome may also be criticized in terms of power/knowledge perspective de-
veloped by Foucault, whose “histories aim to show the contingency” and intolerabil-
ity of “practices and institutions [that] present themselves as having no alternative”
(Gutting, 1994: 10)
There are indeed alternatives. With relatively more developed economic and political
structures as well as accumulated experience in planning, Turkey seems to be one of
the potential developing countries to adopt and apply communicative planning. Con-
sidering its prospects for full membership into the European Union and its domestic
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mounting social and economic problems (income distribution, regional imbalances,
inflation, inadequate health and education, lack of a good urban and rural infrastruc-
ture, etc.) to be addressed in a democratic framework, Turkey needs to use some sort
of a planning besides the functioning of the market forces. In that context, conven-
tional planning approach and organization do not meet the necessities of the new en-
vironment facing Turkish society. But a new planning paradigm based upon commu-
nicative practices do.
It is also important to note that there is a growing concern for democratization, at
least in some influential sections of the business community in Turkey. The demand
for democratization is advocated as a panacea for fragmented social and political
structure as well as a precondition for joining the EU (İKV, 1997; TÜSİAD, 1997).
That is, both in terms of domestic political stability and better access to the global
markets, an observable portion of the Turkish business community seems to perceive
its interest in democratization of Turkey. That is a very important step considering
the traditional particularistic mode of relationship between the business and govern-
ment. In that context, it can be argued that a well-designed and presented participa-
tory and democratic planning model would find significant support from the business
community in Turkey.
If democracy is going to have a real meaning in the sense of giving the public the
chance to be involved into administration, then planning need to be put into a demo-
cratic context as well. For an authoritarian planning practice, power and expertise
may suffice, but not for a democratic one. In that context, participatory mechanisms
at different levels (project, agency, region, sector/issue, macro, global) need to be
developed at the crossroads of power, public and expertise.
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This mix also refers to a confrontation of different rationalities in a deliberation pro-
cess to reach temporary understanding on policies. That necessitates a paradigm shift
from a subject-centered instrumental rationality based upon technical knowledge to
an intersubjective approach based upon communicative rationality, a broader con-
ception of rationality, which also includes instrumental part. On the basis of commu-
nicative practices, it is expected that each party is going to enrich the perspective of
other parties and help formulation of policies with a stronger legitimacy basis. This
process may also be considered as a tool for enlarging the information basis, man-
aging complexity and ensuring successful implementation of decisions in a highly
differentiated as well as interconnected world.
6.4.2 A New Issue-oriented Organizational Perspective
The current sector-wise division of labor within the SPO is a necessary but
insufficient structure to identify and cope with diversifying and complex problems in
the face of new domestic and global environment. As Roxas (1996: 20) stresses,
sector-specialized view is a paradigm problem that hides economic, social and
environmental connections. There is a need for flexible and horizontal organization
and team working to develop effective response to new issues. That is, the SPO
needs to adopt its internal organization and provide open and flexible teams for
planning with respect to specific issues that go beyond traditional boundaries.
Among these issues are domestic and cross-border environmental problems,
technology development,87 migration, disaster management, traffic problem, etc.
                                           
87 Kepenek (1999), for instance, insists on the role of an active developmental state using new tools in
a global context to tackle with technology development and innovation. Apart from education, SME
and regional policies, this role requires a broader concern for quality public administration and a rela-
tively free environment.
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Because of the sector wise division of the planning system, a previously unrecog-
nized issue becomes "no-one's" problem (Stromberg, 1999). Disaster management
issue in Turkey is a good case for this problem. With its current sector specific or-
ganization it is very hard for the SPO to identify the significance of this issue and
develop adequate response, though it is now very clear that there is a close linkage
between development and disaster. Treating disasters as natural phenomenon with no
implication for development planning would be a grave mistake in the face of exist-
ing experience. In contradistinction to the received views disasters are affected by
and, in turn, affect development process or development strategies.
Natural disasters, more specifically earthquakes, are among the key factors affecting
social, economic and political process in Turkey in recent years. For instance,
economic losses, erosion of political credibility and social unrest are all parts and
parcel of Kocaeli Earthquake. Turkish GNP went through a significant decline
(around – 5 percent) and Turkish industry severely damaged due to this earthquake
that took place in the industrial heartland of Turkey.  The state could not act
promptly and in an organized and efficient manner to help the people, giving rise to
harsh criticisms. NGOs as well as international assistance gained prestige vis-à-vis
state actions in the process.
In this important event the need for coordination and communication as well as
collaboration among the public agencies, NGOs and international efforts became
evident. The problem is the creation of necessary mechanisms to form the necessary
linkages among various actors and actions. If the SPO or a similar planning body
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could organize an interdisciplinary team to overview the general environment for
disaster management the problem of coordination and collaboration would be
minimized. This is not only necessary in disaster recovery phase but also in disaster
preparation phase in order to reduce vulnerability.
There is a need for a broader concept of development and a cross-cutting
organizational structure as well as networking in order to take necessary measures
against disasters. The first step to be taken is to define disasters as a development
problem, particularly for the developing countries that are much more vulnerable
(BID, 2000). There are even attempts in the world to integrate “natural” catastrophes
into development planning (Freeman and others, 2001). The main idea in such efforts
is that “natural disasters” are not totally “natural” but rather closely related to men-
made environment. Both causes and effects of disasters must be conceptualized on
the background of economic, social and political institutionalization of the society.
This brief analysis of disaster management suffices to back the argument that the
Turkish planning should go beyond sector wise organization. An issue-oriented
organizational perspective would not only create synergy among traditionally
compartmentalized units within public planning organizations but also provide a
ground for interacting with relevant local, sectoral, regional, national and
international formal and informal stakeholders, depending on the nature of issue at
hand. That is actually more or less what is stressed in the context of the growing
importance attached to the term “governance” in the international development
literature and practices.
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6.4.3 From Government to Governance
Governance is a fashionable word in recent years particularly in the international fi-
nancial circles. World Bank (1992) is a leading organization in that respect. Some
other international financial institutions and policy bodies (the UNDP, the Asian De-
velopment Bank, the OECD, the EU, etc) have also followed the suit and adopted
governance as a guiding principle in their perspectives and functions.
USAID (2001), for instance, stresses its DG (Democracy and Governance) pro-
grams’ “unique ability to serve as both a means for sustainable development and an
end to consolidate democratic regimes throughout the world.” ASIAN Development
Bank (1999), following the World Bank guidelines, underlies four basic elements of
good governance: accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency, as
factors for sound development management. UNDP (1997), another pioneering in-
ternational agency, declares that governance includes the state, but transcends it by
taking in the private sector and civil society. The state, in that conceptualization, cre-
ates conducive political and legal environment, the private sector generates jobs and
income, and civil society facilitates political and social interaction. The end result is
a constructive interaction among all three. “Good Governance,” for UNDP (1997), is
characterized by participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness
and equity.
That strong emphasis on the concept of governance is in a sense acceptance of the
limited power of market for reaching developmental goals. In that sense, it is an
emphasis on the appropriate institutional context for effective, equitable and
sustainable development. However, this should not be considered as a return to the
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classical institutional context dominated by the nation state as the primary agency.
On the contrary, the concept of governance implies a multi-actor model based upon a
tripartite dialogue and interaction among formal government bodies (at the national
and local levels), civil society organizations and private sector (at the local, national
and international levels). In short, the market is still there as an indispensable
component which is, in a sense, located within a web of institutional mechanisms.
This new framework does not mean a return to classical state-centered planning
paradigm but neither does it mean leaving everything to automatic and impersonal
forces of market as the most efficient mechanism. It is rather in favor of a
participatory planning approach at different levels (local, national and international)
and with multiple actors or stakeholders (official policy makers, civil society
organizations and private sector representatives). There is no generic form for such
an institutional framework. The concrete shape of the planning mechanism needs to
be tailored depending on the issue at hand.
Strengthening institutions like ECOSOC and AHCs in the planning process in
Turkey and empowering such mechanisms in the policy formulation and decision
making process would greatly enhance the possibility of governance in the Turkish
planning. Some similar mechanisms could also be developed at the local level,
providing appropriate linkages between macro planning at the national level and
local planning, where necessary.
The following part comprises more concrete proposals for a comprehensive multi-
actor and multi level planning process in Turkey. These proposals should be
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considered as a tentative framework that needs to be further elaborated through
participatory forums and detailed research for each particular case. That is, the
participatory development process and its concrete mechanisms should themselves
be subject to participatory treatment. In that context, the following ideas should be
taken as indicative framework for debate rather than final or ideal mechanisms for an
effective participatory planning in Turkey.
6.4.4 Mechanisms for Communicative/Democratic Planning
The development of participatory mechanisms for the Turkish planning process is
basically related to how to define a new state in a global world. In that context, shift
from a bureaucratic to a managerial public administration plays a key role. As
Pereira (1997:9) puts it:
The solution is not to wither with the state, but to rebuild it, to reform it. The reform will probably
mean shrinking the state to limit its role as a producer of goods and services, and to a lesser extent as a
regulator; but it will probably entail increasing its role in financing nonstate organizations that will
respond competitively for the provision of the social services where externalities or basic human
rights are involved, and increasing its role in promoting international competitiveness for local indus-
tries.
There are various efforts all over the world in that direction. It is well known in de-
velopment literature that the East Asian countries foster a dense network of ties be-
tween public officials and private entrepreneurs through deliberative councils (as in
Japan or South Korea) or through the tightly knit party organization (as in Taiwan),
allowing operational space for negotiating and renegotiating goals and policies. In
Korea, for instance, there are functionally separate organizations in the canal sys-
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tems. The implementation and routine maintenance tasks are delegated to the Farm-
land Improvement Associations, one per catchment area, which are staffed by local
part-time farmers (selected by the village chiefs), knowledgeable about changing lo-
cal conditions, dependent for their salary and operational budget largely on the user
fees paid by the farmers, and continually drawing upon local trust relationships
(Bardhan, 1999: 101-104).
Malaysian “deliberation councils” linking government, business and civil society,
Malaysian Business Council (MBC), Singapore National Wages Council (NWC) and
Saskatchewan Collaborative Committee on Education Policy (SCCEP) in Canada,
are some other examples. The MBS is particularly informative for reconsidering the
role of ECOSOC in Turkey. It was founded in 1991 to prepare policy papers for
Malaysia. Among the policy papers prepared so far are “Malaysia: The Way For-
ward” and “Malaysia’s Vision 2020.” This is a forum for the nation’s corporate lead-
ers to exchange view on economic and business policies with top political leaders
and civil servants. 76-member committee, chaired by the prime minister, includes
seven cabinet members, eight senior civil servants and 50 private sector representa-
tives. Public and private grants, and four public and five private sector representa-
tives act as vice-chairperson fund the MBC.  All members are personally invited and
appointed by the prime minister to serve on the MBC on a two-year rotation. There is
a number of Working Committees (WOP) preparing working papers becoming basis
for economic policy in Malaysia. Secretariat of the MBC is located at the Institute of
Strategic and International Studies (ISIS). Cabinet decisions are taken on the papers
refined by the secretariat and those papers are disseminated to relevant ministries
(Taschereau and Campos, 1997).
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Among other participatory mechanisms are Neighborhood Governance Councils in
Chicago, devolving substantial power over policing and public schools; The Wiscon-
sin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP), supporting labor/firm/government par-
ticipation to help workers in volatile economic times; the Habitat Conservation
Planning under the Endangered Species Act bring together stakeholders to develop
ecosystem governance arrangements in the USA; the Participatory Budget of Porto
Alegre in Brazil, enabling residents of that city to participate directly in forging the
city budget; and Panchayat Reforms in West Bengal and Kerala in India, devolving
substantial administrative and fiscal development power to individual villages (Fung
and Wright, 2000: 4-5)
There is no limit to designing and operating participatory mechanisms, which should
themselves be part of a communicative process open to multiple alternatives. In that
sense, participatory planning mechanisms suggested below should be considered as
preliminary or draft proposals to be open to discussion with all relevant parties or
stakeholders. There are mainly 5 levels that are identified in this prescriptive part for
participatory planning in Turkey.
1) Macro Level
2) Issue or Sectoral Level
3) Regional Level (Provincial Plans included)
4) Project and Program Level
5) Institutional or Agency Level
Each of these levels should be restructured and provided with appropriate and
sufficient mechanisms for the interplay of formal and informal stakeholders in
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reaching agreements for collective action at local, regional and national levels. The
below given table summarizes this multi-level and multi-actor framework for
participatory development and planning. Issuing of a “Freedom of Information Act,”
defining the rules and obligations in opening public information to citizens, is a
critical initiative to make such participatory mechanisms effective in practice.
Participatory Mechanisms at Different levels
Level of Planning Participatory Mecha-
nisms
Products, Decisions or
Collective Actions
Macro ECOSOC, HPC, macro
level AHCs
Long term national plans,
annual programs, stabili-
zation programs
Sector/issue AHCs, Master Plans,
Team Work
Policies and priorities at
the sectoral level, issue-
based policies
Regional/local Regional Development
Agencies, Provincial and
Regional Coordination
meetings, Regional Plans
by NGOs,
Regional and provincial
strategies and operational
programs
Program/project PCM, Logframe, OOPP,
PRA, etc.
Investment portfolio,
project implementation,
monitoring & evaluation
Agency/institution Strategic plans at agency
level
Agency mission state-
ment, policies and priori-
ties
Costumer-oriented serv-
ices
Freedom of Information Act
There are planning products in each of these levels. However, it should be stressed
from the outset that this participatory planning perspective does not emphasize plans
as documents or paper work, but rather planning process as a learning process. In
short, in line with communicative planning theory, it is process rather than product
oriented (Sager, 1994: 16). Coupled with distribution of necessary responsibilities for
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implementation and a realistic financial program, these participatory processes of
plan making will address the “representation crisis” in planning by reducing the gap
between what is planed and what is realized.
That change towards participatory planning will also affect the content of plans and
their presentation. Plans prepared in that new environment shall be more focused,
service and target group-oriented, sensitive to the concerns of all relevant
stakeholders. These plans need to be clear in their financial sources and set clear and
inter-subjectively measurable indicators for assessing the future success or
performance. There is a possibility for preparing different plans with different time
frames and concerns in that new environment involving multiple actors in diverse
contexts.
6.4.4.1 Macro Level
The primary participatory mechanism at the macro level is the economic and social
council (ECOSOC). This is a mechanism that can be encountered in various
developed countries including the EU countries. In that sense, ECOSOC would not
only bring participation at the macro level but also help the harmonization process
with the EU and other developed countries. Six critical dimensions need to be taken
into consideration in reforming and assessing the functions of ECOSOK and other
participatory mechanisms like AHCs in Turkey:
(i) How genuinely deliberative are the actual decision-making processes?
(ii) How effective are the decisions made through this process translated into
real action?
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(iii) To what extent are the deliberative bodies able to effectively monitor the
implementation of their decisions?
(iv) To what extent do these reforms incorporate recombinant measures that
coordinate the actions of local units and diffuse innovations among them?
(v) To what extent do the deliberative processes constitute real “schools for
democracy”?
(vi) Are the actual outcomes of the entire process more desirable than those of
prior institutional arrangements? ((Fung and Wright, 2000: 41-42)
ECOSOC has already been established in Turkey with a circular of the Prime
Minister. However, it could not act as a powerful mechanism due to its membership
structure dominated by the public sector, unclear procedures and lack of budget.
After the February 2000 crisis the need for the ECOSOC became more apparent and
“the Law No.4641 Regarding the Establishment, Working Procedures and Methods
of the Economic and Social Council” has been published in the Official Gazette on
April 21, 2001 (SPO, 2001c). The most important contribution of the new Law is the
identification of the SPO as the secretariat of ECOSOC. However, this new Law just
gave a more formal status to the ECOSOC without addressing its problems
mentioned above. For instance, since the publication of the new Law, ECOSOC hold
no meeting due to problems in selecting vice chairmen as a result of unclear
provisions and lack of ownership.
ECOSOC should be strengthened at the macro level with a new membership
composition and more effective and clear procedures for functioning. It should have
a budget and necessary sub-committees to identify research and negotiation areas and
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develop policy. Ad Hoc Committees should also be convened when ECOSOC
requires. Issue based invitation to NGOs can be a standard procedure. Agreement
reached among parties in ECOSOC can be transformed into authoritative decisions
through the HPC, empowering this participatory organ with practical results.
The role of ECOSOC should particularly be emphasized in the formulation of macro
strategy for long-term development plans, giving a sense of direction for the society,
and providing a framework for political bargaining on long-term interests of
business, labor and consumer-citizens. It may also be considered as an effective tool
for easing transition or stabilization periods that generate costs for various sections of
the society.
However, there is also a danger of incorporating the opposition and manipulating the
representatives of the civil society in such participatory forums by the bureaucratic
apparatus of the state. This danger needs to be acknowledged for sustainable and
respectful existence of the participatory mechanisms in general. What is required
under this risk is a lively public debate outside such semi-formal mechanisms as a
check upon their effective functioning. In other words, power relations and private
interest would always be part of the process, which requires persistent resistance and
struggle on the part of active social groups.
The right to set the agenda, invite relevant parties to the dialogue, inform the general
public about the debates, set up working committees to study specific issues, etc.
should not be left solely at the discretion of the public representatives of ECOSOC.
Civiv society members of ECOSOC should also have such rights to ensure “free and
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equal participation” and eliminate the risk of being used just as a passive legitimizing
party in a ritualistic participatory environment.
There is also a need for more cooperation among government institutions
themselves. The current economic administration is fragmented and ineffective due
to lack of effective cooperation among the SPO, the Treasury, the Ministry of
Finance and the Central Bank. HPC could be activated to bring these different
economic decision-making bodies together periodically and providing a room for
debate between technocrats and politicians. That change requires new rules and
procedures in the functioning of the HPC and a stronger political mandate. As voiced
by different political parties, and the incumbent government party JDP, in their
election campaigns, high level policy related economic agencies may also be covered
under a broader umbrella of an “Economy Ministry.”
Determining investment, recurrent and transfer spending of agencies all at the same
time in the HPC or Economy Ministry might be an effective mechanism to relate
different issues in a broader perspective. That would help devise these different
“means” or “tools” in accordance with the policy statements. In that process,
however, means-ends relationships and technical rationality needs to be
complemented with social demands and priorities arising from participatory
mechanisms like ECOSOC and AHCs.
As a final check to the decisions of HPC or Economy Ministry, the TGNA needs to
be incorporated into this process. TGNA members and general public should be
informed with standard and transparent reports, containing all necessary details for
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debate. Otherwise, the relative power of representative organs and civil society
organizations that are not represented in the ECOSOC would be diminished to a
great extent.
At this junction, as a framework condition for effective macro level participation in
public policy, transparency issue should be discussed in broader terms. When used
by the international financial institutions like the IMF, transparency usually denotes
to the openness to external scrutiny in order to judge the creditworthiness of an
indebted and crisis ridden economy.  Put in a broader context, transparency means
accountability of public officials and politicians to the public. A legal framework
provided by a specific “freedom of information act” would help a lot in that regard.88
With an effective media scrutiny in the framework of freedom of press and measures
against monopoly in the field of media, such a freedom of information act would
greatly enhance the accountability and contribute to mentality change within the
public sector.
6.4.4.2 Sector and Issue Level
Considering communicative mechanisms at the sectoral level (or meso level) AHCs
should be used as a valuable asset from the history of planning in Turkey despite
their deficiencies generated over time. They should be reexamined and reactivated on
the basis of a communicative planning perspective, with necessary linkages to macro
level and micro level planning.
                                           
88 Freedom of information act is operational in many European countries, adopted by some member
countries in recent years (e.g., Ireland) and recommended to candidate countries.
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AHCs should be reformed, given a more permanent structure and sufficient budget.
Rules for AHCs should be written and developed over time. SPO experts should be
part of these mechanisms as facilitators rather than coordinators or reporters. NGOs,
business, labor, consumers, etc. should be represented in AHCs, taking into account
the nature of the problem at hand.
Similar to macro level ECOSOC procedures, issue level AHCs should also have
clear procedures for creating “free and equal” participation. In that context, informal
members of the AHCs should also have the right to set the agenda, invite new
participants, disseminate the results, monitor the implementation, etc.
Sectoral master plans are also a meso level planning mechanism for bringing
different stakeholders and experts together. Such plans (covering areas such as
transportation, health, education, etc.) need to be given a strong participatory element
in their preparation and revisions.
Apart from these participatory mechanisms, the SPO could also use commercial
mechanisms to buy services from the domestic and foreign private consultants and
academicians. That would be only a small part of the budget compared to the
spending to the physical assets, but no less significant. That demand created through
public funds might also encourage creation of private research units and academic
efforts in the areas given priority by the governments. Terms of references drawn for
consultants would also provide an opportunity to incorporate communicative
dimension into the planning process. Particularly important in this regard is
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employment of independent facilitators who would reduce manipulation of
participatory mechanisms by the bureaucracy or any particular group.
It is also important to put participatory methods in the terms of references as a
condition for private consultancy firms preparing reports on various sector and issue
areas. This practice would increase participatory planning capacity in private
consultancy firms along with increasing quality of plans.
6.4.4.3 Project or Program Level
The problem in the current approach to projects and programs is that there is a
fragmented structure (between the SPO and the MOF) and a top-down approach
throughout the project cycle.89 The SPO is related directly with the investment
budget, while the MOF is responsible for the recurrent budget. Adding the Treasury
as an increasingly strong economic policy institution directly responsible for debt
management further complicates the institutional framework. Apart from these
institutional problems, projects do not have a clearly defined and participatory
project cycle management (PCM) process.
What is required at the project level is a well-defined PCM process that incorporates
participatory mechanisms. This need has indeed been identified by an AHC report in
the preparation of the 8th Plan and included in relevant sections of the Plan document
                                           
89 Project cycle covers stages of indicative programming, project identification, project preparation,
project analysis and finance, project implementation and monitoring and evaluation of projects.
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as a recommendation (AHC Report; SPO, 2001b). Identifying stakeholders 90
through a stakeholder analysis has a critical role in that process. The projects need to
be designed together with the target group(s), beneficiaries and other relevant parties,
facilitated by project experts and other technical and bureaucratic staff. It is also
important to include evaluation criteria other than a simple cost-benefit analysis in
project appraisal, going beyond instrumental rationality. Converting the “value of
human life” in monetary terms, for instance, calls for ethical judgment as much as
technical complexity in calculations (Kelman, 1981).
Objectives Oriented Project Planning (OOPP or ZOPP in German initials) at the
project level employed in the EU countries and agencies provides systematic and
well-structured mechanisms for communicative rationality to be operationalized at
the micro level (EU, 1993). All relevant stakeholders participate in all phases of
project cycle management (PCM) under competent and neutral facilitators in that
method.
OOPP methodology works both at the project and program level, through “the
logical framework and integrated approach” developed as a participatory problem
solving tool, making use of visualization (card technique) as much as possible to be
accessible to all parties. The process starts with participatory workshops involving all
key stakeholders and beneficiaries of a project in order to make a comprehensive
                                           
90 Stakeholders are all parties who are directly or indirectly affected by the realization of a project.
These affects may be positive or negative, short-term or long-term. Many projects are doomed to fail-
ure just because of ignoring stakeholders and their concerns. A well-known example in that frame-
work is a foreign gold mining company in Bergama Turkey. This foreign company ignored the local
community and their health and environmental concern in its project preparation and implementation
process and ended up with a very effective civil society resistance that delayed the project and in-
creased its cost. This example is also important to hope for the feasibility of civil society involvement
at the micro level with some leadership and appropriate mechanisms.
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situation analysis. Situation analysis is used to identify key potentials and problems,
organize and clarify them, and prioritize among various problem areas. After
situation analysis done, workshop techniques are used to draft alternative strategies,
select the preferred or realistic strategy, and identify risks that are beyond the control
of the project. By developing common indicators for success, OOPP and logical
framework approach also functions as a basis for monitoring and evaluation at later
stages of the project implementation, creating necessary tools for accountability.
In all these stages of the project relevant parties are involved into the process through
participatory workshops facilitated by moderators. The stakeholders build and revise
logical framework of the project throughout the life cycle of the project, down to ex-
post evaluation of project impact upon the relevant target groups or beneficiaries.
There are various adaptations of logframe. However, the basic structure and concepts
maintain a consistency over time that can be explained in the following matrix
representation and terms.
Logical Framework (Logframe) Matrix
Intervention
Logic
Objectively
Verifiable
Indicators
Sources of
Verification Assumptions
Overall Goal
Project Purpose
Results
Activities Means Costs
Preconditions
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Going into more detail on OOPP methodology is of no use within the context of this
thesis. What is important, in that framework, is to see the well-structured
methodologies already developed by EU and other developed countries and use them
in Turkish context with appropriate modifications. Considering the fact that Turkey
is a candidate country for the EU, adaptation of such methods would also contribute
to its accession process. Creating the necessary skills and capacity in Turkey for
using such tools would enhance Turkey’s ability to make maximum use of the EU
and other international funds.
There are various other participatory techniques used in the PCM adopted by various
international and national technical assistance and financial institutions. For instance,
“rapid rural appraisal” or “participatory rural appraisal” (Chambers, 1992) has long
been used in rural projects, creating conditions for social transformation at the village
level. It is a tool for empowering village community and designing as well as
implementing projects with a stress on local knowledge and context-specific
solutions. As the USAID observes in its monitoring studies, when development
projects are put into a participatory or democratic context, “the projects not only
achieve better results but also can change the way communities go about solving
problems. (USAID, 2001: ix). In other words, participatory mechanisms at the
project level are not only means for efficiency but also mechanisms for community
development. IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development), for instance,
strives to design projects that provide what people want as opposed to telling what
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they should have (IFAD, 1999). It promotes participation in a demand-driven
approach at the project level in order to:
• Reduce the cost of project development and implementation
• Promote sustainability and replicability
• Take advantage of traditional practices and indigenous technologies
• Facilitate training, extension, input delivery and credit services, and
• Enhance community cohesion (IFAD, 1999)
Some public agencies in Turkey (like the Southeastern Anatolia Project
Administration) are already using participatory mechanisms effectively at project and
planning studies. What is required is a widespread and enabling environment for a
broader spectrum of public agencies. Such macro level mechanisms are very
effective tools for “social and bureaucratic learning” as well. Without much
theoretical rhetoric and formal education, participants of such workshops enjoy the
benefits of communication by being part of the process and getting used to its
practicalities.
6.4.4.4 Regional or Local Level
 Particularly important for the current thesis is the development of local and regional
initiatives in development planning. Under the new concept of regional development
based upon local amenities used within a global competitive environment, it is im-
portant to recognize unique socioeconomic structures that are also spatial units, and
to select the region as a planning area where there is a high potential for local people
to become the major participants in the development process.
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 Regional policies are gaining a new momentum all over the world with new objec-
tives, new actors and new instruments. Particularly important for the purposes of this
thesis is the involvement of new “internal” and “external” actors within the regional
development process. Originally, regional policy and reducing interregional dispari-
ties was in the responsibility of the central government. This concept of regional
policy is now completely outdated and a new approach needs to go with close coop-
eration of other actors; such as, sub-national governments, enterprises and other na-
tions. As a result of globalization of the economy, intensification of international re-
lationships and focus on cross-border cooperation, international organizations be-
came important actors to be taken into consideration in regional policy. In this re-
spect, several OECD countries; including Portugal, Greece, Denmark, Belgium,
Norway and Finland take Economic Union procedures and policies into account in
designing their regional policy. By the appearance of the new actors, the role of the
central government is changed to facilitate the action of other actors and coordinate
them. This new role is reflected in the new instruments of regional policy (OECD,
1994).
Decentralization efforts are very important in devising regional planning framework.
Generally speaking, the objectives of decentralization are:
• Promotion of a more balanced development in the country
• Design of more realistic projects and programs which take into account local po-
tentials and constraints
• More effective coordination of development activities at various spatial levels
through desegregation of planning functions
• Strengthening of local political institutions and increase of people’s participation
in development
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• Boosted mobilization of local resources (Maetz and Quieti, 1987)
Turkish planning experience and the organizational structure of the SPO have been
based on macro and sector wise classifications, paying no effective attention to
spatial dimension in the planning process. Even when regional planning issues are
addressed they have been treated through formal means and with limited regional
participation up until recent years. However, regional problems and the need for
effective regional institutionalization remain important issues before Turkey.
Particularly as a result of globalization processes regional identities as well as
complex articulation of certain provinces and regions with the “external” world
created new challenges for planners.
 
According to the Census of 1997 the population of Turkey is 62.6 million, about 65
percent of which live in cities and towns. Annual population growth rate is around
1.5 percent and an annual urbanization rate about 4.5 percent. Turkey is a country
with a wide variety of topographical and climatic conditions that form seven differ-
ent regions, namely, Marmara, Aegean, Mediterranean, Central Anatolian, Black
Sea, Eastern Anatolian and Southeastern Anatolian. There have been considerable
social, economic and cultural disparities among these regions in terms of develop-
ment indicators such as GDP per capita, unemployment rate, literacy rate, etc. Eco-
nomic growth is largely concentrated in the Western parts of country around big cit-
ies like İstanbul, İzmir and Ankara.
The regional disparities and concentration of population as well as economic activi-
ties in certain regions are evident from the below given tables.
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  Mid Year Population Estimates by the Regions (SPO)
Regions 1990 %
Share
1995 %
Share
2000 %
Share
Mediterranean 7,026,489 12 7,875,119 13 8,774,881 13
Eastern Anatolia 5,346,208 9 5,409,886 9 5,374,184 8
Aegean 7,594,977 13 8,367,419 14 9,160,718 14
Southeastern Ana-
tolia
5,159,464 9 5,952,662 10 6,823,811 10
Central Anatolia 9,913,306 18 10,487,183 17 10,985,086 16
Black Sea 8,136,984 14 8,088,787 13 7,854,861 12
Marmara 13,295,607 24 15,462,944 25 17,860,454 27
Turkey 56,473,035 100 61,644,000 100 66,833,995 100
 
 
 Gross Domestic Product by Regions
 
 (in Current Prices - Million TL)
Regions 1987 %
Share
1992 %
Share
1996 %
Share
Mediterranean 8,937,414 12 128,819,712 12 1,817,377,378 12
Eastern Anatolia 3,054,349 4 46,545,049 4 567,574,729 4
Aegean 12,391,697 17 171,045,318 16 2,375,479,133 16
Southeastern
Anatolia
3,905,910 5 60,684,887 6 789,407,897 5
Central Anatolia 12,635,749 17 183,822,241 17 2,423,833,904 16
Black Sea 7,449,852 10 106,943,539 10 1,386,758,863 9
Marmara 26,346,958 35 395,507,302 36 5,411,678,291 37
Turkey 74,721,929 100 1,093,368,048 100 14,772,110,195 100
 
With its young, dynamic and rapidly urbanizing population Turkey has faced many
problems in her development process, which forced to adopt an effective regional
policy. Sustainable regional development has been gaining importance in Turkey
with globalization like the other countries in the world. Considering the problems the
country has faced, development policies keep importance such as; controlling the
growth of metropolitan areas, appraising the resources of less developed regions, re-
enforcing the development of poor regions as well as stimulating the urban-rural re-
lationships.
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There have been many small and large-scale regional planning efforts in Turkey
since 1950s. Among these the Southeastern Anatolia Project (SAP) is the largest and
the most comprehensive project ever carried in Turkey. This regional development
project has recently been revised under the coordination of the SAP Administration.
What is very significant for the purposes of this thesis is that this revision has been
done mainly through participatory methods involving public, private and civil society
representatives from national and regional levels. That is an important sign for the
feasibility of more extensive participatory planning practices in other parts of Turkey
on a wider scale.
There are also on-going regional development plans and projects, such as the Eastern
Anatolia Regional Development Project, the Eastern Black Sea Regional
Development Project, and the Yeşilırmak River Basin Development Project. It
should also be noted that, since the 7th Plan (1996-2000), the public sector adopted
the policy of countrywide development of growth poles in order to curb the
uncontrolled growth of the metropolitan areas and foster the reduction of regional-
spatial disparities in Turkey. In sum, the reduction of regional disparities and support
of country-wide growth of healthy metropolitan areas are fundamental objectives of
regional policy in Turkey for achieving economically, socially, culturally and
politically coherent development that would contribute to the strengthening of
national unity. However, such policy statements in development plans and annual
programs are yet to be achieved.
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Considering the importance of regional policies for the EU and its repercussions in
terms of benefiting from EU funds, Turkey needs renewed attempts to formulate and
implement effective regional policies. These new attempts should focus on the
creation of new mechanisms for public and private partnerships, development of
local media and civil society as well as better coordination among public agencies at
the local level.
A critical work to be done in this context is identification of NUTS 91 at different
levels for Turkey. Indeed, the Institute of Statistics and the SPO has already
identified NUTS-II level for Turkey in the broader harmonization process with the
EU. A Government Decree No 2002/4720 dated on August 28 2002 officially
declared these new 26 units. Besides, the same Decree identified 12 NUTS-I and 81
NUTS-III. These NUTS-IIs will draw more realistic regional units for policy
formulation and implementation as well as appropriate locations for creating new
regional development agencies that will bring public/private partnerships and civil
society contribution.
 
 Each NUTS-II level, in that framework, will draw its own regional strategic plan
based upon an analysis of regional situation with the help of all relevant parties.
Apart from strategy document, each NUTS-II shall have its “regional operational
programme.” Analyzing such a program prepared by Czech Republic for the NUTS
                                           
91 In the European Union NUTS-I, NUTS-II and NUTS-III levels are particularly important for re-
gional planning. NUTS-I corresponds to “regions” in Turkey and NUTS-III to “provinces.” However,
Turkey, until recently, lacked NUTS-II level, which basically means “planning units” or “service
units” that are critical for channeling the EU regional funds. NUTS-II is a sub-region which does not
have to be an administrative unit, but requires a regional planning body.
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II Region Southwest (Final Report, November 1999), in the context of the EU Phare
programme, NUTS II level programs should include:
• Description of the current situation,
• Priorities of the regional operational plan,
• Outline of the measures,
• Financial plan, and
• Implementing provisions (managing authority)
 OOPP (Objectives Oriented Project Planning) methodology explained in project
planning context is also a very effective tool for participatory preparation, imple-
mentation, monitoring, revision and evaluation of such regional operation programs.
Local or regional plans prepared in that participatory way are;
• Vision driven, as opposed to problem driven model,
• Thematic or issue based, instead of discrete chapters on different sectors,
• Collaborative, more open, inclusive and interactive, involving
stakeholders
• Region-specific, with a special emphasis on interdependence among lo-
calities, and
• Prepared with the help of information technologies, reducing paper work
(Chandler, 1998).
One of the recent initiatives by the SPO in recent years is to create regional branches
of SPO in selected provinces, directly linked to central organization. That is a posi-
tive development in terms of acknowledging the significance of regional planning,
but does not have a clear and cost-effective content. A more proper solution is not
regional branches of SPO but development of planning capacity in each region on the
background of central guidance by the SPO and networking among different regions
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and provinces. Decentralized managerial functions entails decentralization of certain
planning decisions as well. However, in the transition period central planning per-
sonnel should support local planners by training and other means. That is, some
planning functions need to be located at the center even after a full decentralization.
These functions include preparing and explaining guidelines, ensuring local compli-
ance to nationally set technical guidelines, participating in negotiation processes at
the central government and donor agency levels, ensuring consistency among local
plans, planning shared or national services, supporting national level legislative pro-
cess, undertaking overall human resources planning and allocating resources to local
levels (Green, 1992: 320-321).
 It is a general tendency in Turkish modernization to generate new institutions and
enact new laws, naively expecting such novelties to change reality almost automati-
cally. What is perhaps more important than creating new institutions and legal
framework is to make the best use of existing ones in a time and cost effective man-
ner. To change the content of existing practices and institutions, to involve new ac-
tors into the process, and to create new synergies through networking and better
communication, should gain priority over hallow reform efforts. For instance, there
are current mechanisms like “provincial coordination meetings,” held quarterly,
which are not used effectively at present. Such already existing mechanisms can be
reformed, and instituted not only at provincial but also at regional level with the help
of regional development agencies, and better linked to national planning process
through effective participation of SPO experts.
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 The new Local Administrations Act on the agenda of the TGNA does have a critical
importance in the institutionalization of local and regional planning. This law could
incorporate necessary participatory mechanisms at the local level parallel to the dele-
gation of more resources and authority. Apart from local administrations and decen-
tralization, the role of the local community should go beyond identifying problems
and needs through popular participation and should involve itself in acquiring some
capability to handle the means of development through empowerment mechanisms.
As a condition, which allows the local community to play such a role, it is essential
to establish a local area that is self-sustaining, both socially and economically.
However, as many observers caution, in making such reforms one should also be
conscious about the dangers of localism, losing the broader development agenda and
substituting elitism at the national level with similar structures at the local level,
ending up with the dominance of the local elite (Bardhan, 1997; Blair, 2000: 25;
Streeten, 1995: 212). That is why regional and local planning initiatives need to be
put into the larger development framework and developed along democratic lines at
the local level. National planning agencies like the SPO might play a critical role in
that regard, both in terms of integrating different regional policies along national
priorities and cross regional issues as well as in acting as a counter force against local
powerful groups vis-à-vis less organized broader sections of the local community.
6.4.4.5 Institution or Agency Level
The main instrument for the institutionalization of participatory mechanisms at
agency level would be a strategic planning initiative. Strategic plans (SPs) at the
public agencies imply a re-orientation in the functioning of formal public agencies
306
along the lines of participatory, flexible and effective plans to meet the demands of
target group. They are also considered as mechanisms to develop a stronger link
between plans and budgets. In that framework, public agencies are expected to
transform their current passive status in terms of policy formulation and better relate
their resource utilization to their specific goals and objectives.
Strategic planning started in the private sector and later adopted by the public sector
in various developed countries, among whom the United States of America played a
pioneering role. It depends on SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities,
Threats) analysis, which is also called as the “Harvard Policy Model” (Yılmaz, 1999)
Basic Headings of SWOT analysis
Institution’s Internal Components
Strengths Weaknesses
Opportunities Threats
Environmental Components
This planning approach departs from the understanding of organizations not as
isolated units but as part of a broader environment, which pose uncertainty and
which contains elements beyond the control of the single organization (Bryson and
Roering, 1987). What an organization is expected to do in this context is to analyze
307
its environment, draw a broad policy formulation (mission, vision, goals, etc.),
identify and analyze its costumers and stakeholders (internal and external), identify
and analyze key issues and set priorities for action.  Under uncertainty, planning
never ends and the organization is expected to monitor its success very carefully
(Benveniste, 1989: 79). Some theoreticians for the private sector emphasize the
concept of “strategic thinking” instead of strategic planning to differentiate between
“visions” on the part of leadership and “planning” on the part of technical staff
(Mintzberg, 1994).
Agarwala (1985) argues that this model is basically what has been applied in East
Asia in their development process. This approach in public sector entails selective
involvement of the public sector on the basis of clear priorities, provides flexibility,
and sets a balance between long-term objectives and short-term activities under the
general conditions of uncertainty. This new understanding in public planning might
also be related to “policy planning” which stresses qualitative rather than quantitative
targets in selective sectors and issue areas (Celasun, 1984: 342). As observed in the
evaluation of planning in the 1990s, Turkish planning has evolved towards this
approach particularly with 7th Plan. However, Turkey could not achieve this
transformation in a comprehensive way to date.
Recently, a variety of efforts focused on public spending have begun, aimed at in-
creasing the effectiveness of the budgeting process, both under the eighth Five Year
Development Plan and under joint projects with international bodies. Within the
scope of these efforts, the main areas that appear are ensuring financial discipline in
the budget preparation and implementation process, distributing resources according
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to strategic priorities, checking whether these resources have been efficiently used or
not, and developing a corporate responsibility to account for this.
Turkey’s recent economic crisis and stabilization programs with the World Bank and
IMF, particularly PFPSAL credit agreements, brought forth the issue of strategic
planning again on agenda. In PFPSAL the SPO is given the mandate to prepare a
strategic planning guideline to generate policy formulation capacity in line agencies.
According to this initiative, the SPO will supervise the process and help line agencies
prepare their own strategic plans within the broader macro priorities and national
policies.
Strategic planning is a flexible, change-oriented approach, working within the
framework of long-term perspective. What is most important for the purpose of this
thesis, however, is participatory element in agency level strategic planning initiative.
It is essential that the top-level management of an institution fully support the strate-
gic planning process. Along with this, a strategic planning process cannot succeed
without the participation, cooperation and support of managers and employees at
every level. In addition to these internal stakeholders, SP also entails involvement of
external customers into the planning process. This participatory planning process in-
creases communication and learning along horizontal and vertical lines, and contrib-
utes ownership of the plans and their success in implementation. This process is
more important than printing the planning document.
The SPO has already started to prepare a guideline in order to assist institutions in
the strategic planning process. It is expected that the strategic plan prepared by an
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organization will, on the one hand, help to create, develop and strengthen an organ-
izational culture and identity, and on the other hand, increase the effectiveness of the
financial administration of the organization within the framework of its budgeting
process.
In that context, strategic planning at the agency level may also be considered as a
tool to integrate planning and budgeting process. With the current division of labor
between the SPO, MOF and Treasury, there is no holistic approach to the activities
of an agency. With clear goals with resource statements covering all investment, re-
current and transfer budgets, SPs of line agencies would provide an opportunity to
close the gap between what is stated in the plans and what has been delivered92.
In summary, strategic planning helps an institution answer the following four basic
questions93:
- Where are we now?
- Where do we want to go?
- How do we get there?
- How do we measure our success?
The answers to these questions make up the strategic planning process.
                                           
92 This issue has been extensively discussed in analyzing past plans over the 1980s and 1990s. With-
out closing the huge gap between plans and realizations, planning in Turkey would have little chance
in regaining its credibility.
93 The following description of SP process reflects the draft guidelines of the SPO regarding SP at the
level of line agencies in Turkey. These are actually steps that are observed in many guidelines all over
the world, particularly in the US. US administration has introduced this concept during the 1990s and
passed a law to force all public agencies to prepare SPs in the mid-1990s.
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The question ‘where are we now?’ will be answered by carrying out a situation
analysis, which includes a comprehensive examination and evaluation of the internal
and external environment in which an institution functions, and drawing up a mission
statement, which is a short statement of the institution’s reason for existence.  The
principles that allow for the institution’s activities will also be expressed here.
The answer to the question ‘where do we want to go?’ will be given in the vision, a
conceptual, realistic and short statement of the desired future; the goals, which can be
defined as the general conceptual results which will direct efforts and actions in order
to attain the vision; and the objectives, which means the measurable results that must
be secured in order to attain the required results.
The strategies and activities which are the methods used to achieve the aims and tar-
gets will answer the question ‘how will we get there?  Finally, the monitoring sys-
tem, consisting of compiling administrative information and reporting on the imple-
mentation of the plan, and the evaluation process, which measures the degree to
which the results of the implementation fulfilled the previously stated mission, vi-
sion, principles, goals and objectives and reviews the plan according to these results,
answers the question ‘How will we observe and measure our success?’
Without creating and developing the necessary institutional and human resources
capacity, Turkey could fall into superfluous and formalistic application of SP at the
agency level and confront the problem of ineffectiveness as in the macro level
planning. That is why it is very important to implement SP initiative parallel to a
broad spectrum of promotion, training and institution building activities.  The SPO
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has a very critical role in this process as the central agency to guide the rest of the
bureaucracy. Hence the need to start capacity building from the SPO, which shall
also contribute to the transformation of the SPO’s mission and organizational
structure along the way.94
As in the SPO, line agencies and local administrations need to be developed along
human resources and organizational capacity to apply SP. In addition to large-scale
promotion and training, certain organizational changes are also required for this
purpose. Among such organizational requirements is the specific role of Research
Planning and Coordination (RPC) Units within agencies. They must be strengthened
and given a new mandate. Strategic planning at the agency level required
involvement of all main units. RPCs shall act as a coordination unit to bring other
units and outside stakeholders into the planning process. RPCs should also act in an
active manner in the process of monitoring and evaluation of the planning process. A
better communication and coordination between the SPO staff at the center and
RPCs would provide the necessary linkage between national and agency level issues
and priorities.
                                           
94 Even the traditional five-year development planning process might evolve towards a new direction
after institutionalization of SP at the agency level. Long-term national plans would not only dictate
policies in a top-down manner, but would also get affected by agency level policies and priorities,
motivating a two-way interaction. The concrete shape of long-term national development plans shall
be adapted to the new environment and gain a strategic approach after starting an extended application
of SPs at ministerial, regional and local contexts.
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6.4.4.6 What About Unorganized Society
The whole debate on participatory planning mechanisms so far turns around
organized formal and informal sections of society. However, it is a widely observed
phenomenon that the organization level in developing countries and the level of civil
society development are rather low. In that context, participatory planning might
create new exclusion mechanisms while trying to enhance inclusive practices. How
civil is civil society is another problem that needs to be tackled as well95. All such
problems go back to the historical conditions and characteristics of Turkey, which
have been discussed in the relevant parts of the thesis.
There is a broader and long-term answer to such problems, which is to foster
organization of the society and support civil society by various means.  Development
process itself is a means for this in the long run. Autonomous and strong civil society
organizations develop as economy grows, urbanization and education level increases
and legal framework improves. In that context, overall socio-economic development
and democratization of Turkey is a critical framework condition for the broader
application of communicative planning. Democratization process within the context
of Turkey’s efforts for full membership into the EU is a very positive factor in that
regard.
The second response is specific participatory mechanisms that do not require a
previous organization on the part of larger society. OOPP mechanisms discussed in
the context of participatory project planning could be accepted as such a
                                           
95 As Muzelis (1995: 232-233) puts in clear terms “the majority of civil society organizations operate
not so much as safeguards against state despotism, than as administrative extensions of the state’s
highly corrupt and particularistic apparatuses.”
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mechanisms. Some similar mechanisms might also be conceived at the other levels
of participatory planning. However, such proxy mechanisms should not overshadow
the general requirement for a more developed and democratic environment for
broader and equal participation.
The third response to the problem is to reconsider the role of planning experts in the
participatory planning process and increase their role as guardians of unorganized
groups or general interest. That is actually what “advocacy planning” approach
defended in the planning history since 1960s (Goodman, 1971). Considered in-itself
advocacy planning has its own limitations, but taken in combination with the above-
mentioned measures, it might improve the lot of unorganized sections of society in
the planning process.
As has been emphasized before, power is not a negative term in the context of
planning. Foucault emphasizes this “productive” aspect of power and thinks that
“resistance cannot be external to power” (Rouse, 1994: 108). In that context,
“radical planning,” as advocated by Sandercock, going beyond state-centered
planning (Sandercock, 1999), is an alternative for broader social involvement in
planning.
Her planning theory combines feminism, postmodernism and political economy… Civil society is
itself part of a larger political economy where inequalities and injustices abound and where people
who lack resources and power and who are not white, male, heterosexual and middle- and upper-class
are marginalized. … She exhorts planners to be personally engaged and to identify those on the
society’s margins.  (Beauregard, 1998: 95)
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Empowerment of society through communicative planning is the main idea behind
radical planning (Kennedy, 1996). That is, future planners will also be community
planners and plan for those who oppose but cannot get organized to be effective.
Empowerment through community planning may also be considered as a learning
process for more effective participation in formal planning mechanisms. Community
planning is significant also to prevent participation within formal planning
mechanisms to turn into ritualistic and manipulative platforms maintaining the status
quo.
In any case, planning in post-positivist global world cannot be reduced to a single
methodology, mechanism, or approach.96 Old planning will continue along with new
alternatives, generating multiplicity or plurality, in response to diversified demands
of a multi-layered public sphere.97
                                           
96 It is also argued by radical pluralists that the disadvantaged groups “must be free not participate, not
to be visible to powerful and potentially hostile others,” taking into account the representation prob-
lem and non-neutrality of facilitators in a Habermasian planning context (Edmunds and Wollenberg
2001: 246).
97 An interesting case for participating disorganized public into the planning process is the jury system
in which participants are selected by lot. In Germany “planning cells” have been organized along
these lines to contemplate issues such as energy policy planning and in Minnesota “citizen panels” on
issues such as agriculture and water quality.  Statistical representation in that manner provides a
method that is less open to manipulation by powerful interests (Dryzek, 1996: 114)
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
As has been observed in the chapter two, the relationship between man, nature and
society in modernity is conceptualized primarily along instrumental terms based
upon a positivist epistemology and legal-institutional frameworks provided by the
nation-state and capitalist economic organization. The dominant mode of thinking in
that framework has been the domination of nature and social reality via technologies
developed on the basis of objective knowledge and expertise. Despite universal
ideals in the Enlightenment thinking, this manipulative and domination-oriented
relationship has resulted in the separation between elite and the rest within the same
society, while creating a hierarchy between developed and developing parts of the
world. Under this “simple modernity” conditions, as conceptualized by Ulrich Beck
in a broader context, conventional planners derived their legitimacy from their access
to scientific and rational knowledge, and worked their plans by the agency of the
state and the state elite within national boundaries.
In chapter three, I have argued that this “simple modernity” framework for planning
faced with a crisis as a result of various theoretical and practical developments over
the 20th century. Development of post-positivist epistemologies, debates on
postmodernity, discourse on and evolution of globalization, are but some major signs
for this transformation into a new intellectual and material environment. It has been
observed that this new environment made conventional planning obsolete to a great
extent and fostered liberal ideas of previous centuries. However, it is getting
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increasingly clear that neo-liberal and market-based approaches to the problems of
development and social improvement do not deliver what they have promised either,
particularly for the developing countries. Recent economic crises in various parts of
the world, East Asia, Russia, Latin America and Turkey, among others, as well as
growing inequalities over the last decades within and across nations entail a more
qualified and critical approach.
What is emerging from such developments in terms of planning is the necessity of
going beyond a simple state/market dichotomy and bringing in new forms of
improving our lives. The response to this challenge is neither the guidance of the
state elite nor blind functioning of the market. What is required is an appropriate mix
between the state, market and civil society. Planning, in that context, entails the full
use of communicative channels among multiple actors, without ignoring the role of
power relations and private interest. In that context, a new and broader conception of
rationality along communicative lines developed by Jürgen Habermas has been
identified—with some qualifications and criticisms—as a more appropriate
theoretical framework for proposing a new planning paradigm.
One needs also emphasize that the conventional planning is both an outcome of and a
means for modernity. On the one hand, planning has been a natural consequence of
modern state structures, assuming increasingly important roles in social life, and a
reaction to periodical and systemic instabilities and inequalities generated by uneven
development of the capitalist market. On the other hand, conventional planning has
been used as an effective tool for deliberate modernization, by the latecomers in
317
industrialization (including today’s developed countries like Germany and Japan)
and particularly by the so-called developing countries.
In the developing countries planning has been enthusiastically adopted as a tool for
rapid and deliberate modernization after the Second World War. However, as
modernity has transformed in its intellectual and material framework, particularly
after the 1960s and 1970s, developing countries have come to face a crisis in their
modernization efforts as well. Turkey, a new modern state established on the ruins of
an old empire, has gone through all these developments and reflects the general
trends in its individual experience to a great extent. That is the reason why this thesis,
in its second part, focused on Turkey as a case to discuss the evolution of planning in
a modernizing country in detail on the background of theoretical analyses in chapters
two and three.
As has been discussed in chapters related to the Turkish experience, the history of
planning in Turkey goes back to 1930s. This early experience was confined to
industrial plans that were aiming at import substitution in some basic consumer
goods and intermediate inputs. It is observed that Turkey adopted this planning
perspective within its broader nation-building, state-building and modernization
efforts. That experience was interrupted by the Second World War, which was
followed by relatively liberal policies of the 1950s. Turkey has started to prepare
comprehensive five-year development plans aiming at a systematic policy of import
substitution since the early 1960s. This was, in a sense, a continuation of
modernization efforts of Turkey under new global conditions. The State Planning
Organization was established in that process and became part of the Turkish public
318
administration. With this new institutionalization under the Post-War conditions,
Turkey tried to manage its development through five-year plans and annual
programs.
Today Turkey is in the period of its 8th Plan. However, there has been a major shift in
the development strategy of Turkey since 1980. That shift has been summarized in
this thesis as a transition from the state-led, inward oriented development strategy to
an outward oriented development strategy based on free markets and private sector
discourse. It has been argued that the nature of the Turkish development plans and
the planning organization has changed substantially in this process. I have related
this change to global trends of the times and argued that this change could be
explained within the larger framework of the globalization processes. Under the new
conditions, the State Planning Organization maintained its legal existence but lost
much of its former functions and status. Plans, in that context, lost their meaning,
too. They have transformed into somewhat ritualistic exercises with little
implications for the actual policy formulation and implementation.
The transformation in the Turkish development strategy is not a unique experience
but rather shared by many developing countries similar to Turkey. In most of the
developing countries, the objective of establishing a self-sufficient and diversified
domestic economy has been replaced by policies favoring integration into the global
markets and specialization in certain sectors during the 1980s. Apart from post-
socialist countries, Latin American countries, India and various other Asian and
African nations revised their planning frameworks and adopted a new market
friendly development discourse in this process. In other words, there seems to exist
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some general forces operating at the global level that shape the policy range for those
countries beside their “internal” dynamics.
In fact, the very concept of “external/internal” distinction has lost much of its
practical meaning in this process. These “external” forces shaping the policy range
for Turkey, for instance, depend not only on the “invisible hand” of the markets but
also on the “visible” institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, among others.
Moreover, I have stressed on some occasions that this was not a “necessary and
inexorable” fate, but a result, which has been brought about with the preferences of
the political agents within Turkey as well as global conditions. In that sense,
globalization has been treated in this thesis not as an “external” and outside
phenomenon that forces us to adopt one single course, but rather a process embedded
in local and national contexts, open to different reactions and alternatives.
Turkey has been largely integrated into world trade and capital movements during
the 1980s. That transformation also affected the planning process and discourse.
Instead of a comprehensive rational planning focused on optimum allocation of
resources, the planning efforts were put to the service of structural adjustment
policies along neo-liberal premises. Plan rationality has largely been substituted by
market rationality in that transition.
However, as has been argued in this thesis, these two rationalities have been mainly
derived from the same conception of universal instrumental rationality, being
prominent in the simple modernity context. Moreover, they were legitimated with
reference to the same objectives or goals in the field of public policy. At stake in
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both conventional planning and market rationality is the optimum allocation of
resources. They differ only in tools and methods chosen for that purpose. It has been
observed that the conventional planning approach stresses expert knowledge, while
neo-liberals or market advocates favor demand and supply forces in a deregulated
environment. Turkey has largely abandoned expertise and turned towards markets as
a mechanism to achieve economic prosperity during the 1980s. That was not just a
national decision. International environment and ‘intervention’ by the international
institutions played a significant part in that ‘choice’.
However, as has been stressed in this thesis, the change in the Turkish development
strategy cannot be solely based on international environment. Based upon the
analysis of the historical experience in the thesis, it is clear that the old development
strategy and conventional planning did not any more work in the case of Turkey1
towards the end of the 1970s. Furthermore, it has been argued that it was the
inadequacy of then current strategy that brought about the new approach based on
free markets ideology. Under these conditions, it would not be wise to go back and
use the traditional means to cure problems of the new approach.  However, I have not
argued for continuing with the present approach either, which succeeded in some
respects –particularly in increasing exports—but failed in many other domains –like
investments, income distribution, inflation, macroeconomic stability, vulnerability to
external shocks, etc.
                                           
1 There may be two reasons for this failure: either the failure of the tool itself or the failure in not
using it appropriately or misusing it –or else a combination of both. Whatever the reason, one thing is
clear that the conventional planning had reached its limits within the context of economic crisis
towards the end of 1970s.
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In this context, this thesis advocates that we don’t need to make an “either or” choice
between an ineffective planning and an imperfect market. I have introduced the idea
that there are various alternatives in between, which may also add a strong
democratic element into the development process besides instrumental rationality of
optimum resource allocation.
As has been elaborated on in the previous chapter, it is possible to devise
communicative planning mechanisms for Turkey at macro, regional, sectoral, agency
and project levels. A more effective ECOSOC at the macro level, functional AHCs at
sector or issue level, regional planning bodies at provincial and sub-regional levels,
strategic planning at agency level, and participatory techniques (e.g., OOPP) at
project level, are but some main mechanisms discussed in that framework. Each of
these mechanisms is supposed to bring the state, market and civil society
representatives together for creating an understanding through open and equal
discussion. Habermas’ communicative action theory guides the formation of such
mechanisms, without putting a strong emphasis on the Habermasian idea of reaching
consensus as the telos of communication.
Disorganized and disadvantaged sections of society that will be excluded from such
formal mechanisms are also considered in this attempt to suggest a new planning
paradigm. It has been argued that an informal community planning should be
activated in order to represent larger sections of society and counterbalance the
power of formal planning. Foucault’s idea of power/knowledge and ideas of radical
planning theorists have guided the suggestions developed in that regard.
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It should be noted, however, that these mechanisms do not exhaust the possibilities
of the new approach based on inter-subjectivity and involvement of multiple actors.
Democratic or communicative planning approach, by definition, entails a
participatory development of participatory mechanisms. In that sense, all
mechanisms suggested in this thesis are just provisional and open to revision through
dialogue with relevant parties.
Those alternatives in between state-led and market-led paradigms may be called as
democratic or communicative planning in a global environment. The issue here is not
to substitute one form of instrumental rationality with another, but open a space for
different forms of rationalities. That approach may be compared to deliberative or
dialogical democracy, which favors communication between free and equal
participants in a broader public sphere. The state is not withering away but changing
its present form and function in this response to globalization. What is emerging
from these processes is the “negotiation state” which would supervise the markets as
well as facilitate interactions among various groups within the society. In a similar
vein, communicative planning advocated in this thesis does not ignore or object to
the role of the state and expertise but argues against their dominance or monopoly.
The development of a regulatory and supervising state is indeed reflecting the spirit
of the 7th and 8th Plans of Turkey covering respectively 1996-2000 and 2001-2005
periods. Globalization and regional integration, particularly the Customs Union
Agreement between Turkey and the EU and prospects for a full membership, are at
the background of these Plans whose strategy documents clearly recognize their
importance for the future policies of Turkey. Publication of Ad Hoc Committee
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Reports on Globalization and Regional Integration during the preparation of these
Plans also supports these considerations. In this sense, communicative planning
approach, as proposed in this thesis, is also in line with broader trends in Turkey.
“Democratic planning” has been accepted as a normative principle in the Turkish
planning since 1960s. This principle has been operationalized to some extent through
AHCs within the planning process as described in relevant parts of the thesis. What
is required today is to fully operationalize this normative principle of Turkish
planning in various contexts and at various levels of planning, turning it into a central
organizing principle in real life situations. That process is not by nature a once and
for all enterprise but rather one that entails a perpetual effort in theoretical as well as
practical contexts. In other words, operationalization of democratic planning itself
needs to be a democratic enterprise, working through efforts of multiple actors in
diverse situations.
Apart from normative ideals embedded in Turkish experience, it has also been
argued that the evolving globalization processes force Turkey towards adaptation of
new planning practices. Although recent development plans recognize the
significance of globalization and the need for re-institutionalization in various
domains, there is not yet a clear path to be followed in order to create a democratic
reform process. In the context of Turkish planning, this is still an open alternative.
Although there are more favorable normative and material conditions for democratic
planning, there is no automatic and necessary trend for the evolution of planning in
that direction. In other words, there are no natural laws of historical development to
transform Turkey in democratic directions. We are rather confronted with a historical
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possibility, which entails human agency and effort. That agency should neither be
confined to the state nor to the civil society, but attributed to both.
Planning can actually be rescued from being a tool of the state elite and experts by
devising mechanisms to involve different groups and individuals within the larger
society. Society in that case would not just mean business elite but different groups
of civil society from labor unions, to academicians, environmental groups, and local
administrations, down to village communities. At the macro level the politicians,
state bureaucracy, business, labor and academia may collaborate better to devise
macro-level strategic plans, while on the regional, sectoral and project levels all
those who are effected from consequences of specific projects or programs may have
a voice. A real and extensive decentralization and incorporation of the NGOs and
civil society organizations within deliberation processes are critical elements for this
new planning framework.
In sum, I have argued that planning should be a humane planning that empower its
participants and stop forcing those disabled by market forces to accept their situation
as a fate.  In that framework, different rationalities, beside technical instrumental
one, would have a legitimate saying in the decision making process. Virtue needs to
be part of this process as much as impersonal technical rationality and private self-
interest. There is a room for experts as well as laymen in that conceptualization of
planning. However, this time experts would not be above others. In other words, they
have to accept a modest position of facilitating others to make their own minds and
provide them with necessary means and mechanisms for effective participation in the
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pursuit of collective actions. In that understanding, the loyalty of the planner should
not be fixed to a narrow state or business elite but enlarged towards the larger public.
As a general proposition it has been emphasized that simple mechanisms or tools are
not meaningful in themselves. They need to be part of a change in overall
understanding of planning. Thus, I have argued that there is a need for a different
discourse on planning with a strong democratic element internal to its application
rather than a solely technical discourse on planning. In this context, post-positivist
epistemology stressing inter-subjectivity and the value of local knowledge is a
critical theoretical condition for a new planning paradigm. However, such a
discourse cannot be separated from the larger issue of effective freedom of speech
and empowerment of citizen initiatives. On the contrary, this new epistemological
underpinnings of planning entail an enabling legal-institutional framework to be
operationalized.
For communicative planning to be effective it is necessary that the powerful groups
within the society and the state recognize its merits, particularly its effectiveness in
solving Turkey’s long-term development problems and periodically repeating
instabilities and crises. In this context, I have pointed out that participation by diverse
groups within the planning process would provide two major benefits. On the one
hand, it would increase the legitimacy of the plans and programs as well as specific
projects and policies in the eyes of the public. On the other hand, it would increase
efficiency of the planned actions by directing resources into areas that are most
demanded by the society.
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Of course, this process of institutionalizing communicative planning should not be
considered as a smooth one devoid of power politics and conflicting interests.
Conflict should be accepted as part of the process as much as possibility of a
consensus. The problem is to create an institutional environment and a broader
discourse that would enhance effective governance, reduce the domination of narrow
interests and increase accountability. That would contribute in the amelioration of the
“legitimacy” or “representation crisis” of the state and forge better linkages between
the state and society.
In different parts of this thesis I have also pointed out the fact that developing
countries are relatively more receptive or more constrained by the changes in the
world, and especially in the developed parts of the world. That fact can be observed
throughout the history of planning in Turkey from 1930s up to date. Power relations
and clash of interests occur not only at the national level but also at a global scale,
characterized by hierarchical relations among different countries and regions. For
these reasons, it is also considered as very important to observe changes in the
developed world and their repercussions on international institutions for a relatively
easy transformation towards communicative planning in developing countries.
In this context, the “World Development Reports” issued by the World Bank in
recent years signal a very positive re-orientation at the international level,
considering their strong emphasis on second-generation structural reforms and
governance issues. Participatory practices developed in the regional integration
process in the EU and in various technical assistance agencies of the individual
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developed countries are important in that regard as well, though one should also note
that this trend is more in discourse than in deed so far.
However, as I have emphasized in various contexts, such globalization efforts “from
above” need to be complemented by globalization “from below” (various forms of
resistance and alternative global movements) in order to cope with the growing
inequalities and erosion of autonomy on the part of poorer regions of the world.
“Glocalization” concept needs to be stressed at this junction. More democratic global
governance may facilitate more democratic forms of planning in various localities
and vice versa. In this sense, democratic forms of governance in global level would
support democratic planning practices in Turkey. In turn, progress in communicative
planning in Turkey and in some similar countries is expected to help overcome a
simple state/market dichotomy in the developing world.
This argument of glocalization is also in line with the general observation of this
thesis about the parallelism between broader modernity and Turkish modernity
throughout the 20th century. Planning in the 1930s or 1960s were not unique
experiences of Turkey but rather reflected the respective periods in their broad
characteristics.  Hence the need for a new alternative that would respect to the
historical experience and particularity of Turkey as well as broader trends of our
times.
In this search for a better alternative by going beyond state/market dichotomy, this
thesis has advocated the possibility of reforming and transforming planning in Tur-
key by introducing new participatory mechanisms incorporating communicative ra-
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tionality in the field of public policy formulation for collective action. A new organ-
izational perspective based upon interdisciplinary approach and teamwork as well as
governance structures emerge as desirable and feasible options in the new planning
environment characterized by complexity and multiple actors. It has been argued that
this new perspective saves us from being in a necessary position to make a simple
either-or choice between ineffective planning and imperfect market. The telos of this
initiative is democratization of the state and state-society relations, democratic plan-
ning being a significant interface of this broader agenda. In other words, democratic
planning mechanisms would contribute to broader democratization process, and at
the same time, be reinforced and consolidated with broader democratization—par-
ticularly in the fields of freedom of expression and organization.
In the last chapter of this thesis, it is observed that the conventional planning ap-
proach lost its theoretical attraction and practical effects as a result of globalization
processes and neo-liberal reform efforts in Turkey. However, particularly after the 7th
and 8th Plans, Turkey has also started to search for a different planning approach.
Though in its embryonic forms, this new approach should be built upon and devel-
oped into practical mechanisms. In that context, I have recommended some practical
participatory mechanisms in macro, sectoral, regional, program/project and agency
levels. Besides some other sources, the EU practices have guided much of the sub-
stance in these reform proposals –due to advanced practices in the EU as well as the
fact that Turkey is a candidate for full membership into the EU. In all these partici-
patory planning mechanisms there is a networking structure, which involves formal
institutions of the state as well as informal organizations of the civil society. The
SPO as the central planning agency does have a significant role to play in the effec-
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tive working of these networks as a locus for moderating among different views and
interests, and in transforming temporary agreements of various participants of such
mechanisms into practical actions. Power relations and private interest would not
disappear in this new planning environment but be forced to be more transparent and
share their influence on collective actions by deliberation mechanisms open to a
broader set of stakeholders.
It would be naive not to consider structural constraints in front of any reform agenda
that depends on the agency of social actors. “Globalization from above” as well as
local power relations may hinder such reform efforts or set limits to their reach.
However, in social life “structures” should not be taken as permanent and unbreak-
able elements, but rather as forces to be overcome in order to enjoy the real meaning
of freedom. Freedom, in this context, is not to do as we wish, but to search for im-
proving our environment in the future as conscious and responsible human beings,
working upon our history and resisting to our present conditions.
It should also be stressed that a new planning paradigm and practice based upon
communicative rationality is not only more humane but also favored with the new
mode of thinking and material conditions of “complex modernity.” That is, “struc-
tures” that we face today do impose constraints but also provide incentives for ac-
tion. That double-faced nature of structures like globalization and post-positivist
epistemologies increases the possibility of success in our efforts for reform. Besides
these “structural dynamics” that force Turkey to change, there are also conjectural
factors, like the recent deep economic crises in Turkey and Turkey’s candidacy into
the EU, that support reform ideas within the state structures as well as in society.
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